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A bstract
This thesis has three connected aims: to argue that, despite recent feminist 
criticisms, the ideal of autonomous self-constitution is essential to a feminist 
account of women's moral agency; to show that, within our philosophical and 
cultural heritage, we have no adequate ideal of what it is for women qua women 
to be autonomous agents; and to attempt to articulate an ideal of autonomy which 
can incorporate a recognition both of the embededness of moral agents and of 
their different bodily perspectives. My argument is that such a recognition does 
not entail a commitment to a sexually specific ethic. However it does entail that 
in articulating what it means for women to act as autonomous moral agents in 
circumstances which are sexually specific we must recognise the specificity of 
women's bodily perspectives.
The thesis comprises four parts and six chapters. In Part I (Chapter One), I sketch 
out an initial account of the ideal of autonomy, drawing on both contemporary 
philosophical analyses and feminist criticisms of the ideal. In Part II (Chapters 
Two and Three), through a discussion of the ideal of autonomous agency in the 
work of Simone de Beauvoir, I examine some of the reasons why autonomy has 
been seen as an achievement which it is difficult for women to attain: because 
autonomy has often been defined as control over the passive body by the active 
will; and because women's bodies have become a cultural metaphor for 
unconscious passivity. I argue however that, despite some of the difficulties with 
her work, de Beauvoir's idea that subjectivity is constituted in and through both 
our bodily perspectives and our relations with others, also points in the direction 
of a more adequate understanding of autonomy.
Part III (Chapters Four and Five) investigates some of the historical origins of the 
opposition between autonomy and femininity -  in the contrasts between public 
and private; reason and feeling; and reason and nature. Chapter Four consists 
mainly of a detailed examination of the different ideals of autonomy, but 
overlapping accounts of women's ethical life, in the works of Rousseau and
i v
Hegel. My argum ent here is that in their works the contrast between autonom y 
and w om en's ethical life arises out of an attem pt to resolve deep tensions within 
the Enlightenm ent conception of social life. Their attem pted resolutions 
how ever entail the political subordination of women and give rise to a 
representation of w om en's bodies as passive 'natural' bodies. C hapter Five is a 
reading of the writings of Mary W ollstonecraft in which I show that the main 
concerns of W ollstonecraft's life and writings were to try to articulate what it 
means for women to act as autonom ous moral agents, and to envisage the social 
and political changes necessary for them to do so. In contrast to some 
contem porary feminist com m entators, I argue that W ollstonecraft does not 
m erely preserve the oppositions between public and private, reason and feeling, 
and masculine and feminine ethical life but, especially in her later writings, 
realises that som ehow these oppositions m ust be integrated.
In the Introduction to Part IV I outline a conception of subjectivity as 
intersubjective and as constituted through the constitution of a bodily 
perspective. My claim is that this view of subjectivity opens up the space for a 
conception of autonom y that can recognise the different situations and bodily 
perspectives of different moral agents. C hapter Six provides an example of what 
such a recognition m ight entail, through the example of w om en's autonom ous 
agency in the context of pregnancy and abortion.
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Introduction
Within contemporary analytical moral philosophy the ideal of autonomy is 
being revitalised. As Gerald Dworkin notes, appeals to autonomy and 
questions of paternalism feature significantly in debates in the area of bio­
medical ethics, in discussions ranging from the issues of abortion and 
euthanasia through to medical consent and institutional commitment.1 
Moreover, the alleged failure of utilitarianism to take cognisance of the 
value of autonomy is seen by many, including some utilitarians, as a major 
flaw in the theory,2 while much non-utilitarian moral and political 
philosophy accords a central role to autonomy. At the same time however, 
among many feminists autonomy has a bad name as an excessively 
individualistic and masculine ideal. Rather than aspiring towards 
autonomy, it is suggested, feminists more appropriately should view it with 
suspicion.
In spite of this disfavour among feminists, my aim in this thesis is to argue 
that the ideal of autonomy is an important ideal for women because it must 
underpin women's claims to moral agency, both with respect to their bodies 
and with respect to the direction of their lives more generally. It would be 
foolish therefore for feminists to abandon the ideal as hopelessly 
masculinist. Nevertheless I also want to show that we have no adequate 
philosophical account of what it is for women, qua women, to be 
autonomous. By this I mean that our cultural and philosophical 
conceptions of autonomy either have defined it in terms of certain capacities 
and values which are associated explicitly or implicitly with masculinity, or 
else, in assuming a supposedly sexually indifferent or neutral autonomous
1. Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge U.P. 1988), Ch. 1
2. See for example Jonathon Glover's Causing Death and Saving Lives (Penguin, 1977) in 
which he argues that utilitarianism is inadequate on its own to deal with the moral issues 
raised by questions of harm and death.
subject, overlook the significance of bodily difference. As a result, 
autonomy has been seen as an ideal which is either incompatible with 
femininity or which it is difficult for women to achieve.
In the thesis I suggest that the main reason for this is that, in our cultural 
and philosophical 'imaginary' ,3 women's bodies have been represented in 
various ways as passive entities, beyond or resistant to control by the will. 
Women's bodily existence has therefore been seen as being lived more at the 
level of mere natural event than at the level of autonomous agency. Now it 
could be argued that to some extent this representation simply reflects the 
facts of women's biology -  in menstruation, pregnancy, menopause, women 
just are subject to bodily processes over which they have little control.
While not disputing the fact that aspects of both men's and women's bodily 
existence are not in our conscious control, I want to argue that this 
representation of women's bodies as passive, heteronomous bodies is more 
a construction of certain aspects of the modern philosophical tradition than 
it is a reflection of the 'facts' of women's biology.
Firstly, this representation derives a lot of its force from a conception of 
autonomy which positions the will in opposition to the body, and reason in 
opposition to desire and sentiment. These oppositions of course have a 
long philosophical history dating back to classical thinkers and to 
Augustine, and re-emphasised in the modern era with Descartes, but their 
association with the ideal of autonomy is a legacy of Kant. While many 
contemporary philosophers of autonomy have explicitly distanced
2
3. I am borrowing this term from Michele Le Doeuff who uses it to refer to those images, 
rhetorical devices, oppositions, and so on, upon which a philosophical system depends in 
order to constitute itself as a coherent system, but whose constitutive function cannot be 
registered within the system itself. See her essays in L'lmaginaire Philosophique (Paris, 
Payot, 1980). This collection includes some works translated into English. English 
translations include: 'Operative Philosophy: Simone de Beauvoir and existentialism', 
translated by Colin Gordon, I&C, no. 6, Autumn 1979, pp. 47-57; 'Women and Philosophy', 
translated by Debbie Pope, Radical Philosophy 17, 1977, pp. 2-11; 'Pierre Roussel's 
Chiasmas', translated by Colin Gordon, I&C, no. 9, Winter 1981/82. pp. 39-70.
3themselves from this aspect of the Kantian view, it still retains a powerful 
hold on our contemporary philosophical imagination in a way that is 
particularly problematic for women.
Secondly, this image of women's bodies must be placed in the broader 
context of the political philosophies of the Enlightenment, from which our 
modern picture of the ethical significance of sexual difference has emerged. 
In the modern era, the ideal of autonomy arose within the political and 
philosophical discourse of the Enlightenment as an ideal associated with 
public life. In this context it was defined in association with certain virtues 
which were characterised as masculine -  reason, moral independence, 
ethical universality. The idea that women have a distinctive ethical life in 
the family based on feeling, moral dependence and ethical particularity was 
also a product of the Enlightenment. Autonomy and femininity thus came 
to occupy mutually exclusive theoretical spaces. The alleged explanation for 
this gendering of social life -  and for women's exclusion from the body 
politic -  was that women's ethical life is grounded in the exigencies of 
nature, in particular in women's reproductive role which renders them 
more susceptible to the less rational aspects of human nature, especially the 
passions. I want to suggest however that the distinction between a 
masculine public sphere and a feminine private sphere arose more in 
response to profound tensions within the Enlightenment conception of 
social life than in response to the exigencies of nature. The image of 
woman's passive, natural and heteronomous body was produced within 
this context as a way of supporting this distinction and displacing these 
tensions.
The challenge in arguing that autonomy must underpin women's claims to 
moral agency therefore lies in articulating an ideal of autonomy that is free 
from these associations with the notion of a disembodied rational will and 
the ideal of masculine ethical and political life. In the thesis I argue that
4such an ideal must start from a double recognition: firstly, from the 
recognition that subjectivity is constituted in relation to specific bodily 
perspectives; and secondly from a recognition that autonomy is an 
intersubjective achievement. My claim is that such a recognition does not 
entail the need to articulate a sexually specific ideal of autonomy or a 
sexually specific ethic. However it does mean that our ideal of autonomy 
must be sensitive to the specificity of bodily perspectives, especially in 
articulating what it means for women to exercise autonomy and bodily 
autonomy in certain circumstances which are sexually specific -  for example 
in pregnancy and abortion. In the final chapter of the thesis I provide an 
example of what such an embodied account of autonomy might look like, 
and what might be its moral impact, through a phenomenological analysis 
of pregnancy in the context of a defense of abortion. While it must be 
acknowledged that in doing so I have focused on only one among a myriad 
of possible bodily experiences that might form the basis for such an account, 
it seems to me that this experience focuses very clearly on the issues of 
agency and control raised by the idea of autonomy.
There are a few points that need to be made at the outset about the scope of 
this thesis, the methods employed in it and the metaphilosophical 
perspectives which inform it. On the question of scope there are a number 
of issues central to discussions of autonomy within the analytical literature 
with which I will not be concerned here. The most glaring omission from 
this point of view is the whole vexed topic of 'paternalism', that is the 
question of when, if at all, it is legitimate to interfere with the autonomous 
decisions of others, either when 'we' consider it is in their best interests for 
them not to act in accordance with their decisions or when these decisions 
are allegedly immoral or potentially harmful to others. The main reason 
for this omission is that I see the debates about paternalism as bound up 
with conflicting views about justice and about the nature and role of the
5state. Although such questions are ultimately relevant to my concerns, the 
main focus of my attention here is with questions concerning the issue of 
women and moral agency -  why it is that women have been represented as 
incapable of autonomous agency, why it is important for feminism to hold 
onto the ideal of autonomous agency, how to develop an ideal that 
embodies a recognition of sexual difference.
Another glaring omission, this time from the perspective of readers versed 
in recent French philosophy and psychoanalysis, is my failure to discuss the 
plausibility of the ideal of autonomous agency. From this perspective it 
could be argued that recent theoretical developments in the theory of the 
unconscious, as well as recent analyses of the notion of the 'subject', put into 
question the very idea of self-conscious and self-directed agency. In this case 
there are two reasons for my omission. Firstly, one of my main interests in 
trying to develop an account of embodied autonomy is to develop an 
adequate feminist analysis of, and response to, the moral issues raised by the 
new reproductive technologies. While I have found recent work by French 
feminists on the questions of subjectivity, the unconscious and the body 
helpful in formulating my views, I am frustrated by the ever-increasing 
abstruseness of the theoretical discourses generated by this work, and by its 
failure to address the moral issues raised by bodily difference and by 
technological changes in the sphere of reproduction. I suspect that one of 
the reasons for this is that, in giving up on the notion of self-conscious 
agency, one also undercuts the possibility of being able to address these 
moral issues. But secondly, to develop this suspicion into a coherent 
argument is an enormous project in itself, one that, had I pursued it, would 
have distracted me from my main concerns here.
On the question of method, my discussion is informed by readings of both 
recent French philosophy and recent ethical work in the so-called 'analytical' 
tradition of English-speaking philosophy. This is reflected in my approach
6to the topic, which tries to integrate, perhaps at times uneasily, the kinds of 
questions, methods of argument, and analysis characteristic of 'analytical 
philosophy', with the techniques of textual interpretation and interrogation 
and the kinds of metaphilosophical questioning characteristic of recent 
French philosophy. It is usually fairly clear which of these diverse sources 
informs any particular discussion. Since I do not discuss their work in any 
detail in the body of the thesis however it needs to be made clear here that 
my analysis of what I have called our philosophical and cultural 'imaginary' 
with respect to women's bodies is informed by methods of textual analysis 
developed especially in the writings of Jacques Derrida and Michele Le 
Doeuff.4 In my readings of various historical and contemporary texts I try to 
combine an attention to philosophical arguments with an analysis of the 
way in which certain images, textual metaphors and hierarchical 
oppositions can disclose the hidden presumptions and assumptions of a 
text. The philosophical justification for this method is that 'a text is not a 
text unless it hides itself from the first comer', including its author. No 
matter how much we may struggle to assert authorial control, texts operate 
on the basis of assumptions -  historical, cultural, political, social -  of which 
their authors may be aware only at an inchoate level, if at all. These 
assumptions are often manifest in the text in certain rhetorical devices, or in 
images and metaphors. Although they may function as merely ornamental 
devices extraneous to the philosophical claims of a text, such metaphors and 
images do not always do so. What I try to show, with respect to the various 
metaphors or representations of women's bodies on which I focus in my 
readings of different texts, is that these cannot be seen as extraneous to the
4. Of Derrida's voluminous writings I have been most influenced by the following: 'White 
Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy' in Margins of Philosophy, translated by 
Alan Bass, (Harvester 1982); Of Grammatologv. translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
(Johns Hopkins U.P. 1976); and 'Plato's Pharmacy' in Dissemination, translated by Barbara 
Johnson (University of Chicago Press, 1981).
7main purport of the texts in which they occur. Rather they reveal what a 
philosophical view must presuppose, or hide, in order to be coherent. My 
claim is that what tends to be presupposed, or hidden, by such images is 
some variant of a dominant cultural and philosophical representation of 
women's bodies as passive, heteronomous bodies bound to nature.
On the question of metaphilosophical perspectives it should be clear from 
the preceding discussion that I regard the history of philosophy as entirely 
relevant to present-day philosophical concerns, because these concerns and 
our ways of addressing them have partly been shaped by the philosophical 
tradition. But this statement needs some clarification. It seems fairly self- 
evident that philosophical views arise in response to, and are a product of, 
specific political, social and cultural contexts. But there are a number of 
views about the implications of this claim. On the one hand, historians of 
ideas argue that for this reason philosophical texts cannot properly be 
understood unless we have a thorough understanding of this context. It is 
sometimes also thought to follow from this that philosophical problems 
and concerns are so tied to this context that the idea of a history of 
philosophy, that is a history of the development of philosophical problems 
and concerns, is deluded.5 As John Passmore and others have pointed out, 
this view is partly a response to the perception of some philosophers that 
philosophical problems can be discussed completely independently of the 
cultural context out of which they arose.6 It is also a response to the idea
5 According to Passmore, Collingwood first proposed this view. See John Passmore, 'The Idea 
of a History of Philosophy', in History and Theory, vol.4, 1964-65, Beiheft 5, The 
Historiography of the History of Philosophy. Slightly less drastic versions have also been 
proposed by John Dunn and Quentin Skinner. John Dunn, The Identity of the history of ideas', 
Philosophy, vol. XLIII, April 1968, pp. 85-104. Quentin Skinner, ’Meaning and Understanding 
in the History of Ideas' in History and Theory, vol 8, 1969, pp. 3-53.
6 See Jonathon Ree, 'Philosophy and the History of Philosophy' in Ree, J, Ayers, M & 
Westoby, A (eds) Philosophy and its Past (Harvester Press Ltd. Sussex, 1978). See also the
8that previous philosophers were not completely clear about either the 
nature of their problems or their solutions to them, and that the task of 
contemporary philosophers reading these texts is to engage in a process of 
'rational reconstruction'. On the other hand, some contemporary 
philosophers respond to the inescapable historicity of past philosophical 
texts by claiming that they are completely irrelevant to present social and 
philosophical concerns. I would endorse neither of these views. On the 
first view any feminist reading of a historical text is bound to be illicit 
because it imports foreign concerns into the text. On the second view 
feminists are simply wasting their time discussing texts which no longer 
have any relevance. While not denying that our social life is vastly 
different from that of the thinkers of the Enlightenment period, nor that 
philosophy itself has developed in all kinds of new directions, I would want 
to argue that philosophy has a double role as both representing and 
providing a critique of broader cultural values and assumptions. To the 
extent that our social life has been profoundly shaped by the values of the 
Enlightenment era, the philosophies of the Enlightenment have also 
shaped our present conceptual and social possibilities. My reading of past 
philosophical texts is thus what Le Doeuff calls an 'interested' reading, a 
reading which is focused by present concerns while not claiming to reduce 
past texts to present concerns.
papers by Rorty, MacIntyre and others in R. Rorty, J.B. Schneewind, & Q. Skinner (eds.) 
Philosophy in History (Cambridge U.P. 1984)
p a r t i
WOMEN AND MORAL AGENCY
Chapter One
FEMINISM AND THE IDEAL OF AUTONOMY
In her article 'On Psychological Oppression' Sandra Bartky makes the 
interesting claim that psychological oppression has so severe an effect on 
the psyches of the oppressed, in this case women, that it should be 
characterised as a kind of psychic alienation or self-estrangement.1 This 
alienation or estrangement has two aspects. Firstly it involves a kind of 
fragmentation, 'the splitting of the whole person into parts of a person', 
leading to internal conflict and self-division. Fragmentation is the result of 
processes of internalisation whereby women come to have perceptions of 
themselves, or experience desires, or engage in behaviours, with which at 
some level they do not identify. Secondly it involves mystification, a 
process whereby the real causes of her situation are obscured to the 
oppressed person herself, leading her to see her internal conflicts as the 
result of peculiar failings or incapacities on her part, rather than as the result 
of oppression. The effects of this fragmentation and mystification are 
seriously to undermine the autonomy of women.
Bartky argues that while psychological oppression functions partly through 
mechanisms such as economic exploitation, political disenfranchisement 
and physical coercion, it also functions through unique modes of psychic 
alienation which she identifies as stereotyping, cultural domination and 
sexual objectification. Bartky does not offer an analysis of what she means 
by autonomy or self-estrangement but her account of the way in which the 
three modes of psychic alienation function suggests that in the experience of
1. Sandra Lee Bartky, 'On Psychological Oppression' in S. Bishop and M. Weinzweig (eds.) 
Philosophy and Women, (Wadsworth, 1979).
oppression a woman's sense of herself as a unified self-directed agent is 
undermined and as a result so is her autonomy.
In the first section of this chapter I want to draw on some of the 
contemporary philosophical literature on autonomy in order to try to 
develop Bartky's intuition that there is a link between autonomy and a 
sense of oneself as a unified self-directed agent. I will attempt to show that 
this captures something important about our experiences of what it is to be a 
person and what it is to have one's personhood undermined. In the second 
section of the chapter I want to explain and clarify the motivations of some 
of the recent feminist objections to the ideal of autonomy. Although I will 
not simply endorse these objections, I will suggest that they do point 
towards difficulties, for an adequate understanding of women's moral 
agency, in any straightforward assimilation of the idea of autonomy as self- 
directed, unified agency. However I will also suggest that it is a mistake for 
feminists simply to jettison this idea.
Section 1: Autonomy and Agency
In broad philosophical usage, the term autonomy remains close to its literal 
meaning -  as derived from the Greek words autos (self) and nomos (law) -  
of giving the law to oneself or being self-governing. Implicitly or explicitly 
it is also contrasted in this usage with 'heteronomy' -  from heteros (other) 
and nomos (law) -  or receiving the law from others, being governed by 
others. As has been noted by others, the ideal of autonomy was originally, 
and continues to be, a political ideal referring to the right of sovereign states 
to political self-determination.2 In its modern philosophical usage it refers
10
2. See Dworkin, op. cit. See also Robert Young, Personal Autonomy: Beyond Negative and 
Positive Liberty, (Croom Helm, 1986). I have found Young's account of autonomy the most 
illuminating of the book-length treatments of the topic and my discussion at some points in 
the first part of this chapter is indebted to a number of distinctions developed in this book.
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by analogy to persons and it is with this ideal of autonomy as a characteristic 
of persons that I will be concerned.
The apparent simplicity of the concept of personal autonomy conveyed by 
this broad usage is misleading however, because questions concerning the 
scope and interpretation of the notions of self-government, or self- 
determination, and government by others, raise complex philosophical 
issues about which there is room for a great deal of disagreement. As 
Dworkin makes clear these issues have at least three overlapping 
dimensions -  political, social and moral. At the political level, at least in 
pluralist democracies, the ideal of personal autonomy is inevitably bound 
up with questions about the appropriate relationships between the state or 
the government, the diverse cultural, religious, racial and other groups 
within a society, and the individual members of that society. Clearly the 
notion of personal self-determination presupposes some commitment to 
the idea that individuals or groups within a society have some liberty to 
pursue their own conception of the good. But how far should this liberty 
extend? What is the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate state 
interference with this liberty? And what should be the role of the state in 
dealing with conflicts between individuals and the social groups to which 
they belong? It is in this political context that the question of paternalism 
versus autonomy arises. As I stated in the Introduction, although my 
discussion will touch on such questions they will not be its main focus.
The fact that human persons are necessarily social beings whose lives are 
shaped and lived within a particular social and cultural context raises 
questions at the social level about the extent, even the very possibility of 
personal autonomy. On the one hand there are questions concerning 
socialisation. To what extent does the ideal of autonomy presuppose that 
we can or should free ourselves from the influences and forces -  familial, 
educational, cultural -  which have shaped us? To what extent does it
12
disavow what it presupposes -  socialisation, parental care, dependencies? 
What is the difference between the kinds of socialisation which make 
autonomy possible and those which subvert it? Do individuals have any 
political rights to, or at least defensible expectations of, the kinds of social 
conditions which are conducive to personal autonomy? On the other hand 
there are questions concerning the relationship between autonomy and 
other social values such as commitment, obligation, loyalty, solidarity, 
obedience. What moral weight should be given to autonomy versus these 
values? How much does autonomy presuppose and how much does it 
conflict with them? And, connected with the political issues mentioned 
above, are political structures which promote and place high value on 
personal autonomy morally preferable to those which place more 
importance on one or some of these other values? The pertinence of some 
of these questions to the issue of women's moral agency will become clear 
later in this chapter.
There are two different kinds of question raised by the ideal of personal 
autonomy as a moral ideal, both of which will be relevant to my discussion. 
Since Kant writers on autonomy have often run these questions together, as 
does de Beauvoir, but it is useful to distinguish them from one another.
One kind concerns the nature of moral agency. As I will be arguing, it seems 
that the very idea of persons as responsible moral agents presupposes that 
people have some degree of autonomy over their choices and actions. But 
what does this view presuppose about the extent of our control over, and 
self-awareness of, our own desires, motivations and character? And how 
much control do we have to have over the outcomes or contexts of our 
actions in order to be considered responsible? The second kind of question 
concerns the nature of morality and moral decision making. Does self- 
determination mean that it is up to each individual to invent her own 
moral code? Does it mean that ultimately it is individuals who alone are
13
responsible for the moral choices that they make? What is the role of moral 
authority or advice in moral decision making?
As I will show in the second section of this chapter, what underlies the 
various feminist objections to autonomy are objections to the ways in which 
some of these questions are answered, whether explicitly or not, by 
particular accounts of autonomy. But more importantly what is also at issue 
in debates about autonomy, both in the feminist objections and in the 
differences between various interpretations of the notion of self- 
government, are different views about the self and about the character of 
our moral, social and political relations with others.
In order to bring out the sense of autonomy implicit in Bartky's intuition I 
want to begin by distinguishing very roughly between two ways in which 
the notions of autonomy, or self-determination, and heteronomy, or 
government by others, have been understood. I will call these the 'thin' and 
'thick' senses of the terms. In its first minimal or 'thin' sense, autonomy is 
understood simply as freedom from the interference of others. Autonomy 
is thus equated with what Berlin calls negative liberty.3 Heteronomy by 
contrast arises when an individual's choices are illegitimately restricted or 
constrained by the interference of others. Understood in this 'thin' or 
minimal sense the ideal of autonomy is closely aligned with the liberal 
political tradition, in particular with its more libertarian tendencies, and has 
been the target of much justified feminist criticism.4
3. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty' in his Four Essays on Liberty, (Oxford U.P. 1969).
4. I have in mind here liberal thinkers more in the tradition of Hobbes than in the tradition 
of Mill. In contemporary political philosophy the names associated with this view of 
autonomy are those of Robert Nozick and David Gauthier. I discuss some of these feminist 
objections later in this chapter.
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In the second 'thick' sense, self-governance is understood more positively as 
both a precondition for personhood and as a character ideal. The idea here 
is that the chief characteristic of persons is that they have the capactiy to be 
originators of their own life-plans. The exercise of this capacity is what 
constitutes autonomy, which is the process of shaping for oneself, through 
one's own choices and activities, an identity and a conception of the kind of 
person one wants to be. Heteronomy by contrast is characterised as a lack of 
control over the shape and direction of one's life. It is clear that autonomy 
in the 'thick' sense presupposes to some extent the 'thin' notion of 
autonomy, for it is difficult to see in most cases how a person could shape 
their identity without some degree of liberty. Some sort of notion of non­
interference must therefore be presupposed in any critique of oppression. 
However the notion of non-interference is incapable of explaining how the 
kind of self-estrangement which seems to characterise the experience of 
oppression can undermine autonomy. The notion of self-estrangement 
thus seems to invoke the idea of autonomy as a character ideal, and it is 
with an analysis of this concept that I want to begin.
In his article 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person' Harry 
Frankfurt develops a notion of identification which goes some way towards 
capturing the notion of unified agency that is implicit in the idea of shaping 
for oneself an identity.5 Frankfurt sees identification as the chief 
characteristic of 'freedom of the will', which he defines in contrast to 
'freedom of action'. Free action is the ability to do what one wants or to get 
what one wants, that is to be able to translate one's desires into actions, or to
5. Harry Frankfurt; 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person', journal of Philosophy, 
LXVIII, no. 1 (January, 1971). Frankfurt does not claim to be providing an analysis of 
autonomy but the account of agency that he proposes provides the basis for such an analysis. 
My claims below about the ways in which Frankfurt's notion of identification falls short of a 
complete account of autonomy should be read as claims about what is needed to supplement 
the notion of identification, rather than as a criticism to the effect that Frankfurt did not 
achieve what he never set out to do.
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act according to one's intentions. Freedom of action, in other words, 
requires that we have at our disposal certain resources and capacities and 
that we are not constrained in acting on our desires or intentions. Given 
these conditions, both humans and non-human animals are capable of free 
action even if in many circumstances they are not able to act freely.
Freedom of the will however is a capacity that, according to Frankfurt, is 
both peculiar to persons and essential to our conception of what it is to be a 
person.
Frankfurt's account of the will involves a distinction between first-order 
desires, second-order desires and second-order volitions. First-order desires 
are desires relating to action, desires to do or not to do something -  wanting 
to have a bath, wanting to eat something, wanting to go for a walk. Our 
first-order desires are often conscious wants, but they do not need to be. 
First-order desires may also include desires of which we are not conscious or 
desires which we think we do not have -  we can be self-deceived about our 
first-order desires. Freedom of action involves being free to translate these 
first-order desires into action.
Frankfurt's suggestion about the will is that a person's will is identical with 
the first-order desire that moves her to action. In other words, although we 
have many first-order desires, we do not translate them all into actions. Our 
will, on any particular occasion, coincides with the first-order desire which 
is effective in moving us to action. There are a couple of points to note 
about this conception of the will. Firstly there is an important difference 
between a person's intentions and their will. Quite often we intend to do 
something which we don't end up doing. Thus our intention to realize a 
desire often does not coincide with the desire that we actually act upon. 
Secondly the desire which ends up being our will does not have to be a 
desire of which we were conscious beforehand. Sometimes we only find out
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what our will is, what it is that we want, when we find ourselves 
performing some action.
Frankfurt argues that in addition to our first-order desires we also have 
second-order desires and second-order volitions. A second-order desire 
involves wanting or not wanting to have a first-order desire. A second- 
order volition involves wanting or not wanting one of our first-order 
desires to be our will, that is, wanting or not wanting one our first-order 
desires to be the one that moves us to action. For example, a frustrated 
parent may have a strong first-order desire to lose her temper and shout at 
her child. She also has a second-order desire not to have this desire. Fler 
second-order volition is that the desire to remain calm and be tolerant is the 
desire that prevails and moves her to act. Flowever our second-order 
volitions do not always coincide with our will. Sometimes the first-order 
desires that we act upon are the desires that we wish we will not act upon.
In Frankfurt's view it is this capacity to have second-order volitions that 
specifically characterises personhood. This is because to have a second-order 
volition is essentially to engage in a reflective act. It is only persons, he 
wants to say, that are capable of such acts of reflection, and it is only persons 
that care which of their first-order desires move them to action. Beings that 
do not have the capacity for having second-order volitions, that is, beings 
who either cannot reflect upon their first-order desires or do not care which 
of their first-order desires will move them to act, cannot be persons. 
According to Frankfurt they are wantons. He includes under this category 
infants and non-human animals, because the capacity for self-reflection 
involves a certain degree of rationality, although Frankfurt is not 
committed to arguing that self-reflection is a highly intellectual or self-
conscious act. 6 Often for example we become aware of our volitions 
through feelings and emotions.
Only persons then have second-order volitions, that is, desires that one of 
their first-order desires will be their will. For this reason only persons have 
freedom of the will. But what exactly is freedom of the will? Firstly, a 
person who has freedom of the will is able not only to evaluate her first- 
order desires and decide which of them she wishes to act upon, that is, 
which of them she wishes to be her will. She is also able to translate her 
second-order volitions into actions. Thus she is able to exercise control over 
her will. Secondly, whereas lack of freedom of the will involves some kind 
of discrepancy between a person's will and her second-order volitions, 
freedom of the will is characterised by an accord between a person's second- 
order volitions and her will. The person who enjoys freedom of the will is 
thus able to act in accordance with the first-order desires with which she 
identifies, with the desires which she sees as expressive of what she most 
wants, or how she most wants to be.
On Frankfurt's account then the notion of identification with one's desires, 
that is, regarding one's desires as one's own, is central to the idea of freedom 
of the will. I want to take Frankfurt's notion of identification as the starting 
point for an account of autonomous agency, but I want to expand the 
account to include the beliefs, values and motives which inform our 
desires. This expanded notion of identification also seems to be important 
in trying to provide an explanation of how oppression can undermine a 
person's sense of herself as an autonomous agent. For if autonomy is the
17
6. In 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person' Frankfurt considers the possibility 
that some adults may also be wantons, but in his later article 'Identification and 
Wholeheartedness' he rejects this idea. Harry Frankfurt; 'Identification and 
Wholeheartedness' in Schoeman, F.D. (ed.) Responsibility, Character and the Emotions: 
New Essays in Moral Psychology, (Cambridge U.P. 1987).
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capacity to shape and direct our lives according to our conception of what 
kind of person we want to be and how we want to live, then a person who is 
unable to act in accordance with her volitions, a person who at some level is 
estranged from, and cannot identify with, what she does, believes or desires, 
cannot be autonomous. But the notions of identification with, or 
estrangement from, one's desires need some further amplification. For 
what exactly is involved in identification? Young provides a useful 
clarification of this notion.7 He characterises the process of reflection 
involved in having second-order desires or valuations as primarily an 
activity of the imagination by means of which a person imagines herself 
acting upon a certain first-order desire, or being the kind of person who has 
a certain belief, value or desire. Identification involves endorsing what is 
imagined, regarding it as consistent with one's sense of oneself.
Estrangement from a belief, value or desire, by contrast, involves regarding 
it as in some sense alien to oneself.
However the notion of identification developed so far cannot yet provide 
the basis for an adequate account of autonomy as unified and self-directed 
agency. Firstly it leaves open the possibility that a person's second-order 
volitions may be locally consistent but globally inconsistent -  as in cases of 
anomie. In such cases, although on any given occasion a person may 
identify with her desires, she does not seem to be deciding and acting 
autonomously because her life as a whole does not seem to be self-directed. 
Young's distinction between occurrent and dispositional autonomy captures 
this intuition. Young argues that a person may exhibit occurrent autonomy, 
autonomy with respect to certain decisions or actions, without exercising 
dispositional autonomy, that is autonomy with respect to her life as a 
whole. A person who exercises dispositional autonomy might thus be
7. Young, op. cit. Chapter 4.
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described as a person whose second-order volitions exhibit certain overall or 
global patterns of consistency, patterns commensurate with, or expressive of, 
or constitutive of, their conception of how they want to be. Bartky's claim 
about oppression seems to be that it can rob women not only of occurrent 
autonomy, but also of dispositional autonomy, because while it can cause a 
woman to act upon particular desires with which she may not identify, it 
can also prevent a woman from determining the direction of her life as a 
whole.
There is a second and further problem with the notion of 'identification' 
however, even if it is understood in this dispositional sense. For it seems to 
appeal to the idea that we each have a 'true self' which our wills either 
express or fail to express. But this idea raises two questions -  an 
epistemological and a metaphysical one. The epistemological question is 
'How do we know what our true self is?' In some cases it may be fairly clear 
to a person which desires or aspects of herself she wants to identify with, 
even if she may be unable to act on these volitions, for example if she is 
suffering under a compulsion of some kind. But it is also a fairly common 
experience to be unable to form a second-order volition concerning certain 
first-order desires because we are unsure with which of our desires we want 
to identify. This raises the problem of ever-ascending orders of desire.8 The 
metaphysical question is 'How should the notion of the true self be 
understood?'
In his article 'Identification and Wholeheartedness' Frankfurt addresses the 
epistemological question by suggesting that in cases of such conflict
8. This is the most common objection in the literature to Frankfurt's account of 'freedom of the 
will'. Gary Watson for example endorses Frankfurt's notions of identification and 
commitment but rejects all talk of different levels of desire. See his article 'Free Agency', 
Tournal of Philosophy, LXXII, no. 8, (April 1975). Similar criticisms are also raised by Susan 
Wolf in her article 'Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility' in Schoeman (ed.) 
Responsibility, Character and the Emotions op. cit.
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ultimately there are three possibilities. One is that we never resolve the 
conflict; we find ourselves forever unable to identify with one or the other 
desire. In such cases, he suggests, the autonomy of the person is seriously 
impaired in this aspect of her life, if not in others. Another possibility is 
that we resolve the conflict by losing interest in it or, like the wanton, by 
becoming indifferent to its outcome, for example by seeing the matter as out 
of our control, letting events simply take their course and so on. In such a 
case the conflict will be resolved but arbitrarily and non-autonomously. The 
third possibility is that we make a 'decisive commitment' to identify 
ourselves with one or the other desire. This commitment involves making 
the desire our own, deciding that this is the desire which we want to be our 
will. This decision, which might be reached in a number of different ways, 
does not of course immediately lessen the conflict. But the decision changes 
the nature of the conflict so that it now becomes a conflict between what we 
most want and other desires with which, however strong, we no longer 
want to identify. The salient characteristics of such a decision are that it 
involves separating out those desires with which we identify from those 
from which we wish to distance ourselves, and ordering our desires in some 
kind of hierarchy. Frankfurt's suggestion is that it is through such decisions 
and commitments that we constitute ourselves as selves, that we work out 
what we care about and what we value. This response also answers the 
metaphysical question. Talk about a person's 'true self' should not be 
understood as referring to some inaccessible and intangible metaphysical 
entity. Rather it designates what might be called the process of self­
constitution, a process of defining for ourselves those values, ideals or 
projects that we regard as constitutive of the kind of person we want to be or 
of the kind of life we want to live. This is not to say that in making such 
decisions we cannot make mistakes about what we want. But making 
mistakes about what we want to do or what we want to be is an unavoidable 
aspect of exercising freedom of the will.
21
I think Frankfurt's notion of self-constitution captures an important aspect 
of what is involved in autonomous agency. But the idea of autonomy as 
unified self-determination seems to involve more than self-constitution as 
Frankfurt characterises it. Firstly, it seems to involve some sort of capacity 
for critical evaluation of the self which a person constitutes through her 
various decisions and commitments. Secondly, it requires that a person has 
open to her a certain range of options.
On the question of critical evaluation Frankfurt assumes that, in cases 
where a person seems to be exercising freedom of the will, that is in cases 
where a person is not suffering under some kind of compulsion, is not 
weak-willed or addicted and so on, her second-order volitions and decisions 
are expressive of her true self. But it is not difficult to imagine cases where 
it is someone's first-order desires, rather than her second-order volitions, 
which seem to express most of all what she wants, however aberrant these 
desires might seem to her and however much she may want to identify 
with her second-order volitions. Now in cases where a person does not 
straightforwardly reject these first-order desires Frankfurt might respond to 
this by saying that there is a sense in which, because such a person is not 
wholehearted about her attempted identifications, she is internally divided 
against herself and so her second-order volitions involve a certain kind of 
self-deception or self-denial. But what about a case where someone does 
genuinely and wholeheartedly identify with her second-order volitions and 
yet does not seem to be leading a fully autonomous life because her second- 
order volitions are themselves just a product of that person's socialisation? 
In other words a person may be happy and may exhibit psychic unity but not 
be autonomous because, as Young puts it, her desires, values, decisions are 
not her own.
In response to this problem Taylor argues that self-constitution or 
'responsibility for self' must involve a process of 'radical self-evaluation',
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which he characterises as a kind of moral evaluation.9 In contrast to the 
kind of prudential reflection that goes on when we simply weigh competing 
but morally neutral alternatives (for example, when I ask myself whether I 
should I take my holidays in Queensland or Tasmania), radical self- 
evaluation involves a thoroughgoing and critical evaluation of our desires, 
beliefs and motives, of the sort that is involved when we ask ourselves for 
example whether our desires are noble, courageous, honest and generous, or 
whether they are base, cowardly, dishonest and mean. The example Taylor 
discusses in this context is Sartre's example of the young man who cannot 
decide whether to stay with his mother or join the resistance.10 An 
important aspect of the kind of critical self-evaluation that Taylor talks 
about involves trying to work out why we have the motives, desires and 
beliefs that we do. That is, it involves working out whether they arise 
simply as a result of our socialisation, or because we have a strong 
independent commitment to them.
Now it may sound as though socialisation and independent commitment 
are in some sense mutually exclusive. But this need not be the case. It may 
be that, although many of our desires, beliefs and motives are in some way 
determined by our socialisation, we nevertheless come to identify with
9. Charles Taylor 'Responsibility for Self' in Amelie Rorty (ed.) The Identities of Persons 
(University of California Press, 1976).
10. Taylor's claim is that Sartre's discussion of the young man example is ultimately 
incoherent because his notion of radical choice conflates simple weighing with radical self- 
evaluation. On the one hand Sartre wants to say that moral decisions are ultimately 
contingent, that we just have to plumb for one course of action or the other, like the simple 
weigher. On the other hand the decision can only have the force that Sartre wants it to have 
because it clearly involves more than simple weighing, that is because there are compelling 
but irreconcilable moral considerations going each way. While I think that Taylor might be 
right about Sartre's notion of radical choice, I will argue in the next chapter that de 
Beauvoir's notion of autonomy is in fact very like the notion of self-constitution or 
responsibility for self.
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them as a result of processes of critical assessment.11 We thus make them 
our own or take responsibility for them. The ideal of autonomy or self­
constitution therefore does not presuppose that we have to create ourselves, 
our desires, beliefs, motives and so on ex nihilo. This would indeed be a 
ridiculous presupposition, although the idea of responsibility for self is 
commonly misunderstood to imply just this. Nevertheless a commitment 
to the ideal of autonomy does presuppose that persons have the capacity to 
engage in some kind of independent assessment of their beliefs, values and 
desires, and that such critical assessment is essential for autonomy.
On the question of options, it is obvious that freedom of action, understood 
as freedom from coercion or restraint, is important for autonomy. For in 
cases where a person is physically coerced or restricted it is clear that their 
autonomy will be severely impaired. Frankfurt of course would not deny 
this. There is however another sense of freedom of action which also seems 
to me to be crucial for autonomy but which is underplayed in Frankfurt's 
discussion of freedom of the will. This sense of freedom of action has to do 
with a person's options and the problem with Frankfurt's view is this. On 
Frankfurt's account of freedom of the will it would seem possible for a 
person to have freedom of the will simply because they have very few 
desires and because they only desire to have the desires which it is possible 
for them to realize. In other words, on Frankfurt's view a person with 
extremely narrow horizons and expectations might still be considered to 
exercise freedom of the will. Now in some cases a person may deliberately 
narrow their expectations as a way of coping with a terrible situation. In 
such a case we might say that this person in fact exercises a high degree of 
autonomy. I would want to argue however that in most cases having a
11. There is a considerable literature on both sides of the debate concerning this 
compatabilist solution to the free will vs. determinism question, but the issues raised in this 
debate are not immediately relevant to my broader concerns here.
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narrow range of expectations and desires is not consistent with the exercise 
of autonomy. This is because the kind of critical self-evaluation that is 
essential for autonomy requires that a person has, or can conceive of, a 
range of different expectations and desires, many of which may be realisable 
(it is important that they are not just fantasies). Critical self-evaluation 
involves working out which of these different expectations and desires one 
values most highly. But in order to have a range of expectations and desires 
a person normally needs to have open to them a number of different 
possible options for action, in relation to which they can evaluate their 
values, desires and beliefs. Now too many options can of course undermine 
a person's autonomy. On the other hand, certain people are able to achieve 
a remarkable degree of autonomy in circumstances in which they have very 
few options. However in most cases it is difficult either to engage in radical 
self-evaluation or to exercise autonomy when one has few options for 
conceiving of, or acting upon, alternatives. It thus seems that in a 
significant number of cases where people do not enjoy freedom of the will 
and do not exercise autonomy it is because their options are severely 
restricted. Autonomy thus requires not only freedom from coercion, but 
freedom of action in the broader sense of having available a number of 
options for action.
To sum up, we might characterise autonomous agency as the capacity to 
constitute for oneself, through one's decisions and projects, an identity based 
on a conception of the values and commitments that one regards as most 
important. This process of self-constitution requires the capacity for critical 
self-evaluation on the basis of having available certain resources and a 
number of different possible options for action. Given this, Bartky's claim 
about oppression is that oppression impedes women's capacity for critical 
self-constitution not only by drastically restricting the resources and options 
available to women, but by stereotyping women as incapable of this capacity.
Her claim that one of the effects of oppression is to undermine women's 
self-esteem also suggests that there is a link between self-esteem and the 
freedom and ability to exercise autonomous agency.
I want to stress that I regard the notion of autonomous agency, thus 
understood, as crucial for feminism to retain as the basis for an 
understanding of women's claims to moral agency. Having said that I want 
now to suggest why there are problems for women in any straightforward 
assimilation of this view. To begin to get a handle on the first difficulty I 
want to take Sartre's example but to imagine that the young person faced 
with such a dilemma is not a young man but a young woman. How might 
this change our perception of the dilemma? Or, to bring the example a bit 
more up to date, why is it that newspaper pictures of women soldiers 
farewelling their children on the way to the Persian Gulf call forth a 
different emotional response from similar pictures of male soldiers? A 
simple answer to these questions is that, until recently, women's traditional 
moral role meant that most women could not even pose the dilemma 
posed by Sartre's young man. It would have been obvious where the young 
woman's moral responsibilities lay in this case. But there is more to the 
issue than this. For in our cultural context the notion of autonomy has 
been fairly clearly bound up with only one of the two choices facing the 
young man -  namely the choice of going to the resistance. Young suggests 
one response to this kind of difficulty by arguing that although autonomy is 
intrinsicially valuable it should be regarded as a defeasible value. That is, in 
cases where it conflicts with other values such as happiness, love, loyalty to 
a person or cause and so on, then the autonomous choice is not necessarily 
the morally preferable choice.12 But the problem is precisely that autonomy 
has been defined in opposition to such values and that in our culture these
25
12. Young, op. cit. Chapter IV.
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values have a different meaning for women than they do for men. One 
proposed solution to this problem is to try to de-gender the opposition 
between autonomy and other values by extricating it from the opposition 
between masculinity and femininity. While this may be part of the solution 
it does not address the deeper problem, which is that an ideal of 
autonomous agency which involves a contrast between autonomy and 
values such as love and loyalty is problematic, not only but especially for 
women.
The second difficulty I want to raise concerns the idea of the True self'. As I 
have made clear, I think there is something correct about the notion of self­
constitution. However, in the lack of any indications to the contrary, it 
might be assumed that this 'self' is sexually indifferent. But would this 
assumption be justified? Can we simply assume that we can appeal to a 
neutral idea of the 'person' or the 'self', regardless of their sexually specific 
embodiment? 13 Such an assumption is particularly problematic given a 
historical context in which autonomous agency and selfhood have often 
been defined in opposition to desire and the 'passive' body, and where the 
female body has become a cultural metaphor for passivity and for those 
aspects of humanity that tie us to our animal natures. What it means is 
that, for women, to exercise autonomy has come to mean, in subtle and not 
so subtle ways, to transcend their bodily specificity. In Part III will argue that 
de Beauvoir's account of autonomous agency is seriously vitiated by this 
difficulty.
13. Some contemporary feminists are unhappy with the term 'embodiment', arguing that it 
evokes a dualistic image of the body as the mode of incarnation of a signifying 
immateriality. Judith Butler for example expresses this view in Gender Trouble: Feminism 
and the Subversion of Identity, (Routledge, NY, 1990), p. 152, footnote 15 of Ch. 1. While I 
agree that the term does retain traces of such dualism, I regard the proposed alternative term 
'corporeality' as a term which downplays the notion of autonomous agency to such an extent 
that it gives rise to a reductionist view of bodily life as lived at the level of merely natural 
event.
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The third difficulty focuses on the question of critical self-evaluation. Most 
contemporary writers are careful to stress that critical evaluation need not be 
thought of as a highly intellectual activity. Young suggests for example that 
self-evaluation may occur through feelings of regret, remorse, admiration 
for others and so on.14 Nevertheless it is clear that some distinction needs 
to be made between those procedures of evaluation which simply confirm a 
person's socialised prejudices and those which enable the person to make an 
'independent' evaluation of her values and desires.15 In other words while 
no evaluation procedures are ideologically neutral, we can distinguish 
between those procedures which encourage critical appraisal of the 
prevailing ideology and of our own socialisation within it, from those 
which encourage mere subservience to it. It seems that some such 
distinction needs to be made. The problem is that it tends implicitly to be 
assumed that critical self-evaluation is a purely intrasubjective rather than 
intersubjective process, that is one which occurs within the interiority of the 
ego, rather than in and through our concrete relations with others.
In the next section of this chapter I want to consider some of the objections 
to the ideal of autonomy that have been raised recently by feminist critics. 
The extent to which the three concerns I have just expressed echo some of 
these criticisms will become clear in the course of the discussion. The task 
of the rest of the thesis is to provide a fuller elaboration of the worries I 
have raised and to sketch out an account of women's moral agency which 
might begin to address them without abandoning the ideal of autonomy.
14. Young, op. cit. Ch. V.
15. Dworkin, op. cit. Ch. 1 calls this the requirement of 'procedural independence'.
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Section 2: Feminist Critiques of Autonomy
Feminist objections to autonomy can be separated into at least two different 
but related clusters of concern. The first set of objections is grounded in 
feminist critiques of liberalism and the tradition of social contract theory 
and centres on the way in which the ideal of autonomy is articulated within 
certain forms of liberal individualism .16 The second set of objections is 
directed against rationalist versions of moral autonomy which are 
historically associated with Kant. These objections draw mainly on Carol 
Gilligan's critique of Kohlberg's neo-Kantian account of moral 
developm ent.17
I
Feminist critics of the liberal political tradition have argued that the ideal of 
autonom y which emerges from this tradition is masculinist, because it 
emphasises independence over connectedness and individualism in 
opposition to reciprocity and community. Although some of these claims 
may also be applicable to Kantian interpretations of the 'thick' conception of 
autonomy, it is clear that one of the principal targets of this attack is the 
'thin ', minimal account of autonomy as non-interference. The question of 
the extent to which liberalism is committed to this minimal notion, and to 
the libertarian and extreme contractarian views which underpin it, is the 
subject of a vigorous and extensive debate among liberals, communitarians
16. See for example: Alison Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature, (Harvester, 1983), 
Ch. 3; Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Polity, 1988); Marion Tapper, 'Can a Feminist 
Be a Liberal?' A1P vol 64, June 1986, Women and Philosophy supplement, ed. Janna Thompson; 
Naomi Scheman, 'Individualism and the Objects of Psychology' in Sandra Harding & Merrill 
Hintikka (eds.), Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Ontology, 
Metaphysics, and Philosophy of Science (Reidel, Dordrecht, 1983); Lorraine Code, 'Simple 
Equality is Not Enough' ATP Supplementary volume op. cit.. My account of this objection is a 
reconstruction from a variety of views presented by these and other writers.
17. Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice (Harvard, 1982). See also the articles in E. Kittay & 
D. Meyers (eds.) Women and Moral Theory (Rowman & Allanheld, 1987).
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and feminists. I do not want to enter into this debate here except to note 
that there seems to be an unfortunate tendency within the feminist 
literature simply to conflate liberalism with libertarianism.18 In my 
discussion below of feminist critiques of liberalism I am using the term 
liberalism' to refer mainly to the libertarian and contractarian tendencies 
within liberalism, while not denying that some of the feminist objections 
are also applicable to a liberal like Mill. My use of the masculine pronoun 
in this discussion is deliberate.
There are a variety of different ways in which this minimal conception have 
been articulated but they share at least the following features. Firstly, the 
'good' cannot be given any a priori concrete content but can only be specified 
in terms of the particular desires and interests particular individuals happen 
to have. This carries with it the implication that autonomy itself is not 
intrinsically but only instrumentally valuable and that a person may choose 
to forsake it if he perceives that it is in his interests to do so.19 Secondly, 
persons are discrete, separate existences whose moral and political 
interactions with one another can only arise through consensual contracts.
18. A notable exception is Carole Pateman. In The Sexual Contract she is careful to 
distinguish the views while nevertheless arguing that, despite the attempts of many liberals 
to dissociate liberalism from libertarianism, on many issues involving women, such as 
prostitution, pornography and surrogate motherhood, the liberal view collapses into 
libertarian contractualism. It will become evident later in this thesis that I think Pateman's 
analysis of the sexual-social contract does a great deal to illuminate the tensions in women's 
situations within contemporary liberal societies. Also I find her criticisms of the liberal 
position with respect to prostitution, pornography and surrogacy persuasive. But I am not 
fully persuaded by Pateman's claim that ultimately liberalism cannot coherently be 
distinguished from libertarianism. (For further discussion of this issue see my review of The 
Sexual Contract in ATP, vol 68, no 4, December 1990.)
19. This point is connected with the whole vexed issue for liberals of slavery contracts. Some 
libertarians are quite happy to argue that persons should be free to enter into slavery 
contracts if they so desire. Liberals like Mill want to rule out this possibility. Among 
feminists, Pateman (op. cit.) has argued that Mill's position is theoretically inconsistent and 
that the libertarian position is a logical consequence of the liberal theory of the social 
contract. Again it is beyond the scope of my concerns here to enter into this dispute.
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Thirdly, the moral obligations between individuals are purely negative 
obligations to refrain from harming, or interfering with the interests of, 
others. Fourthly the only legitimate function of government is the function 
of ensuring that conditions are appropriate for individuals to pursue their 
interests free from interference -  including interference by the state itself. 
Here the idea of appropriate conditions is spelt out in terms of protection 
from harm to one's life, liberty or property.
The feminist objections to the notion of liberty or autonomy as non­
interference arise from a number of interconnected claims about the 
conceptions of subjectivity and of moral and political relations which are 
said to underlie it. On the question of subjectivity it is claimed that the idea 
that freedom amounts to freedom from interference is based on two 
questionable assumptions about human nature: that human beings are 
discrete, separate, independent and self-sufficient existences each motivated 
by the pursuit of their own separate self-interests; and consequently that 
conflict between the interests of these separate existences will be an 
inevitable feature of the interactions between them. It is these assumptions 
which make the fictional 'states of nature' of liberal social contract theory 
coherent and imaginable fictions. In connection with morality, feminists 
argue that the idea of freedom as non-interference is supported by a number 
of further questionable assumptions of liberalism: that personhood is 
defined in terms of the abstract liberty and capacity for rationality of each 
individual; that our moral relations with others can only arise out of respect 
for their liberty and capacity for rationality; and that the function of 
morality is to act as a curb on self-interest, so ensuring that the pursuit of 
individual self-interest does not compromise the liberty of others. In 
conjunction, these two sets of assumptions underpin the main political 
presumptions of liberal theory: that the fundamental problem of human 
social life is to work out a way of ensuring that each individual is able to
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pursue his own self-interested ends without thereby preventing others from 
doing likewise and so giving rise to conflict; that the form of social life 
which is best (most rationally) able to achieve this end is one founded as if 
on an imaginary contract between the separate individuals that together 
make up the social body; and that this contract involves an agreement on 
the part of each individual to refrain from interfering with the interests of 
others in exchange for which he will be guaranteed an inviolable space 
within which to pursue his own interests.
The starting point for feminist criticisms of the idea of non-interference is to 
point to the discrepancy between some of these assumptions and many 
other dimensions of human life. The idea that personhood can be defined 
in terms of an individual's capacity for reason, for example, downplays the 
importance of a host of other human characteristics, especially physical 
abilities and attributes, and emotional capacities, such as the capacity for 
love. But if we recognise the importance of such capacities many of the 
liberal assumptions about human subjectivity and social life look much less 
plausible. This is because these capacities are necessarily social capacities and 
so point to the fundamental interdependence, rather than separateness, of 
human interests. The assumption that human beings are discrete, separate 
existences motivated primarily by the pursuit of their own self-interest for 
example overlooks the extent to which human beings, at various times and 
stages of life and to varying extents, are dependent upon the care of others 
and supportive of the needs of others. This fact also calls into question the 
assumption, implicit in the notion of non-interference, that others 
represent a possible threat to our freedom, rather than the condition of its 
possibility. Further the idea that social life should be thought of as founded 
upon convention or contract makes little sense of relations between friends, 
lovers, parents and children, the elderly and those who care for them and so 
on. The kinds of moral obligations and commitments which arise from
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such relationships also suggest that the liberal view of the function of 
morality is severely impoverished.
According to feminists, these discrepancies arise from the implicit 
masculinism of liberal theory. The argument is that whereas women's 
social experience, which historically has revolved around care and 
responsibility for others, is founded upon a recognition of the emotional, 
physical and social connections and interdependencies between human 
beings, the claims of liberal theory seem applicable, if anywhere, only to 
relations among men in the public sphere. Consequently an emphasis on 
the importance of autonomy understood as non-interference devalues the 
importance of many of the activities, values and capacities which have been, 
and continue to be, associated with women. More than this, it also 
presupposes what it disavows. In response to the reply that the idea of non­
interference only characterises relations between contracting adults and that 
women equally may be parties to such contractual relations, feminists point 
out that rational, independent makers of contracts who respect one 
another's liberty and who refrain from harming others or interfering with 
their interests, do not spring into life fully formed. They are the products of 
a process which involves extensive and intensive training, a training which 
forms the right kinds of habits, inculcates the right kinds of moral attitudes 
and teaches the right use of reason. Such training cannot be acquired 
without 'interference', neither can it be acquired without the expenditure of 
a great deal of emotional and other kinds of labour, much of which is 
performed by women. Furthermore such training presupposes the existence 
of social relations which are very different in kind from relations based on 
contract and consent -  relations of trust, care, love, loyalty and so on. The 
'minimal' notion of autonomy as non-interference is therefore minimal 
only because it excludes what underpins it.
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My view of autonomy endorses and supports the spirit of this critique of the 
'minimal' notion of autonomy. In particular I agree that any account of 
autonomy which defines it in opposition to relations of dependence and 
interdependence and which presupposes that the only autonomous 
relations are contractual relations between (usually male) adults is 
extremely problematic for women. However I want to distance myself from 
some of the implications which are sometimes thought to follow from this 
critique. Firstly, although I regard it as fairly damning of the 'minimal' 
account of autonomy, my discussion in the first part of this chapter should 
make it clear that I do not think this critique entails the rejection of the ideal 
of autonomy per se. To assume that it does is to slide between a rejection of 
individualism and a rejection of the concept and value of individual self- 
determination. Certainly liberalism itself is also guilty of such slippage. But 
it is important for feminists to attempt to disentangle these notions and to 
defend some form of the latter. Secondly, and in connection with this first 
point, it is important to show both that relations based on care, trust, love 
and so on are the unacknowledged underside and support of the 
'autonomous' (minimal) contractual relations of 'liberal individualism', 
and that the distinction between these different kinds of relations is 
gendered. But this is not a reason for women either to repudiate the value 
of individual self-determination or to locate women's ethical life primarily 
in the realm of affective relations with others. Nevertheless, this critique 
echoes some of the concerns I raised earlier, alerting us to the need for a 
conception of autonomous agency which is not implicitly contrasted with 
certain values which historically have been associated with women, and 
which sees autonomy not just as an individual but as an intersubjective 
achievement.
The feminist critique of the abstract individualism of liberal theory echoes 
the second of my concerns raised above. Feminists have argued that
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liberalism promotes a view of human subjectivity which fails to appreciate 
the significance of the bodily, cultural and social dimensions of human life. 
Now liberal theorists of course do not deny that our capacities are shaped by 
our environments and by the socialisation process. In fact it was liberalism's 
stress on the importance of education and environment that made it such 
an amenable theory for feminism. What contemporary feminists object to 
is the Lockean tabula rasa conception of subjectivity that is associated with 
the liberal view of human nature, as well as the image of the 'socialisation 
process' as a kind of inscription upon this tabula rasa.20 Feminist critics of 
liberalism argue that a person's specific historical, cultural and bodily 
location is not simply an accretion upon a somehow invariant 
'consciousness' or capacity for reason, but that consciousness itself is always 
constituted within a particular context as a specific historical, cultural and 
embodied consciousness.21 Because the liberal notion of autonomy as non­
interference is premised upon a view of persons which abstracts from this 
context and regards everybody's position as in all important respects 
equivalent, it leaves no room for a recognition of the concrete differences 
between individuals and groups which arise from their specific situations. 
The result of this, feminists argue, is that the ideal of autonomy promotes a 
view of persons as disembodied and disembedded. While agreeing with this 
claim with respect to the notion of autonomy as non-interference, it is 
important not to conflate this 'minimal' account of autonomy with the 
notion of self-constitution. Thus the conclusion that should be drawn from 
this argument is that the notion of non-interference is seriously flawed and
20. They also point out how, through devices such as the state of nature or, more 
contentiously, some analogue such as Rawls' 'original position', this historically specific 
conception of human beings gets reified into a given of human nature.
21. Spelling out exactly what this claim means and what are its implications is the subject of 
a complex and sometimes confusing debate among feminists. In the Introduction to Part IV I try 
to articulate my understanding of this idea.
that the ideal of autonomy as self-constitution must be re-articulated in 
various ways. However this argument does not provide grounds for 
rejecting the idea of autonomous agency.
n
While the 'thin7 account of autonomy is associated with libertarian liberals, 
the 'thick' account has its origins in the work of Kant. For Kant although 
negative liberty or freedom from interference is important, the notion of 
autonomy is a much loftier ideal than this. For it consists in the freedom of 
a rational being to determine its own laws in accordance with the universal 
demands of reason itself. The differences between the two accounts of 
autonomy arise from the differences between Kant's ideals of freedom, 
morality and reason, and the way these notions are understood in the 
traditions to which the libertarian account is heir -  the traditions of Hobbes 
and utilitarians like Bentham. Whereas these philosophers regarded 
freedom as 'natural liberty', that is the ability to pursue one's desires free 
from external constraint or from other obstacles, for Kant freedom can only 
arise from reason, which transcends merely natural desire and all empirical 
determination. Thus whereas under the notion of non-interference, 
autonomy simply amounts to being at liberty to pursue one's own self- 
interested ends, for Kant actions motivated by self-interested concerns are 
paradigmatically heteronomous. Only actions performed in accordance 
with universal reason can be autonomous. Kant argues that the reason why 
earlier philosophers were unable to see this was because they equated reason 
with instrumental reason. Hence they thought that while reason can help 
us in achieving the ends set by our desires and inclinations it has no role in 
determining these ends.22 On the Kantian view this dissociation of action
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22. The debate, within contemporary moral philosophy, between proponents of the so-called 
'Humean' and 'Kantian' theories of motivation, continues this earlier debate.
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from reason can provide no basis for morality, since morality is necessary 
and universal and so cannot be grounded in our own subjective and 
contingent ends. Morality must therefore be grounded in something which 
has unconditioned worth as an end in itself, namely 'rational nature'.
It is this notion of 'rational nature' as an end in itself that links Kant's view 
of autonomy inextricably to morality and that explains the apparent paradox 
in his account of autonomy -  that the autonomous person both legislates 
and is subject to the universal laws of reason. If rational nature is an end in 
itself then it alone can be the only proper and moral end of all our actions. 
This gives rise to the practical principle: 'Act in such a way that you treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always 
at the same time as an end and never simply as a means' . 23 From a 
subjective view this principle enjoins us to abstract from our own particular 
subjective ends and to take as our end ourselves as rational beings. But this 
principle must be the same for all rational beings and hence from an 
objective view it enjoins us to regard all other rational beings as ends in 
themselves. In taking as our end ourselves as rational beings we therefore 
also take as our end all rational beings. But what is involved in taking as 
our end ourselves as rational beings? For Kant it is to have a good will, that 
is a will which legislates to itself only those actions grounded in respect for 
rational nature and hence only those actions in accordance with pure 
practical reason. Autonomy is the property of a good will because a will 
which acts only in accordance with its own self-given laws is free from all 
external determination, including determination by the desires and 
inclinations of the human being to whom that will belongs. For Kant 
autonomy is thus not only intrinsicially valuable, it is also the supreme
23. Immanuel Kant; Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by James W. 
Ellington (Hackett, 1981), p. 429. Page numbers are to the standard German edition (Menzer, 
Berlin, 1911).
value, the ground of all human dignity and worth and the foundation of 
morality.
It is against the Kantian and neo-Kantian conception of autonomy that the 
second set of feminist objections is directed. These objections focus on two 
principal and related aspects of Kantian moral theories. The first is Kant's 
universalisability criterion and associated notions such as duty and the 
moral law. The second is the Kantian conception of reason and the 
distinction between the 'true self' of practical reason and the 'natural self' of 
inclinations, sense and desire.24
II. i.
The central tenet of Kant's moral theory is that the commands of morality 
are universal commands of reason holding for every rational being and 
admitting of no exceptions. The categorical imperative stated as universal 
law enjoins: 'Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same 
time will that it should become a universal law' . 25 Duty is action in 
conformity with this law and for Kant the only moral and hence 
autonomous action is an action performed solely out of duty. This is 
because a moral action is an action performed solely for its own sake, that is 
because it is unconditionally good, not for any other purpose. But the only 
actions performed for their own sakes are those which accord with pure 
practical reason, for only reason has the good as its necessary end. No 
matter how much they may seem to coincide with moral actions therefore, 
all actions which are motivated by other purposes make the good 
conditional upon these purposes and so have no moral worth. As we have 
seen what underlies this conception of morality is the idea of rational
37
24. My discussion of Kant focuses only on the aspects of Kant's moral theory against which 
these objections are raised.
25. Kant, op. cit. p. 421.
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nature as an end in itself. This idea still retains a powerful hold on the 
modern moral imagination, and for good reasons, but it entails a number of 
implications which recent writers have found troubling.26 Firstly it entails 
that what is of moral worth is not the outcome of an action, but the 
principle in accordance with which the action was performed. Secondly it 
means that actions performed out of other motives than reason, even out of 
apparently virtuous motives such as benificence, sympathy, love or care, can 
have no moral worth. According to Kant these virtues only have worth to 
the extent that they arise out of duty, not sentiment. Thirdly it implies that 
where there is a clash between the universal commands of morality and the 
claims made upon us by particular sentiments -  claims of loyalty or love for 
example -  the only possible moral course of action is the action performed 
in accordance with the universal demands of reason.27 Fourthly, and in 
connection with this last point, it characterises autonomous action as action 
in accordance with a moral law which 'abstracts from the personal 
differences of rational beings and also from the content of their private 
ends' . 28 Autonomy is thus defined in opposition to sentiment. It is these 
implications which trouble feminist critics of Kantian and neo-Kantian 
notions of universalisability.
The catalyst for these criticisms has been the work of Carol Gilligan which 
arose as a response to Lawrence Kohlberg's neo-Kantian theory of moral 
development. In order to clarify the concerns expressed by these criticisms I 
want briefly to outline the salient features of Gilligan's critique of Kohlberg.
26. In his article 'Moral Luck' (Mortal Questions, Cambridge U.P. 1979), Tom Nagel has 
questioned the coherence of the first two of these implications.
27. Note however that the duties demanded by reason may include duties arising out of 
particular relations to others. Kant's point however is that actions connected with such 
relations can only be moral to the extent that they are motivated by these duties, rather than 
by sentiment.
28. Kant, op. cit. p. 433.
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Gilligan's complaint against Kohlberg's theory is that it assumes that moral 
maturity and hence moral autonomy coincide with the ability to resolve 
moral dilemmas through the application of universal rational principles to 
particular situations. On Kohlberg's view the autonomous moral agent is 
the person whose moral judgements are formed independently of the 
historical, psychological and personal factors involved in any given 
individual situation and by reference to universal principles alone.
Kohlberg identifies these principles as rights-based principles of justice. 
Gilligan points out that as a consequence of this assumption he regards all 
other forms of moral decision making as either steps on the road to moral 
maturity or as morally deviant. But by starting from these two premises 
Kohlberg could only conclude that women are morally deficient because in 
his empirical research he found that the majority of the women subjects 
that he interviewed did not in fact appeal to universal principles in 
response to the abstract moral problems which were presented to them.
Apart from expressing dissatisfaction with the level of abstraction of the 
dilemmas to which they were asked to respond, they tended to try to find 
solutions to these problems at an interpersonal and hence, given Kohlberg's 
framework, less morally autonomous, level.
In reply to Kohlberg, Gilligan suggests that rather than concluding that 
women are morally deficient we might conclude that women approach 
moral problems from a different perspective than men and with a different 
set of concerns. She characterises this perspective as an 'ethics of care' and 
attempts to develop a theory of moral development, parallel to Kohlberg's, 
within this ethic. In contrast to Kohlberg's rights-based justice ethic, which 
sees moral decision-making as a process of abstraction both from the 
particular concerns of the agents involved and from the particularities of 
the specific context, Gilligan sees the 'ethic of care' as a way of thinking about 
morality which focuses on such particularities as necessary determinants of
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the moral situation. The 'ethic of care' is thus an agent-centred moral 
perspective which is based on the presum ption that moral problems are 
always bound up with the particularities of context and with our 
conceptions of ourselves and our relations with others. Morality in other 
words cannot be divorced from the attachments, responsibilities and 
obligations arising from our particular affective relations with others. To 
the extent that this ethic can be characterised as having an overriding 
concern it is a concern with 'care', that is with avoiding hurt and preserving 
and m aintaining the connections between people.
Since the publication of her book Gilligan's work has sparked a great deal of 
debate among feminists and some moral philosophers. The debate has 
centred on questions relating to the implications of her work. Is Gilligan 
suggesting that men and women think and reason differently about 
morality or is she suggesting that men and women have different moral 
priorities? Does Gilligan's work imply that women's moral thinking is and 
should be completely contextual, without regard to universal principles, or 
does it imply that in any given situation adequate moral appraisal must 
involve a dialectic between universal principles and an agent-centred 
perspective?29 What is the relationship between justice and the 'ethic of 
care'? And, most pertinently here, should we conclude from Gilligan's 
analysis of the 'ethic of care' that the ideal of autonomy is a masculine ideal?
29. The literature on this topic is increasing at an exponential rate, but there is a clear 
discussion of these questions in Jean Grimshaw's book Feminist Philosophers (Harvester, 
1986), Chs. 7&8. Grimshaw argues that Gilligan's work should be interpreted as implying 
that men and women have different moral priorities, arising out of their different social 
experiences, rather than as implying that women think differently about morality. She also 
suggests that 'care' should itself be regarded as a moral principle. In his article 'Gilligan and 
Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory' Ethics 98 (April 1988) , Lawrence Blum attempts to 
characterise what is distinctive about Gilligan's approach to moral theory by means of a 
useful comparison between Gilligan's work and other philosophical critiques of impartiality.
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In response to this last question there has been a tendency among some 
feminists to assume that Gilligan's work entails that autonomy is a 
masculine ideal and to argue that rather than emphasising the importance 
of autonomy feminists should instead be trying to promote, at both an 
individual and a more global level, the values of connection, love and 
responsibility for others that are associated with care and with activities such 
as mothering.30 While I do not deny either the significance of these values 
or the fact that they have been culturally and ethically devalued, I would 
endorse Grimshaw's cautionary remarks about any too-ready identification 
of such values as feminine. As Grimshaw reminds us, it is important to 
situate the ideal of care in the context of the history of the split between the 
private domestic world of the family and the public realm of political life 
and to remember that certain conceptions of care have functioned in an 
oppressive way for women. A celebration of care in the absence of a 
thoroughgoing critique of the public/private distinction is therefore 
politically problematic. In Part III I will raise similar points in the context of 
a discussion of Carol McMillan. The point I want to make here however is 
somewhat different. I want to suggest that the problem with this construal 
of Gilligan's work, as entailing that the ideal of autonomy should be de- 
emphasised, is that it conflates the notion of autonomous agency with a 
rationalist universalist ethical perspective. This conflation is not 
philosophically groundless given that for Kant, as we have seen, to be an 
autonomous agent just is to act in accordance with universal laws.
However I think Gilligan should be read as attempting to disentangle the 
notion of autonomous agency from rationalist ethical universalism and to
30. See for example Sara Ruddick 'Maternal Thinking' and 'Preservative Love and Military 
Destruction: Some Reflections on Mothering and Peace' in Joyce Trebilcot (ed.) Mothering: 
Essays in Feminist Theory (Rowman & Allanheld 1984), and 'Remarks on the Sexual Politics 
of Reason' in Women and Moral Theory op.cit. See also Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine 
Approach to Ethics and Moral Education. (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1984).
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articulate an intersubjectively-grounded account of what I have been calling 
self-constitution. Putting it another way if 'care' is not to collapse into what 
Gilligan calls 'conventional femininity', that is a self-denying care for others, 
then an 'ethic of care' must presuppose some conception of self-constituting 
agency.
This claim might be clarified by thinking of Gilligan's work as in some ways 
analogous to Bernard Williams' critique of utilitarianism.31 What I am 
suggesting is that at one level Gilligan's 'ethic of care' is a reflection on the 
nature of moral motivation which functions as a critique of the conception 
of agency implicit in universalist, rationalist moral theories. Like Williams 
and other contemporary critics of universalist moral doctrines32, whether 
Kantian or utilitarian, Gilligan is suggesting that when people engage in 
moral reflection they must do so from the perspective which constitutes 
their point of view, that is from the perspective of their personal 
commitments and projects. For it is only by having such a perspective that a 
person can be an agent at all. Certainly this 'point of view' may partly be 
shaped by certain principles, but these principles only motivate our actions 
to the extent that they are part of our sense of what is important to us. Yet 
universalist doctrines stipulate that the moral point of view is a point of 
view abstracted from all such perspectives.33 But this gives rise to an 
incoherent conception of moral agency because it means that to take the 
moral point of view requires that we strip ourselves of the very motivations 
which make moral reflection and agency possible. It is for this reason that
31. Bernard Williams, 'A Critique of Utilitarianism' in Smart & Williams Utilitarianism: 
For and Against (Cambridge U.P. 1973). Also Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1985).
32. See for example Michael Stocker, 'Agent and Other: Against Ethical Universalism', A1P, 
vol.54, no.3, 1976 and Andrew Oldenquist, 'Loyalties' T.Phil, vol. 79, no. 4,1982.
33. An exception is Hare's 'role reversal' notion of universalizability. See for example R.M. 
Hare, Freedom and Reason. (Oxford University Press, 1963).
the idea of autonomous agency must be extricated from a Kantian or neo- 
Kantian view of autonomous action as action in accordance with universal 
principles.
However whereas Williams' characterisation of a person's 'point of view' 
puts most stress on notions like personal integrity and the importance to a 
person of their projects and goals, Gilligan characterises the kind of 'point of 
view' embodied in the 'ethic of care' as a point of view focused mainly on a 
person's sense of their responsibilities to others and to themselves, and on a 
sense of their concrete relations with others. What is emphasised therefore 
by the perspective of the 'ethic of care' is that our points of view and our 
decisions about what we value or regard as important do not arise merely 
from abstract reflections about principles, nor even from processes of 
introspection. Rather they are constituted intersubjectively. But how 
should this notion be understood, and what are its implications for an ideal 
of autonomous agency?
Firstly, a recognition of the significance of intersubjectivity involves a 
recognition of the developmental aspects of subjectivity, that is it involves a 
recognition of the fact that the development of the capacity for autonomous 
agency is an achievement which occurs partly in the context of a child's 
relationship with those adults who have primary responsibility for its well­
being.34 In this context autonomy and dependence on others are not 
opposed. Rather it is these relationships of dependency which provide the 
basis in an individual for both the capacity for autonomy and the capacity 
for reciprocal relations with others.35 Although the significance of these
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34. It is Nancy Chodorow's work which has done most to emphasise the importance of this 
fact. See especially The Reproduction of Mothering (University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1978). Also 'Gender, Relation, and Difference in Psychoanalytic Perspective' in 
Hester Eisenstein & Alice Jardine (eds.) The Future of Difference (G.K. Hall, Boston, 1980)
35. This is not to deny that there is a difference between psychically healthy and unhealthy 
dependencies. Nor is it to claim that these relationships are always successful in achieving
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early relationships does not go unrecognised in the philosophical literature 
on autonomy, it is usually recognised negatively in that the influence of 
these relationships gets bracketed under the 'socialisation' from which a 
person must in some senses free herself in order to achieve autonomy.
Thus it seems as though individuals achieve autonomy despite, rather than 
because of their early emotional dependencies on others. If the significance 
of these dependency relations is recognised however autonomy does not 
need to be seen as opposed to dependence but rather as existing in dialectical 
relationship with it.
Secondly, but following from this point, the idea that self-constitution is 
possible only in intersubjective relations means that the pursuit of 
autonomy must also involve reciprocal recognition of the autonomy of 
others. In the absence of such recognition the pursuit of autonomy is likely 
to be associated with the domination of others.36 Now it could be argued 
that the Kantian ideal of autonomy, which enjoins respect for rational 
nature as an end in itself, embodies a similar view. But the feminist claim 
is significantly different. In fact feminist criticism of contemporary neo- 
Kantianism -  as exemplified in Kohlberg and Rawls -  echoes Hegel's 
criticism of Kant.37 Seyla Benhabib, extrapolating from Gilligan's work, has 
argued that neo-Kantian notions of universalisability cannot in fact ground
these ends. Chodorow's argument is that in patriarchal societies these capacities are 
unlikely both to be adequately developed within the one individual precisely because 
autonomy and dependence are defined in opposition to one another and associated with 
different genders.
36. As 1 will argue in Part II, this point was first made by de Beauvoir in the light of Hegel's 
stress on the philosophical significance of recognitive relations. Most recently the point has 
been developed by Jessica Benjamin in 'The Bonds of Love: Rational Violence and Erotic 
Domination' in Eisenstein & Jardine (eds.) The Future of Difference op. cit. and also in her 
book The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis. Feminism and the Problem of Domination (Virago, 
1990)
37. G.W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, translated with notes by T.M. Knox, (Oxford 
University Press, 1967). First Part: 'Abstract Right' & Second Part: 'Morality'. I discuss this 
criticism briefly below in Chapter 4 Section 3.
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the respect for others which they take as the foundation of justice.38 This is 
because neo-Kantians misconstrue the notion of respect. She suggests that if 
we understand respect for others as respect for 'rational nature' or as respect 
for others as bearers of abstract rights, as what she calls the 'generalized 
other', then we are not really coming to terms with the different 
perspectives of others, with the ways in which their points of view are 
fundamentally different from ours. Rather we are abstracting away from 
everything about them that is different and reducing everybody's 
perspective to one common perspective. Thus we are stripping down the 
self to the point where what grounds agency -  a person's point of view -  
disappears. Benhabib suggests however that if we do this we cannot respect 
the autonomy of others. Such respect can only arise from a recognition of 
the different points of view of others, a recognition which Benhabib refers to 
as seeing the other as a 'concrete other'. Benhabib suggests that unless our 
conception of justice embodies a conception of others as 'concrete others' 
then we will not in fact be able to treat them justly at all. This claim does 
not deny the need for a critical appraisal of the points of view of others, nor 
of our own. But it suggests that critical appraisal requires an intersubjective 
context as well as principled reflection.
At the level of considerations of justice, and in contrast to some feminist 
commentators, I do not think a stress on intersubjective recognition will 
eliminate the possibility of conflicts between different points of view, nor 
will it overcome the fact that in some contexts there will be inevitable 
ethical tensions between universality and particularity, individuality and
38. Seyla Benhabib; The Generalized and the Concrete Other' in Seyla Benhabib &
Drucilla Cornell (eds.) Feminism As Critique (Polity Press, 1987). Benhabib's argument is a 
response to Kohlberg's claim that Gilligan conflates 'justice' and the 'good life'. According to 
Kohlberg, whereas justice is concerned with dealing with conflicts in public life and so must be 
centred around impartial principles and notions of rights, considerations pertaining to the 
'good life', that is pertaining to people's commitments and projects, are really aspects of their 
private selves which should be irrelevant to considerations of justice.
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community, love and justice, an agent-centred perspective and an act- 
evaluative perspective. But like Benhabib and Pateman I think that a 
concrete recognition of the differences which ground these tensions puts 
them more into dialectical relationship with one another, rather than 
pitting them in opposition.39 I also agree that the idea that we can eliminate 
these tensions simply by abstracting away concrete differences in fact ensures 
that one perspective will dominate. At the level of articulating an adequate 
conception of autonomous agency I want to suggest that the kind of critical 
self-evaluation that characterises autonomy is best achieved through 
intersubjective recognition. To give an example which gets back to the issue 
of socialisation and procedural independence, the kind of critical reflection 
on one's own socialised racism that arises from a genuine reciprocal 
encounter with other racial groups, is of an entirely different order than the 
kind of reflection prompted by reference to universal principles. In Chapter 
Six I give a fuller elaboration of what is involved in this kind of reflection 
in the context of the example of abortion decisions.
II.Ü
What is so powerful about Kant's moral system is that it seems to unite the 
individual point of view with the moral point of view, and autonomous 
agency with respect for others. This unity is achieved however only by 
means of the distinction between the noumenal, rational self and the 
phenomenal self of inclination, desire and the body. I said earlier that for 
Kant autonomy is action of the will in accordance with its own self-given 
laws and hence free from all external determination, including 
determination by the desires and inclinations of the human being to whom 
that will belongs. Central to this conception of autonomy is the Kantian
39. Benhabib, op. cit. Carole Pateman, ’Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy' 
in Benn, S. & Gaus, G (eds.), Public and Private in Social Life (Croom Helm, London & 
Canberra, 1983)
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distinction between the intelligible and the sensible realms. The sensible 
realm, the realm of appearance, is subject to the causal laws of nature.
Beings which are subject to such laws are subject to empirical 
determination. As such they cannot be regarded as free, nor can they be 
regarded as ends in themselves. Rather their value is relative and they are 
called Things' .40 The intelligible realm by contrast is the ground of all 
appearance and is subject only to the laws of reason. Kant makes it clear that 
the idea of such a realm is of course beyond the bounds of experience. It is 
rather an idea which reason must presuppose in order to explain the 
possibility of freedom of the will, 'a something that remains over when I 
have excluded from the determining grounds of my will everything that 
belongs to the world of sense' 41 or 'a point of view which reason sees itself 
compelled to take outside of appearances in order to think of itself as 
practical' 42 Freedom itself is also an idea of reason, an idea that must be 
presupposed in order to explain 'the activity of rational beings endowed 
with a will' .43
According to Kant it is the nature of morality itself which necessitates these 
presuppositions. This is because moral action, as we have seen, is action 
which is motivated by duty alone, that is action in accordance with 
universal principles. But such action in accordance with principles requires 
reason, that is, practical reason. Only rational beings therefore can act out of 
duty. Further, only rational beings can have a will. The reason for this is 
that all effects presuppose some causality. But if reason is unique, a faculty
40. Kant, op. cit. p. 428.
41. Kant, op. cit. p. 462.
42. Kant, op. cit. p. 458.
43. Kant, op. cit. p. 448.
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which distinguishes rational beings from all other things,44 then action in 
accordance with reason cannot be the effect of any natural causality. Rather 
it must be the effect of a rational causality, namely the will. Now all 
causality presupposes the existence of universal laws regulating the relation 
between cause and effect. The laws governing rational causality cannot 
however be empirical laws but must be laws of reason. In order to act in 
accordance with laws of reason the will therefore must be free from all 
empirical determination. Consequently such a free causality can only be 
determined by itself, that is, it can only be a 'law to itself' 45
Kant is explicit that this idea of freedom of the will is derived not from the 
experience of human nature but rather from the idea of rational nature 
itself. The necessity for the categorical imperative arises because human 
nature is not perfectly rational. For a perfectly rational being, what is 
objectively necessary is also subjectively necessary. The actions of such a 
being therefore 'would always accord with the autonomy of the will' .46 But 
for human nature what is objectively necessary is subjectively contingent- 
hence the necessity of the categorical ought. This lack of accord between 
human actions and what is demanded by reason arises, according to Kant, 
because human beings are both rational beings and sensible beings, both 
members of the intelligible realm and affected by the sensible world, 
including by themselves as sensuous beings. In so far as human beings 
belong to the intelligible realm they must be regarded as free, insofar as they 
belong to the sensible world they are subject to empirical determination.
Once again Kant is explicit that in human experience the moral agent does 
not experience herself as divided between the intelligible and the sensible
44. Kant, op. cit. p. 452.
45. Kant, op. cit. p. 447.
46. Kant, op. cit. p. 454.
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realms. It is thus never possible in any actual decision to separate out the 
motives of duty from the impulses of sentiment or desire. Nevertheless 
because Kant's ideal of autonomy presupposes the idea of a perfectly rational 
being, he is committed to the view that, from the perspective of such a 
being, any actions arising from sensuous inclinations, desires or impulses 
are heteronomous. Further, to the extent that human beings are regarded 
qua rational beings, the proper (noumenal) self must be identified with the 
rational will and cannot be held responsible for the sensuous inclinations 
and impulses arising from human nature or the phenomenal self. The will 
is responsible however for indulging such impulses, that is, for allowing 
them to hold any sway over its actions.47 For Kant then, for human beings 
the exercise of autonomy is bound up with the will's authority and control 
over those aspects of the self that are associated with bodily desires and 
inclinations.
Contemporary accounts of freedom of the will and autonomy explicitly 
dissociate themselves from the metaphysical aspects of this Kantian picture. 
Nevertheless the echoes of Kant's account of autonomy still resound in the 
contemporary distinction between different aspects of the self, and in the 
idea that autonomous agency is bound up with a person's ability to exercise 
control over their will. I think there is something correct about these ideas. 
The kind of self-evaluation involved in autonomy involves not only 
reflection on whether one's values, desires, inclinations and so on are truly 
one's own, but also an ability to exercise a certain degree of control over 
those desires and inclinations in the interests of what one values, or in the 
interests of longer-term goals and projects. However in the contemporary 
literature, as I also indicated earlier, the bodily and intersubjective nature of 
the self that constitutes and is constituted in this process tends to get
47. Kant, crp. cit. p. 458.
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understated. In the wake of the Kantian account of autonomy this can 
invoke the idea of an isolated and disembodied or at least sexually neutral 
self, which has freed itself of its social determination, exercising control 
over an unruly (neurotic, compulsive, addicted and so on) self still 
enchained by social and bodily determination.
Now while there is no a priori reason to associate this unruly self with 
women, in the context of a social and philosophical split between the 
public and the private spheres, femininity has become a metaphor for 
those feelings, inclinations and desires which autonomous reason must 
transcend.48 As I shall show in Parts II and HI, this metaphor has 
functioned through a representation of the female body as a 
heteronomous body which in some ways always represents a threat to 
reason and to the will. As a result, for women the autonomous self has 
become the self which can transcend its feminine embodiment.
In Part I, I have developed two interconnected strands of argument.
Firstly, through a review and analysis of the contemporary philosophical 
literature, I have given an account of autonomous agency and have 
shown the importance of the ideal of autonomy, thus characterised, for 
understanding and condemning the phenomenon of oppression. On the 
basis of this account I have upheld the value of autonomy as an important 
ideal for women. Secondly, I have analysed and assessed the two main 
lines of contemporary feminist critique of the ideal of autonomy -  those
48 The most sustained argument to this effect is given by Genevieve Lloyd in The Man of 
Reason (Methuen, 1984)
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based on critiques of liberal individualism, and those developed out of 
critiques of contemporary neo-Kantian moral psychology. While I have 
rejected the claim, made by some feminists, that these critiques reveal 
autonomy to be an irredeemably masculinist ideal, I have argued that 
these critiques do raise serious worries, both for women and more 
generally, about the way in which the ideal of autonomy has been 
understood within our culture. The two aspects of this cultural and 
philosophical understanding which concern me most, and on which I will 
be focusing in this thesis, are the twin conceptions of the ideally 
autonomous individual as self-enclosed and self-sufficient, and of 
autonomy as an exercise of control by the purely rational will over the 
unruly body of desires, inclinations and sentiments. In contrast to this 
kind of view of autonomy, I have argued the need for an understanding of 
autonomous agency which is based on a recognition of the fundamentally 
embodied and intersubjective nature of human subjectivity.
My aims in the rest of the thesis are firstly, to try to develop an account of 
autonomy which builds on the account given in the first section of Part I, 
but which also incorporates the insights of the feminist critiques 
considered in the second section of Part I. Secondly, I aim to show why 
our dominant cultural conceptions of autonomy have made it such a 
fraught ideal for women, and hence why an adequate account of 
autonomy must take as its starting point a recognition both of the 
significance of human embodiment and of intersubjectivity.
In Part II, I show how some of the implicit assumptions of our cultural 
and philosophical conceptions of autonomy create insuperable tensions in 
the work of Simone de Beauvoir. In particular, I examine the way in 
which the Kantian notion of autonomy as transcendence of empirical 
determination re-emerges in a different guise in de Beauvoir's implicit
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distinction between the immanent and the transcendent body, in such a 
way as to pit an allegedly sexually neutral autonomous self in opposition to 
female embodiment. But I also argue that, despite its problems, de 
Beauvoir's work nevertheless suggests a different way of thinking about 
autonomy, or the activity of self-constitution, as an activity which occurs, 
in intersubjective relations with others, through the body and through the 
constitution of the body image. From the infant's earliest attempts at co­
ordination through to the experience of the elderly and infirm in coming 
to terms with bodily incapacity, we constitute ourselves in interaction with 
bodily changes and processes and through the way in which those processes 
are represented by ourselves and by others. Seen from this perspective, 
there can be no sexually indifferent self because there is no sexually 
indifferent body. Seen from this perspective, autonomous agency is also 
inextricably bound up with shaping for oneself, always in a social context 
and always in interaction with others, an integrated bodily perspective. In 
Part IV, I try to develop these suggestions in de Beauvoir's work into an 
account of autonomy which preserves some of her insights about 
embodiment and intersubjectivity, but which avoids the tensions arising 
from her view of autonomy as an exercise of a disembodied will.
Between the discussion of de Beauvoir in Part II, and my own account of 
embodied autonomy in Part IV, Part m  reconstructs the historical origins of 
our contemporary understanding of autonomy and in doing so shows why 
autonomy has been such a fraught ideal for women. This part of the thesis 
focuses principally on the social and political philosophies of Rousseau and 
Hegel. It aims to show the systematic interconnections within their work 
between their rather different accounts of autonomy, but highly similar
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views about the appropriate social roles of women. My argument is that 
these views about women cannot be dismissed as superficial sexism, but 
underpin Rousseau and Hegel's different solutions to what they perceive 
as the fundamental moral and political problem of the modern age, the 
problem of how to reconcile individuality with community. Part m  
concludes with a chapter on the ideal of autonomy in the writings of Mary 
Wollstonecraft. Contrary to the dominant feminist interpretations of 
Wollstonecraft's work, which regard her as simply attempting to 
appropriate a masculine ideal of autonomy for women, I argue that 
Wollstonecraft was in fact wrestling with the problem of how to articulate 
an ideal of autonomy which recognises the significance of both human 
embodiment and intersubjectivity.
PART II
A Certain  Lack  of Sym m etry: d e  Beauvo ir  o n  
A u t o n o m o u s  A gency a n d  w o m e n 's Em bo dim ent
The terms 'm asculine' and 'fem inine' are 
used symmetrically only as a matter of form, 
as on legal papers. In actuality the relation of 
the two sexes is not quite like that of two 
electrical poles, for man represents both the 
positive and the neutral, as is indicated by the 
common use of m an  to designate hum an 
beings in general; whereas woman represents 
only the negative, defined by lim iting 
criteria, w ithout reciprocity...just as for the 
ancients there was an absolute vertical with 
reference to which the oblique was defined, 
so there is an absolute hum an type, the 
masculine. (The Second Sex, p. 15)
Introduction
In the Introduction to The Second Sex de Beauvoir lays out for the reader 
the conceptual grid which will be employed in her analysis of woman's 
situation. A number of interconnected categories and oppositions feature 
significantly in this grid, categories and oppositions which de Beauvoir 
claims she derives directly from Sartrean existentialism. Distinctions such 
as subject/object, transcendence/immanence, authenticity/bad faith and 
concepts such as 'freedom' and 'the project' are thus introduced from the 
outset. In the body of the text these are supplemented by others such as self- 
consciousness/Life. Chief among these interpretive categories is the 
opposition essential One/inessential Other. This opposition, in particular 
the category of the Other, de Beauvoir asserts, is 'as primordial as 
consciousness itself', figuring in all mythologies and cultures.1 Primordial 
or not, if we are to believe de Beauvoir, it seems that an understanding of 
the philosophical implications of this category had to wait for the 
phenomenology of Hegel and the ontology of Sartre. It is their 
understanding of the self/other opposition that de Beauvoir claims she is 
using to throw light on the situation of women.
Given the extent of authorial guidance as to how the text should be read The 
Second Sex should by rights present the conscientious reader with no major 
interpretive obstacles. So what is to be made of the fact that the text is 
knotted with tensions? In recent criticism one tendency has been to argue 
that these internal difficulties arise as a result of de Beauvoir's application to 
woman's situation of the very categories, including that of the Other, which 
she regards as facilitating her analysis.2 These arguments suggest that these
1. Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, translated by H.M. Parshley, (Penguin Books, 
Harmondsworth, 1972), p. 16. Hereafter cited as S.S.
2. See for example: Genevieve Lloyd, 'Masters, Slaves and Others', Radical Philosophy 34, 
Summer 1983, Special issue on Women, Gender and Philosophy; Elizabeth Spelman, 'Woman 
as Body: Ancient and Contemporary Views', Feminist Studies, vol. 8, no. 1, 1982, pp. 109-131;
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categories in their original Hegelian and Sartrean contexts are inextricably 
connected with a fundamental hierarchical opposition between masculine 
and feminine in which the feminine is associated with whatever is 
devalued and to be transcended. De Beauvoir's ability so strikingly to 
illuminate the situation of women is thus all the more remarkable. It is an 
achievement despite rather than because of her philosophical framework.
Another view, suggested by Moira Gatens, is that de Beauvoir's assessment 
of her own philosophical approach in The Second Sex has the effect of 
making her contribution to philosophy invisible.* 3 Michele Le Doeuff has 
argued that in their relationship to philosophy women historically have 
acted as vestals, preserving, commemorating and commenting upon the 
work of the great philosophers but adding no words of their own to the text 
of philosophy .4 Gatens argues that it is not that women add no words of 
their own, it is rather that they claim no words as their own. De Beauvoir's 
analysis of the situation of women is an instance of just this syndrome, 
since she herself tells the reader that her analysis is entirely consonant with 
Sartrean existentialism. However her text belies this claim. To take de 
Beauvoir at her word and hence to regard the internal contradictions of The 
Second Sex as arising chiefly out of the philosophical constraints de 
Beauvoir has imposed on herself is thus to underestimate the complexity of 
both de Beauvoir's project and her text.
and my article 'Simone de Beauvoir: Philosophy and/or the Female Body' in Elizabeth Gross 
& Carole Pateman (eds), Feminist Challenges: Social and Political Theory, (Allen & Unwin,
Sydney, 1986).
3. Moira Gatens, 'Feminism, Philosophy and Riddles without Answers' in Feminist 
Challenges op. cit.
4. Michele Le Doeuff, 'Women and Philosophy', translated by Debbie Pope, Radical 
Philosophy 17, 1977, pp. 2-11. However, despite the fact that, in keeping with this 
argument, Le Doeuff calls The Second Sex 'a morganatic wedding-present' and a 'labour of 
love', in her own article on de Beauvoir Le Doeuff's main aim is to show how de Beauvoir 
actually transforms Sartrean existentialism in applying it to the situation of women. See 
Michele Le Doeuff; 'Operative Philosophy: Simone de Beauvoir and existentialism', 
translated by Colin Gordon, Ideology & Consciousness, no. 6, Autumn 1979, pp.47-57.
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My argument in this part of the thesis assumes that both of these approaches 
to The Second Sex are correct. I want to show how de Beauvoir's analysis of 
woman's situation simultaneously uses, is limited by, and reveals the 
limitations of, some of the philosophical presuppositions from which she 
begins. In particular, I want to show how her account of the way in which 
oppression structures the psyches and the bodies of women, is both 
constrained by and calls into question the account of autonomous agency, 
derived from themes in the work of Hegel and Sartre, which also provides 
the philosophical perspective from which she develops her analysis of 
oppression.5 As a result, while de Beauvoir's conception of autonomy 
opens up the theoretical space for an analysis of oppression, it also commits 
her to the problematic view that women's embodiment makes ethical 
authenticity, or autonomy, more difficult for women to achieve than it is 
for men.
I begin Chapter Two by arguing that what specifically characterises 
de Beauvoir's philosophical project is an ethical concern. That this is the 
primary concern of de Beauvoir's philosophical work becomes evident once 
The Second Sex is read in conjunction with The Ethics of Ambiguity, de 
Beauvoir's more explicitly ethical text which was written at about the same 
time as The Second Sex and which is concerned primarily with questions of 
freedom, choice and ethical responsibility.6 De Beauvoir's concern with 
ethics has a double aspect. On the one hand she is interested in articulating 
the conditions of possibility for ethics in general; on the other hand she 
seeks to understand the difference between autonomous, authentic ethical 
agency and ethical failure or heteronomy. In particular she is interested in
5. De Beauvoir rarely uses the term 'autonomy'. My discussion uses the term 'autonomy' and 
de Beauvoir's preferred terms 'transcendence', 'freedom' and 'authenticity' interchangeably.
6. Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, translated by Bernard Frechtman (Citadel 
Press, Secaucus, NJ, 1975). Hereafter cited as E.A.
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investigating the reasons for ethical failure or heteronomy. It is this 
investigation in The Ethics of Ambiguity which gives rise to her analysis of 
women's oppression in The Second Sex.
My discussion of de Beauvoir's accounts of autonomy and oppression 
focuses in particular on her notion of woman as Other. I argue that if we 
situate the notion of woman as Other within the broader context of de 
Beauvoir's ethical concerns three distinct though related notions of the 
other emerge: others; the Inessential Other or 'object'; the Absolute Other.
In the first of these uses, that is as referring to others, the notion of the other 
is central to de Beauvoir's account of autonomy. For she thinks that 
genuine autonomy requires a commitment to the autonomy of others. 
Understood in this first sense de Beauvoir's use of the notion of the other 
implies that reciprocal recognition between transcendent or autonomous 
subjects is not only possible but ethically required. In this context de 
Beauvoir's view of our relations with others is closer to Hegel's more 
optimistic version of the self/other distinction in the master/slave dialectic 
than to Sartre's version of this distinction in Being and Nothingness.7
This ethical requirement to recognise the freedom of others provides the 
moral framework within which de Beauvoir can condemn oppression as an 
evil. Oppression arises when, instead of recognising that others are the 
condition of possibility of our own freedom, we regard them either as an 
intolerable limit to our freedom or else as expendable in the interests of our 
freedom. In contrast to the reciprocal recognition which characterises a 
genuinely ethical relation to others, oppression is thus defined as an
7. G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A.V. Miller, with an analysis of 
text and foreword by J.N. Findlay. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977). Jean-Paul Sartre, Being 
and Nothingness, translated by Hazel Barnes (Philosophical Library, N.Y. 1972), hereafter 
cited as B.N.. Marion Tapper has proposed a similar view, with respect to de Beauvoir's 
analysis of love, in her article 'Sartre and de Beauvoir on Love' in Critical Philosophy, vol. 
2, no. 1, 1985.
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asymmetrical and ossified relation in which the other is treated not as a self- 
determining subject but as a thing, or 'object7, an Inessential Other. This is 
the second of de Beauvoir's interpretations of the self-other distinction 
which is closely aligned with that of Sartre. But whereas the Sartrean 
version of this relation is a pessimistic account of interpersonal relations 
between individuals, de Beauvoir's ideal of an ethical relation to the other 
based on reciprocal recognition enables her to transform Sartre's account 
into an analysis of oppressive and distorted social relations structured by 
relations of domination and subordination. Here once again de Beauvoir's 
impetus is ethical -  de Beauvoir's use of the notion of the other as 
Inessential Other is used to account for the failure of oppressed persons to 
realise their possibilities as autonomous agents. The great strength of this 
account of oppression lies in the way it is able to explain the process of 
'internalization', that is the way in which the oppressed come to think of 
themselves as less than autonomous subjects.8 However de Beauvoir's 
understanding of 'internalization' is limited by her adherence to the 
Sartrean conception of the subject as radical freedom. This explains why her 
text oscillates between the notions of 'oppression' and 'bad faith' in 
explaining women's complicity with their situation.
In her readings of myth and literature de Beauvoir uses the third sense of 
the notion of the other, the other as Absolute Other, to identify an extreme 
expression of the process of objectification -  the myth of 'femininity'. Here 
de Beauvoir can be taken to show how 'Woman' as Absolute Other 
functions as a metaphor of whatever is repressed or excluded in the self­
constitution of phallocentric systems of signification.9 De Beauvoir shows
8 The term 'internalization' is not actually used by de Beauvoir herself. However 1 think it 
appropriately captures, without distorting, her view.
9 The term 'phallocentrism' is used to characterise discourses, texts and systems of 
signification which are structured around a hierarchical opposition between masculinity and
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in her analysis that the term Woman', as designating some essence of 
femininity, thus does not refer in any direct sense to women, considered 
either individually or collectively, as concrete empirical subjects. Rather it 
is a projection of masculine 'bad faith' which functions to 'naturalize' the 
oppression of women. Her deconstruction of the signifier 'Woman' or of 
woman as 'Absolute Other' is intended to reveal the complete 
unjustifiability of women's oppression.
What is particularly striking about de Beauvoir's analysis of oppression is 
that it locates the effects of internalization not merely in the beliefs of the 
oppressed but in their bodies and body-images. This makes clear the 
connection between the truncated ethical possibilities of the oppressed and 
their bodily situation. But de Beauvoir's presentation of women's bodily 
situations exhibits the same tensions that are in evidence elsewhere in her 
work. In Chapter Three I suggest that her characterisation of the significance 
of women's embodiment can be read in two incompatible ways. On the one 
hand, de Beauvoir's descriptions of female embodiment as passive and 
limiting can be read as descriptions of women's lived experience, as that 
experience is constructed by oppression. Further, if this reading is conjoined 
with de Beauvoir's analysis of woman as 'Absolute Other', what emerges is 
the view that just as the category 'Woman' bears no necessary connection 
with women, so too the passive 'female' or 'feminine' body bears no 
necessary connection with women. Rather it is itself an effect of oppression. 
On the other hand de Beauvoir also seems to suggest that the facticity of the 
female body itself is an obstacle to autonomous agency. Whereas for men 
the body is an active instrument of the will, women's problem is that their 
bodies function more as a resistance to or constraint on the will.
femininity and in which femininity is defined solely in relation to an already defined 
masculinity, as either the same as, or a deviation from, it.
58
My argument is that these two incompatible views about the significance of 
women's embodiment both arise from a distinction between the immanent 
and the transcendent body. While this distinction provides the theoretical 
framework for de Beauvoir's analysis of oppression, it is also problematic 
because in The Second Sex the ideal of the transcendent body is defined in 
opposition to the reproductive body. In other words, de Beauvoir's ideal of 
the transcendent body associates the transcendent body with the masculine 
body. I argue that what this reveals is that the very notion of the body as 
transcendent presupposes a problematic view of autonomous agency as 
control over the body by a supposedly sexually neutral 'will' or 
consciousness. This view is problematic not only because this supposedly 
sexually neutral 'will' turns out implicitly to be associated with masculinity, 
but also because it involves an inadequate conception of embodied 
subjectivity and hence of autonomous agency. As a consequence, there 
seems to be a fundamental tension, within de Beauvoir's philosophical 
project as a whole, between her call for a relation to the other founded on a 
genuine recognition of the radical otherness of the other, and the fact that 
her analysis of woman's situation leaves de Beauvoir unable to provide an 
ideal of autonomous agency that is capable of incorporating a recognition of 
both the specificity and the variety of women's bodily perspectives.
It would be a mistake however to think that the problems in de Beauvoir's 
account of autonomy arise solely from her philosophical framework. While 
part of the problem does indeed lie with this framework, which commits 
her to the idea that autonomous agency involves control over the body by a 
sexually indifferent will, a further source of trouble, as I shall argue in Part 
III, is that in a dominant strand of our cultural history ideals of autonomy 
and representations of femininity have been defined as mutually exclusive.
Chapter Two
FREEDOM AND OPPRESSION 
Section 1: Ethics, Ambiguity and Others
De Beauvoir's project in The Ethics of Ambiguity is not to formulate a set of 
abstract and fundamental moral principles by means of which a person can 
determine how she should act in a given situation. It is rather an 
argument against an abstract moral code and in favour of an ethics of the 
'situation', an ethics of action. That is, it is an ethics which stresses the 
particularity of each moral agent and each moral situation and which 
argues that moral choice is a question of individual action in response to 
the specificity of each situation. No prior determination of value, in other 
words, can indicate how a person should act in any particular situation. 
Ethics is rather a question for each individual of deciding how s/he wants 
to live. But because human freedom is the condition of possibility of ethics, 
this question must be posed again and again, at each moment.
De Beauvoir's ethics thus locates the source of moral value in the moral 
autonomy of each individual. But her conception of autonomy 
nevertheless sanctions neither ethical inconsistency nor ethical anarchy. 
According to de Beauvoir, our choices are always made in the context of 
our previous and possible future moral choices and, more importantly, in 
the context of relations with others. These factors both structure our ethical 
possibilities in specific ways and mean that with the freedom to make 
choices comes also the responsibility for the choices we make. For de 
Beauvoir this responsibility is not merely responsibility for oneself. 
Responsibility for self also involves responsibility to recognise the freedom 
of others to the extent that our choices create or close off the ethical 
possibilities of others and vice-versa. Thus although de Beauvoir rejects 
the idea of an absolute moral code, she nevertheless thinks that we can
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distinguish good actions from bad, that is authentic from inauthentic. The 
Ethics of Ambiguity is an account of the requirements for authentic, 
autonomous action -  namely taking responsibility for our freedom -  as 
well as an explanation of some of the reasons for ethical failure. The 
Second Sex is an extended analysis of one of these reasons -  sexual 
oppression.
De Beauvoir's central claim in The Ethics of Ambiguity is that it is the 
fundamental and inescapable ambiguity of the human situation that both 
makes possible and gives rise to the need for ethics. She characterises this 
ambiguity in terms of a series of interconnected oppositions: between 
nature and consciousness; subject and object; life and death; externality and 
internality; the present and the future; the individual and the collectivity; 
particularity and impartiality. Echoing Kant's idea that human beings 
belong to both the noumenal and the phenomenal worlds, her view is that 
human life is situated ambiguously between these oppositions. For 
example, as embodied natural beings human beings are both part of the 
natural world (inescapably immersed in it, we might say), and yet distanced 
from it by virtue of the fact that we are conscious and self-conscious beings. 
We are subjects amidst a universe of objects, yet we are ourselves objects in 
that universe. This distance cannot be transcended but in fact opens up the 
space for meaning and signification. We do not just inhabit the world, we 
constitute it as meaningful for us. Similarly, the mortality of human 
beings gives rise to a fundamental sense of ambiguity. Like the rest of the 
natural world we will all die, but unlike the rest of the natural world we are 
conscious of our own deaths. Our lives are thus inhabited by and 
structured around consciousness of our own deaths. But it is in virtue of 
this consciousness of death that life is valuable: 'every living moment is a 
sliding towards death...but...every movement towards death is life' . 1 And
1. de Beauvoir, E.A. p. 127.
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while the distance between the present and the future is a source of 
anguish, it is only as conscious beings aware of our own temporality, of 
ourselves as beings with past histories and future possibilities, that we exert 
ourselves beyond the immediate desires of the present to make the future 
possible: 'it is in the interval which separates me today from an 
unforeseeable future that there are meanings and ends towards which to 
direct my acts' . 2
De Beauvoir grounds her analyses of ambiguity, freedom, authenticity and 
choice in certain epistemological and ontological doctrines of Hegel and 
Sartre. From Sartre she derives the claim that ambiguity arises from the 
structure of human consciousness, specifically from its non-coincidence 
with, or lack of, Being and as a consequence from the fact that the meaning 
of human existence is never fixed. To Hegel she owes the insight that self- 
consciousness arises not in the interiority of the Cartesian cogito but in 
intersubjective recognition.3
1. Freedom
Sartre's ontology distinguishes two distinct modes of being, the being of the 
in-itself or transcendent object and the being of the for-itself or 
consciousness. While the in-itself coincides with its being, is identical with 
itself, "full of itself", consciousness exists rather as a relation to Being: 
'consciousness in its inmost nature is a relation to a transcendent being'.4 
All consciousness is 'positional' consciousness of the world and
2. de Beauvoir, op. cit. p. 121. Thomas Nagel's characterisation of the tension in ethics 
between the external and the internal perspectives recalls, without the underlying Sartrean 
ontology but with the common Kantian heritage, de Beauvoir's notion of ambiguity. See for 
example the essays in Mortal Questions (Cambridge U.P. 1975) and The View From Nowhere 
(Oxford U.P. N.Y. 1986)
3. My presentations of the views of Sartre and Hegel in this chapter focus only on those 
aspects of their work that are salient to an understanding of De Beauvoir's appropriation of 
certain themes in their philosophies.
4. Sartre, B.N., p. lx.
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consciousness, though not identical with its intentional object, 
nevertheless has no being apart from the being of this object. It exists as a 
'lack' or 'nihilation' of Being. The being of consciousness is thus to exist at a 
distance from itself, a 'being-in-the-world' that is always projecting itself 
toward the in-itself or Being, but never coinciding with Being.
For Sartre it is this distance internal to consciousness that is the source of 
both human freedom and value. Like Kant, Sartre thinks that human 
freedom is possible only if human consciousness is not subject to empirical 
causality. It is only because it exists as a lack' of Being, that is as a mode of 
being that is able to disengage itself from immersion in the world and to 
choose its mode of relation to the world, that reflective consciousness can 
escape causal determination. Freedom is thus constitutive of human 
consciousness. It is also the source of all value. Sartre defines value as the 
ideal towards which consciousness surpasses itself but which it can never 
attain. As lack', consciousness is haunted by the desire to be what Sartre 
calls an 'impossible synthesis of for-itself and in-itself', that is to be itself as 
totality, a being which coincides with Being and yet maintains the 
translucency of consciousness.5 This totality, the end towards which 
consciousness surpasses itself, is value or the meaning of existence. It is 
also the inapprehensible 'self' from which the for-itself is separated. The 
meaning of the for-itself is thus neither prior to nor independent of 
consciousness, nor is it ever realised by consciousness. Rather, value is 
consubstantial with consciousness, insofar as it is what consciousness 
perpetually lacks.
For Sartre it is only because consciousness does not coincide with itself that 
it is open to possibility, that is to the possibility of being otherwise. While 
the in-itself is thus defined by what it is, being-for-self is a being defined by
5. Sartre, op. cit. p. 96.
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what it is not, that is by its own possibilities in the mode of not yet being 
them. According to Sartre this makes consciousness being in the form of 
an 'option on its being', a being which can choose its mode of relation to the 
world.6 But if consciousness is a being which is constantly escaping itself 
towards its own possibilities then the meaning of its existence is not fixed 
but chosen: 'consciousness is a being whose existence posits its essence and 
inversely, it is consciousness of a being whose essence implies its 
existence' . 7
For my purposes here it is not important to enquire into the veracity of 
Sartre's account of consciousness. What is salient however is de Beauvoir's 
claim in The Ethics of Ambiguity that, as it stands, this ontology opens up 
but does not itself provide an ethical perspective. Her intention is thus to 
extrapolate from the Sartrean analysis of consciousness a number of 
implications about the nature of value, freedom, choice and action that will 
provide the basis for an existential ethic. The first requirement of any such 
ethic is a recognition that the negativity or lack which constitutes 
consciousness must be positively affirmed as the foundation of all 
signification. Value arises only insofar as there is a consciousness which is 
able imaginatively to disengage itself from immersion in the world and, in 
defining its own relation to the world, posit the world as meaningful: 'By 
uprooting himself from the world, man makes himself present to the 
world and makes the world present to him' .8 In other words, although 
consciousness does not bring Being into existence, in constituting itself it 
structures the world as a synthetic and organised totality. In de Beauvoir's 
terminology consciousness is the 'disclosure of Being'. What this means is
6. Sartre, op. cit. p. 99.
7. Sartre, op.cit. p.lxii
8. de Beauvoir, E.A. p. 12.
that value is not given a priori. Rather it arises from the relationship 
between consciousness and the world.
It is of course Hegel's insight that meaning and value are grounded in 
reflective awareness of the dialectical relationship between ourselves as 
subjects and the world which is the object of our consciousness. For Hegel, 
however, because the development of self-consciousness occurs within the 
process of the dialectical unfolding of Spirit, the dialectical oppositions 
between subject and object and between Spirit and self-consciousness are 
eventually reconciled or aufgehoben in Absolute Knowledge. Thus the 
totality which self-consciousness seeks to articulate is universal and 
Absolute. By contrast for de Beauvoir, who rejects the concept of Spirit, no 
such reconciliation between consciousness and its objects and between the 
for-itself and value are possible. Rather ethics is the attempt to live the 
ambiguous tension between these oppositions. Neither can there be a 
universal totality. This is why for de Beauvoir it is not 'impersonal, 
universal man who is the source of values, but the plurality of concrete, 
particular men projecting themselves towards ends on the basis of 
situations whose particularity is as radical and irreducible as subjectivity 
itself' . 9
Following Sartre, de Beauvoir also claims that the negativity which 
characterises consciousness is the source of freedom. It is only because 
consciousness exists as a 'disclosure of Being', and hence because the 
meaning of existence is not given a priori, that I am free to determine my 
mode of relation to the world. For de Beauvoir however although it is the 
structure of human consciousness which makes freedom possible, freedom 
is not a given. Rather it must be willed and won. The authentic ethical
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9. de Beauvoir, op.cit. p. 17.
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agent is the individual who, rather than attempting to coincide with Being, 
actively seeks to disclose Being and thus wills their own freedom.
De Beauvoir's very Kantian notion of 'willing' freedom or 'transcendence' 
is best explicated through the notions of facticity -  freedom's 'other' in 
opposition to which it defines itself -  and the 'project'. Sartre and de 
Beauvoir use the term 'facticity' to refer to the cluster of contingent yet 
inescapable factors which affect both human existence in general and 
individual existences. Human facticity would include such factors as the 
fact of human embodiment and the morphology of the human body, our 
mortality and finitude, 'the staggering dimensions of the world about us, 
the density of our ignorance, the risks of catastrophes to come' . 10 
Individual facticity includes our historical, social and geographical location, 
our race, sex, colour and ethnicity, our individual handicaps and strengths 
and so on. Facticity for de Beauvoir is thus understood in terms of the 
resistance which the world opposes to our wills, but it is a resistance 
without which freedom could not function. Like Kant's dove, I exert my 
will, I exercise choice in relation to a world structured by facticity. To will 
my freedom just is to achieve autonomy within the inescapable limits 
imposed by facticity and thus to transcend or surpass facticity.
If facticity is the ground from which freedom takes off, the 'project' is the 
means by which freedom is concretely realised. For unless freedom can 
express itself in action, in the choice of particular ends and activities, it 
remains a purely abstract notion. The term 'project' has two connected 
senses. In its first sense a project is any willed activity by means of which 
an individual consciously acts upon the world, thereby both transforming 
the world and defining herself in terms of her future possibilities. 
Considered separately from one another however, as discrete choices, such
10. de Beauvoir, op. cit. p. 159.
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projects cannot constitute authentic action. For a project could be chosen 
one moment and abandoned the next, in which case the notion of choice 
would be indistinguishable from impulse while the ambiguity of existence 
would become indistinguishable from absurdity. In order for action to be 
the realisation of freedom therefore, it must exhibit a unity which unfolds 
in time. An action can only be authentic to the extent that it is founded 
upon past actions and projected towards future actions. The possibility of 
ethics thus arises only for a being conscious of its own historicity and 
temporality. This gives us the second sense of the term 'project', the project 
as original project or choice. A project is original not in the sense that it is 
temporally prior to or separate from particular projects but in the sense that 
it justifies them .11
Once again the status of this original project attests to the ambiguity of the 
human situation. On the one hand an individual existence can only be 
justified to the extent that the individual defines herself through such a 
project. On the other hand, human freedom means that this original 
project cannot itself be justified or determined by anything other than itself. 
It is fundamentally contingent. Similarly, although this project is only 
concretely realised to the extent that it is affirmed by and enacted in 
particular projects and choices, it cannot causally determine the future 
actions of that individual. Rather it must be freely chosen at each moment. 
This is why the original choice must be constantly re-made in each action: 
'The drama of original choice is that it goes on moment by moment for an 
entire lifetime, that it occurs without reason, before any reason, that 
freedom is there as if it were present only in the form of contingency' . 12
11. De Beauvoir's distinction between individual and original projects, and her claim that a 
person can only be said to be acting authentically if her individual projects are united by an 
original project, echoes both Young's distinction between 'dispositional' and 'occurrent' 
autonomy and Taylor's distinction between the 'simple weigher' and the 'strong evaluator'.
12. de Beauvoir, op. cit. p. 40.
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The fact that our freedom can only become concrete through these freely 
chosen but fundamentally contingent projects thus means that there is an 
inescapable tension in our perspective on and attitudes towards our 
projects. Viewed from an external perspective they are arbitrary and 
without justification. Viewed from an internal perspective they confer 
meaning upon our existence.
At this point I wish to digress briefly from this exegesis just to indicate an 
aspect of de Beauvoir's account of the project the significance of which will 
become salient in the next chapter. This is that de Beauvoir explicitly 
denies certain activities the status of projects. Significantly these activities 
include bodily functions, as well as activities of self-preservation and 
reproduction. Thus pregnancy, giving birth and childcare are not 
individual projects and cannot justify existence. Rather they are 
unconscious activities serving the interests of the species.
II. Others
The existentialist notion of the project as the concrete realisation and 
unfolding of freedom echoes one of the founding themes of Hegelian 
metaphysics - the theme of externalisation.13 But for both Sartre and de 
Beauvoir Hegel's greatest insight is his account of self-consciousness in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, which charts the development of subjectivity as a 
process of intersubjective relations. In the master-slave dialectic Hegel 
shows how self-consciousness arises only in relation to another self- 
consciousness. It is only through their confrontation with one another, 
through a recognition of their identity in difference, that subjects constitute 
themselves as subjects and that self-consciousness becomes concrete. This
13. In Hegel's system Spirit remains merely an abstract notion unless it becomes concrete by 
externalizing itself in Nature and in human self-consciousness. Similarly in the master/slave 
dialectic, the slave's self-consciousness assumes concrete content when he externalizes himself 
in labour.
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insight is incorporated into de Beauvoir's ethics in the view that freedom 
can only be realized in the context of relations with others. It is 
transformed into the basis of a theory of oppression by the claim that the 
actions of an individual can only be considered ethical, or authentic, to the 
extent that they embody a recognition of the freedom of others. The 
following analysis of de Beauvoir's discussion of our relations with others 
thus begins my examination of her three uses of the notion of the other.
De Beauvoir's characterisation of our relations with others manifests her 
typical preoccupation with ambiguity. She stresses the tension in our 
dealings with others between a concern for justice, which requires that we 
treat individuals impersonally and impartially, and the ethical importance 
of the particular attachments and affections between particular individuals, 
affections and attachments which often conflict with the demands of 
justice. She points to a similar tension between a Kantian demand that we 
treat persons as ends in themselves rather than as means, and a utilitarian 
concern to minimise total suffering. Further, while violence against 
persons is an inexcusable atrocity in which the other becomes for us a mere 
thing, violence against certain individuals is in some instances necessary to 
preserve the freedom of the collectivity. By now it should come as no 
surprise that de Beauvoir's account of our relations with others does not 
offer a solution which will either dissipate these tensions or reconcile 
them. Once again, ethics is necessary because these tensions are endemic to 
human social life. It is inconceivable to imagine a future in which 
individuals will not make opposing and irreconcilable choices, in which 
our projects will not compete with the projects of others, in which the 
diversity of our particular interests can be finally harmonized.
De Beauvoir locates the ambiguity inherent in our relations with others in 
the plurality of human consciousness, in the fact that though related to one 
another human beings are nevertheless separate from one another. Thus
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although from an external perspective our situations are similarly 
conditioned by our finitude and mortality, as lived those situations are 
irreducibly different. From one perspective this irreducible difference and 
the conflict to which it often gives rise might make it appear that for each 
subject the existence of others appears as a threat to her own projects.
De Beauvoir argues however that this perspective misunderstands the 
nature of freedom: 'to be free is not to have the power to do anything you 
like; it is to be able to surpass the given toward an open future; the existence 
of others as a freedom defines my situation and is even the condition of my 
freedom ' . 14 It is only insofar as there are others who, by exercising their 
freedom in projects disclose and transform the world, that there can be a 
world at all in relation to which the individual defines herself. Others 
therefore open out possibilities for us in relation to which or against which 
we define our possibilities.
But others can only open out our possibilities if they themselves can create 
their own possibilities, that is if their possibilities for transcendence are not 
frustrated by their situation. In The Ethics of Ambiguity de Beauvoir 
distinguishes two ways in which our undertakings may be frustrated by our 
situation. On the one hand we often confront natural obstacles and 
disasters as well as the ever-present risk of death. But these factors, cruel 
and contingent though they may be, are not limitations on our freedom. 
Rather they define our human condition. To the extent that we resign 
ourselves in the face of them and give up hope then we have failed to 
come to terms with that condition. On the other hand, because our 
freedom is exercised only in the context of relations with others, our 
undertakings can be frustrated by their refusal to recognise that freedom. 
'Only man can be an enemy for man; only he can rob him of the meaning 
of his acts and his life because it also belongs to him alone to confirm it in
14. de Beauvoir, op. cit. p. 91.
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its existence, to recognize it in actual fact as a freedom' . 15 It is this situation 
which defines oppression which is therefore never 'natural' but always 
arises in the context of relations between subjects.
In the next section of this chapter I will discuss de Beauvoir's 
characterisation of oppression in more detail. Before turning to this 
however I want to make it clear exactly how de Beauvoir defines 
oppression in contradistinction to the ethical demand that we recognise the 
freedom of others. In the discussion so far I have indicated that de 
Beauvoir thinks that mutual recognition between subjects is not only 
possible but is also ethically required. This point will become clearer by a 
consideration of the way in which de Beauvoir is applying to the realm of 
ethics the insights of the master-slave dialectic.16
The master-slave dialectic traces the development of self-consciousness out 
of a confrontation between two subjects. The point of the dialectic is 
epistemological: knowledge requires self-knowledge of oneself as a rational 
being, but self-knowledge is only possible firstly in intersubjectivity, 
ultimately in knowledge of Spirit. In the initial stages of this confrontation 
the quest for self-knowledge or self-certainty takes the form of a desire in 
which each subject seeks to establish its own identity, that is gain 
recognition of itself as a subject, by attempting to appropriate or incorporate 
the other, that is annihilate the independent existence of the other. This 
mode of seeking self-certainty is contradictory however. A subject can only 
gain recognition from another whose existence is independent. The
15. de Beauvoir, op. cit. p. 82.
16. My reading of the master-slave dialectic at this point is strongly influenced by the 
interpretations of Kojeve, Hyppolite and Gadamer. Kojeve's interpretation is of course the 
one that was available to de Beauvoir. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic: Five 
Hermeneutical Studies, translated by P. Christopher Smith, (Yale University Press, New 
Haven & London, 1976); Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of 
Spirit (Northeastern University Press, Boston, 1974); Alexandre Kojeve, Introduction to the 
Reading of Hegel (Cornell U.P., Ithaca, N.Y., 1980).
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attempt to incorporate the other involves treating the other not as a subject 
but as a mere thing. But any independent subject will resist this attempt at 
incorporation. Desire thus becomes transformed into the life-and-death 
struggle in which each subject attempts to gain self-recognition by 
destroying the other. Again however the death of either subject will 
frustrate the desire for recognition. One cannot be recognised by a corpse. 
The attempt to achieve recognition thus results not in the death of the 
other but in the other's subjection. What is attractive to the masterly 
consciousness about the slave's subjection is its ambiguity. For it involves 
a simultaneous recognition and denial of the slave's subjectivity. On the 
one hand the slave is another subject but he is a subject who has agreed to 
become a thing for the other rather than risk death. The slave thus holds 
out the promise of recognition without the requirement that that 
recognition be reciprocated. For Flegel however this promise is an illusion. 
Recognition requires equality between subjects, but in the recognition of the 
slave the master gains recognition not from another subject but from a 
subordinate consciousness whose trepidation in the face of death shows 
that he attaches no value to self-certainty. The slave would rather live a 
life whose sole meaning is survival than risk life in the pursuit of value.
De Beauvoir's condemnation of oppression and her claim that freedom 
requires that we guarantee the freedom of others alludes to this idea that 
recognition cannot be achieved in relations of domination and 
subordination. What then is involved in genuine recognition? In brief 
remarks on love and friendship in both The Ethics of Ambiguity and The 
Second Sex de Beauvoir suggests that genuine recognition of the other 
requires an equality and symmetry between subjects. This involves 
renunciation of any attempt either to merge our subjectivity with that of 
the other or to subsume the other under our own projects. We affirm 
ourselves as subjects only by accepting the freedom and independence of
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the other. Recognition therefore requires recognition of the otherness of
the other, of their difference from ourselves:
It is only as something strange, forbidden, as something free, that the 
other is revealed as an other. And to love him genuinely is to love 
him in his otherness and in that freedom by which he escapes. Love 
is renunciation of all possession, of all confusion. One renounces 
being in order that there may be that being which one is not.17
De Beauvoir makes it clear in The Second Sex that although our relations
with others cannot always involve such reciprocal recognition, love and
friendship 'are assuredly man's highest achievement, and through that
achievement he is to be found in his true nature', that is, as a being which
in renouncing mere being also renounces possession.18
These remarks, in which de Beauvoir clearly indicates that reciprocal 
recognition is possible and requires simultaneous recognition of the other, 
as both like ourselves, as a transcendent subject, and as irreducibly other, 
make a rather sharp break from the ontology of Being and Nothingness.
For while Sartre also acknowledges that self-consciousness only arises in 
the context of our relations with others, he explicitly precludes the 
possibility of mutual recognition between transcendent subjects. As 
Genevieve Lloyd has argued, for Sartre the self as revealed by the other is 
not the transcendent self of the for-itself which is always escaping towards 
its own possibilities.19 It is rather being-for-others, a self experienced 
through the emotions in which I experience myself not as transcendent but 
as objectified by the Other. Although for Sartre the very structure of 
human consciousness means that I cannot ever become this object which I 
experience myself as being, relations with others are nevertheless a
17. de Beauvoir, op.cit. p. 67.
18. de Beauvoir, S.S. p. 172.
19. Genevieve Lloyd, 'Masters, Slaves and Others', Radical Philosophy 34, Summer 1983. 
Special issue, Women, Gender and Philosophy. For Sartre's discussion of the Look, see B.N., 
pp. 252-282
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perpetual struggle in which, in the Look, each subject either objectifies the 
other or tries to resist objectification by the other. In other words for Sartre 
de Beauvoir's ideal of mutual recognition by each subject of the other as a 
free being is not possible. As I have argued however it is this ideal which, 
for de Beauvoir, opens up the theoretical space for an analysis of 
oppression.
III. Authenticity, Bad Faith and Oppression
From the preceding analysis the requirements for autonomous agency 
should be reasonably clear. The authentic agent is the individual who 
seeks neither to evade nor overcome the fundamental ambiguity of the 
human situation, but rather accepts this ambiguity and wills the freedom of 
which it is a consequence. To will freedom or seek transcendence is to 
justify one's own existence through a disclosure of Being, that is to freely 
create or constitute oneself as a relation to the world and in so doing to 
confer meaning and value upon the world. In 'projects' which are the 
concrete realization of her freedom the authentic subject creates herself as a 
relation to the world by transcending the fixed givens of facticity, so 
opening up new future possibilities for herself. Further while the pursuit 
of these possibilities inevitably gives rise to conflict between individuals, 
our relations with others can only be authentic to the extent that, in mutual 
recognition, we guarantee their freedom as the condition of our own.
Such heroism however is not easy to sustain. If freedom must constantly 
be won we face every moment an existential choice between accepting 
freedom and its attendant anguish or, in 'bad faith', attempting to flee that 
anguish by refusing freedom. Although 'bad faith' can manifest itself in an 
infinite variety of ways, the chief characteristic of 'bad faith' is that it is an 
attempt to deny either the ambiguity of existence or the fact that 
consciousness exists only as 'lack'. Thus in 'bad faith' the subject attempts
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to coincide with, rather than to disclose Being; rather than opening up 
possibilities for herself she attempts to foreclose them. For both Sartre and 
de Beauvoir the privileged zone of 'bad faith' is our relations with others.
In this instance 'bad faith' involves an attempt to escape the struggle 
between subjects for recognition. The subject who is acting in 'bad faith' 
fails to resist the other's attempt to objectify him. He allows himself to be 
objectified by the other and identifies himself with the object to which the 
other has reduced him, that is, he becomes the Inessential Other against 
which the subject defines himself as the Essential One.
'Bad faith' in our relations with others is thus the supreme example of
heteronomy or failure of ethical will. But whereas Sartre identifies every
failure to achieve authentic subjectivity with 'bad faith', for de Beauvoir
not all cases of failure to achieve autonomy are instances of 'bad faith'. For
what the notion of 'bad faith' fails to explain is the phenomenon of
systematic oppression, that is the case when the other systematically refuses
my freedom and closes off my possibilities: when, instead of understanding
that my freedom is the guarantee of his own, he sees my freedom only as a
threat and limit to his own; when, instead of recognising me as a subject he
permanently reduces me to the status of object or Inessential Other:
...my freedom, in order to fulfill itself, requires that it emerge into an 
open future: it is other men who open the future to me, it is they 
who, setting up the world of tomorrow, define my future; but if, 
instead of allowing me to participate in this constructive moment, 
they oblige me to consume my transcendence in vain, if they keep 
me below the level which they have conquered and on the basis of 
which new conquests will be achieved, then they are cutting me off 
from the future, they are changing me into a thing.20
For Sartre every time an individual loses his/her grip on transcendence it
is because s/he has allowed it to happen. Thus every instance of
subordination, limitation, failure of will, in relations with others is an
20. de Beauvoir, E.A. pp.82-3.
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instance of 'bad faith' on the part of the individual subject. Furthermore 
because the 'bad faith' of one or other of the parties in any encounter 
between subjects is unavoidable, there is no possibility of genuine 
reciprocity between subjects. By contrast for de Beauvoir failure to achieve 
transcendence cannot always be explained in terms of individual 'bad faith' 
but is often a function of certain forms of social relations which she 
characterises by means of the opposition Essential One/Inessential Other. 
Her use of this opposition is thus significantly different from Sartre's use of 
the same opposition.21 While for Sartre it designates the structure of all of 
our individual relations with others, for de Beauvoir it comes into play 
when human relations are distorted by social relations of domination and 
subordination. I have tried to establish that it is because she upholds the 
ideal of genuine reciprocity that de Beauvoir's account of our relations with 
others is able to illuminate the phenomenon of structural oppression in a 
way that the Sartrean account of 'bad faith' cannot.
Section 2: Woman as Inessential and Absolute Other
De Beauvoir's analysis of women's situation works by playing off against
each other the two notions of the other which I have identified so far. Her
claim is that social relations between the sexes preclude mutual recognition
between two free subjectivities. Rather these relations are structured as an
ossified and asymmetrical opposition between Essential One and
Inessential Other, an opposition in which one social group, men, are always
the essential, transcendent subjects, while another, women, are
permanently reduced to the status of the Inessential Other or object:
Now, what peculiarly signalizes the situation of women is that she -  
a free and autonomous being like all human creatures -
21. This point is also made by Michele Le Doeuff and Moira Gatens. Michele Le Doeuff, 
'Operative Philosophy: Simone de Beauvoir and Existentialism', translated by Colin Gordon, 
Ideology & Consciousness, no. 6, Autumn 1979, pp. 47-57; Moira Gatens, 'Feminism, Philosophy 
and Riddles without Answers' in Feminist Challenges: Social and Political Theory, ed. by 
Elizabeth Gross & Carole Pateman, (Allen & Unwin, Sydney 1986).
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nevertheless finds herself living in a world where men compel her 
to assume the status of the Other. They propose to stabilize her as 
object and to doom her to immanence since her transcendence is to 
be overshadowed and for ever transcended by another ego 
(conscience) which is essential and sovereign. The drama of woman 
lies in this conflict between the fundamental aspirations of every 
subject (ego) -  who always regards the self as essential -  and the 
compulsions of a situation in which she is inessential. How can a 
human being in woman's situation attain fulfillment?22
This curtailment of freedom in social relations is mirrored and reinforced
by, and also helps set up, a series of constraints on women's ability to
exercise their freedom in 'projects'. These constraints, which are variously
legal, economic, historical, physical, psychological and so on, are such that
they close off to women the social space required for transcendence or
autonomy. Much of The Second Sex is taken up with making visible and
documenting these coercive social structures which foreclose women's
options. However while many of de Beauvoir's insights into the workings
of these structures are startling, my discussion of her analysis of women's
situation will focus more on her account of the way in which the two main
aspects of oppression -  the structure of social relations between the sexes
and the foreclosing to women of the social space in which freedom is
exercised -  work to structure women's psyches and bodies in particular
ways.
As Michdle Le Doeuff has argued, de Beauvoir's analysis of women's 
oppression takes as its starting point the Sartrean account of consciousness 
as Tack’ and the critique of the notion of 'human nature' which follows 
from it.23 If consciousness exists only as possibility, that is as 'a being whose 
existence posits its essence', then human consciousness and its possibilities 
cannot be defined prior to the specific determinations that arise out of
22. de Beauvoir, S.S. p. 29.
23. Michele Le Doeuff, op. cit.
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existence in the world. Some of these determinations are inescapable -  the 
contingent givens of 'facticity'. But 'facticity' only defines the limits of our 
possibilities, it does not determine them. As a consequence the curtailment 
of women's freedom cannot be explained or justified by reference to 
'women's nature'. But if this is true what de Beauvoir's analysis needs to 
account for is how oppression can foreclose the possibilities of a free being 
in such a way that that being becomes unfree. In other words she needs to 
explain how and why women come to submit to their oppression. De 
Beauvoir oscillates between two different answers to this question, answers 
which are often in tension with one another. The first answer explains 
how oppression becomes 'naturalised' by being 'internalized'. The second 
answer is given in terms of the notion of 'bad faith'. In the following 
analysis I want to explain how de Beauvoir arrives at these answers but also 
to show how her analysis of 'internalization' is constrained by, but also 
reveals the limitations of, the Sartrean account of the subject as radical 
freedom from which it starts.
As we have seen, oppressive social relations arise when one social group 
fails to recognise the members of another group as free subjects and 
systematically closes off the possibilities of members of that group, that is 
when they regard the group as a whole or its individual members as 
'objects'. De Beauvoir clusters a number of connected meanings around the 
term 'object'. The central meaning is that when a person is regarded by the 
other as a mere object she is regarded as a being who lacks the freedom, the 
capacity and the will for self-determination and for autonomous choice.
She is regarded as a being the meaning of whose existence is 
overdetermined by her facticity, rather than a being able to transcend 
facticity and to exercise her freedom in self-chosen projects. Spelt out less 
abstractly, oppressive social relations turn an individual into an object for 
the other because the mere fact that she is a woman, or black, or poor, or all
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three, is seen as an inherent obstacle to her capacities. A more insidious 
aspect of oppression than this however is the way in which certain 
characteristics of the oppressed group, characteristics which arise as a result 
of and in response to oppression -  that is, in response to being treated by 
the other as an 'object', in response to severely restricted social 
opportunities -  come to be seen as 'natural', inescapable facts which are 
then used to explain and justify the social relations from which they arise. 
The central task of de Beauvoir's account of women's oppression, and this 
might also be considered one of the central tasks of feminism, is to 
'denaturalize' or, to use Marx's phrase, to 'demystify' this situation, to show 
that these supposedly 'natural' facts about women are actually a product, 
rather than the cause of, certain forms of social relation.
But oppression cannot work if the oppressed refuse to identify with the 
oppressor's definition of themselves. Such refusal would signal the onset 
of hostilities between oppressor and oppressed. Oppression works best 
when the process of 'naturalizing' oppression actually structures both the 
oppressed's beliefs about themselves and their modes of relation to the 
world, that is when the oppressed constrain their own possibilities while 
believing that these possibilities are constrained by some natural, 
inescapable facts about themselves. In other words the hallmark of 
oppression is its invisibility to the oppressed.24 This is why oppression 
gives rise to a cruel double bind. On the one hand, the social relations 
between the sexes and the coercive mechanisms which simultaneously 
enforce and give rise to those social relations make it very difficult for 
women to achieve autonomy or transcendence. On the other hand, 
women's failure to achieve transcendence has been rationalized, even by
24. Bernard Williams, in his article 'The Idea of Equality' expands some of these insights 
into a philosophical defence of the ideal of equality. Bernard Williams, The Idea of 
Equality' in H. Bedau (ed.) justice and Equality (Prentice-Hall, 1971).
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women themselves, as a failure arising from natural incapacity or natural 
constraints:
Many of the faults for which women are reproached - mediocrity,
laziness, servility simply express the fact that their horizon is closed.
It is said that woman is sensual, she wallows in immanence; but she
has first been shut up in it.25
It is clear that de Beauvoir's attempt to account for the phenomenon of 
internalization puts a great deal of pressure on the Sartrean account of 
consciousness from which both her ethics and her feminism start. For 
from my earlier discussion of Sartre it should be clear that this idea of 
'internalization' cannot be explained by a Sartrean account of our relations 
with others, nor can it be expressed within the language of 'bad faith'. For 
Sartre, although the other can regard me as an object and although I can 
experience myself as an object for the other I can never actually become an 
object for myself. Even in 'bad faith' when I allow the other to limit my 
possibilities, this is ultimately just a pretence; my subjectivity is always 
transcending itself towards its own possibilities. However de Beauvoir's 
recognition of 'internalization' as a psychological phenomenon which 
structures women's relation to the world and to others requires that 
women do not just play at being the Inessential Other, they actually become 
inessential, that is, they become objects even for themselves. In fact, 
according to de Beauvoir, the result of oppression is that women are both 
subjects and objects for themselves simultaneously. This analysis raises 
two questions. Firstly, what exactly does de Beauvoir mean by saying that 
the oppressed person is both subject and object for herself? Secondly, how 
does de Beauvoir reconcile her conclusion with the Sartrean premise that 
consciousness is a being continually surpassing itself toward its own future 
possibilities?
25. de Beauvoir, S.S. p. 614.
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In answer to the first question, de Beauvoir seems to understand the 
process of 'internalization' as a kind of psychic alienation which alienates 
women from their subjectivity. 'Internalization' is a process of becoming 
for oneself less than an autonomous human subject, becoming for oneself 
an 'object'. As I will argue in more detail in the next chapter, for de 
Beauvoir this process of becoming for oneself an object is of necessity a 
process which takes hold in and through a person's body and body-image.
A person becomes an object for herself when she experiences her body as 
alien to her subjectivity, rather than as the direct expression of her 
subjectivity.26 But what is this subjectivity from which woman is 
alienated? In answering this question we can see how de Beauvoir's 
account of oppression, though it clearly marks a break from the Sartrean 
account of consciousness, also remains within the orbit of Sartre's views -  
thus answering the second question raised above. For de Beauvoir the 
subjectivity from which woman is alienated is the human subject as 
sexually undifferentiated freedom. This subject, the consciousness which is 
always surpassing itself toward its own future possibilities, exists prior to 
and in some sense outside of the social relations of domination and 
subordination. Thus as her dictum 'One is not born, but rather becomes, a 
woman' indicates, de Beauvoir wants to say that women's subjectivity is 
constructed in and by relations of power; but she also wants to posit a 
residual, sexually indifferent subjectivity which somehow escapes the 
determinations of power.27 On the one hand this enables her to give an
26. Sandra Lee Bartky's theory of psychological oppression, as we saw in Chapter One, is an 
elaboration of this conception of 'internalization' as alienation.
27. More recent analyses of the operations of power, such as that of Foucault, have questioned 
this notion of a residual subjectivity that somehow escapes the determinations of power. See 
especially Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 1, translated by Robert Hurley, 
(Vintage Books, Random House, NY 1980); Power/  Knowledge, edited by Colin Gordon, 
(Pantheon Books, New York, 1980) ; Discipline and Punish, translated by Alan Sheridan, 
(Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1982). According to Foucault, the subject is not alienated 
from him or her self by oppression but is rather constituted as a subject within and by the 
network of practices through which power operates. Applying this analysis to the situation
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account of resistance, which is understood as the revolt of a free subject 
against the forces which work to cut her off from her freedom. On the 
other hand it requires an analysis of complicity as a form of 'bad faith'.
More disturbingly, as I shall argue in the next chapter, the tensions within 
de Beauvoir's account of women's embodiment also reveal that de 
Beauvoir's dream of a sexually undifferentiated human subject is actually 
premised on a masculine conception of the subject.
De Beauvoir argues that women become objects even for themselves not 
just because their possibilities are foreclosed by social relations and 
structures of domination and subordination but also because they are 
actually complicit with their oppression. Not only do women just accept 
men's constructions of the world and of themselves, they actually go about 
turning themselves into the creatures that men expect them to be. Another 
way of putting this would be to say that women turn femininity into a 
project; they make the sorts of choices that, instead of aiming towards 
transcendence, actually close off their own possibilities. As de Beauvoir 
details in 'Justifications', Part VI of The Second Sex, in their dreams of 
romantic love, in their own narcissistic preoccupation with their 
appearances, in their various rejections of rationality, women turn 
themselves into 'objects' and so systematically give up their claim to be 
regarded as autonomous subjects.
of women it might be argued that there is no residual sexually undifferentiated subjectivity 
which escapes the operations of power. Rather within patriarchal social relations subjects 
are always already sexually differentiated subjects whose subjectivity is bound up with their 
sex in such a way that the one cannot be extricated from the other. In other words, as Marilyn 
Frye has argued, patriarchal social relations require a rigid sexual dimorphism in which 
subjectivity is only intelligible as sexually differentiated subjectivity; to be a subject is 
necessarily to be a sexed subject. See Marilyn Frye, 'Sexism' in The Politics of Reality (The 
Crossing Press, 1983). While I find Foucault's suggestion that subjects are constituted within 
and by relations of power illuminating, my concern is that the individual subject of experience 
tends to disappear in his account of the operations of power, as well as in his notion of 
'resistance'. One of the main arguments of this thesis is that it is important for feminism to 
provide an adequate account of women as subjects of experience. Some interesting appraisals 
of the implications of Foucault's work for feminism can be found in some of the articles in Irene 
Diamond & Lee Quinby (eds.) Feminism and Foucault: Reflections on Resistance,
(Northeastern U.P., Boston, 1988). In the Introduction to Part IV I provide somewhat 
different reasons for rejecting the idea of a sexually neutral subjectivity.
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While the phenomenon of complicity certainly presents a challenge to any 
theory of oppression, the problem with de Beauvoir's analysis is that, 
because she retains the Sartrean notion of subjectivity as radical freedom, 
she has to explain complicity as a question of 'choice', that is as a question of 
women's collective 'bad faith': 'If woman seems to be the inessential which 
never becomes the essential, it is because she herself fails to bring about this 
change' . 28 This analysis thus undercuts what de Beauvoir gains by 
transforming the individualist Sartrean Essential One/Inessential Other 
distinction into an account of social relations of domination and 
subordination. De Beauvoir's claim is that although it is true that women 
are oppressed, they have furthered their own oppression because complicity 
is easier than the arduous task of resisting oppression and accepting 
responsibility for one's own freedom. In ’bad faith' women have sought to 
escape this responsibility by simply accepting the world as men present it to 
them, rather than asserting their own subjectivities and so creating value. 
Even so-called 'feminine' values are masculine constructions which have 
served simply to further women's oppression: 'In truth women have 
never set up female values in opposition to male values; it is man who, 
desirous of maintaining masculine prerogatives, has invented that 
divergence'.29 The question that needs to be asked however is why 
women's 'bad faith' takes this rather than the reverse form. Why is it men 
rather than women who have set themselves up as transcendent subject?
In the next chapter I will show that, despite its productivity for an analysis 
of oppression, de Beauvoir's ideal of autonomy actually commits her to the 
view that the only values worth having are masculine values. That is to 
say, one reason why women have accepted the world as men present it to 
them is because the only thing that really differentiates them from men,
28. de Beauvoir, S.S. p. 19.
29. de Beauvoir, op. cit. p. 96.
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namely their bodies, cannot actually be sources of value at all. Thus it looks 
as though women's 'bad faith' is an inevitable outcome of their facticity. 
Before turning to this argument however I want to examine de Beauvoir's 
third use of the category of the other -  as designating the Absolute Other. 
Here de Beauvoir uses the notion of 'bad faith' in a surprising and 
illuminating way to condemn man's role as oppressor.
The experience of alterity, de Beauvoir suggests, is an inescapable feature of 
consciousness: in its relationship both with the world and with others 
consciousness is defined as a being which exists at a distance from itself, it is 
a being whose mode of existence is to be other than itself. This alienation 
manifests itself in the ambiguity of the human situation. Human beings 
are both part of nature, yet distanced from it; death represents an absolute 
limit to our possibilities, yet it is only our awareness of death that enables 
us to constitute life as meaningful; it is only in relation to others that our 
freedom is defined, yet our relations with others are necessarily conflictual, 
and so on. De Beauvoir's suggestion seems to be that the category of the 
Absolute Other is a projection of our anguish in the face of this ineradicable 
alterity and the ambiguity which is its consequence. We attempt to escape 
ambiguity by projecting it onto the Absolute Other, we define ourselves as 
transcendence of the Absolute Other which we posit, but this Other can also 
be the repository of our hopes and ideals. In short, the Absolute Other is 
whatever the subject is not, whatever he hopes to escape or whatever he 
aspires towards. As such, the category of the Absolute Other is dialectically 
necessary to the subject who posits it.
De Beauvoir's claim is that while many signifiers have been used to 
represent the Absolute Other, the signifier 'Woman' is privileged among 
them as 'the material representation of alterity'.30 'Woman' is a signifier
30. de Beauvoir, op. cit. p.211.
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which represents whatever fear, desire, hope, ideal it is the projection of. 
This is why, as de Beauvoir shows, 'Woman' can support so many 
contradictory predicates and why 'femininity' gets defined as essentially 
mysterious and contradictory. Understood in this third sense de Beauvoir's 
employment of the notion of the Other is thus closely aligned with the way 
in which the category of the Other has been understood in those feminisms 
strongly influenced by Derridean deconstruction .31 But although the 
signifier 'Woman' is referentially ambiguous, the problem for wom en is 
that 'Woman' is a masculine construction by means of which men seek to 
define and limit women. Rather than recognizing women as free 
subjectivities, men compel women to live out their own myths of 
'femininity'. The motivation for this is 'bad faith'. What men seek in 
condemning women to the status of Absolute Other is what the masterly 
consciousness seeks from the slave -  non-reciprocal recognition from a 
being who will mediate for him his ambiguous relationship to the world 
and to others: '...caught between the silence of nature and the demanding 
presence of other free beings, a creature who is at once his like and a passive 
thing becomes a great treasure '.32 By identifying women with the Absolute 
Other, men therefore simultaneously affirm and deny women's
31. Here I am thinking particularly of Michele Le Doeuff's reflections on women and the 
metaphor of femininity in the context of her analyses of the philosophical imaginary. Le 
Doeuff's readings of the way in which the metaphor of femininity functions in certain 
philosophical discourses are an elaboration of de Beauvoir's point that 'femininity' as myth 
or metaphor is dialectically necessary to those systems of signification which define 
themselves in opposition to it. See Michele Le Doeuff, L'lmaginaire Philosophique (Paris, 
Payot 1980). Kristeva's view that the 'feminine' designates a position of critical marginality 
with respect to phallocentric discourses also echoes this view. See especially her articles 
reprinted in E. Marks & I. de Courtivron (eds.) New French Feminisms (Harvester Press,
1981): Woman Can Never Be Defined', pp. 137-41; 'Oscillation Between Power and Denial', 
pp. 165-7. See also 'Women's Time', pp. 187-213 in Toril Moi (ed.) The Kristeva Reader, 
(Columbia U.P., N.Y., 1986) and 'Talking About Polvlogue' in Toril Moi (ed.) French Feminist 
Thought: A Reader. (Blackwell, 1987). See also Jacques Derrida, 'Choreographies: An 
Interview with Christie V. McDonald', Diacritics, 12, pp. 66-76.
32. de Beauvoir, op.cit. p. 739.
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subjectivity; women become both subject and object, the other but the other 
who can be possessed:
Treasure, prey, sport and danger, nurse, guide, judge, mediatrix, 
mirror, woman is the other in whom the subject transcends himself 
without being limited, who opposes him without denying him; she 
is the other who lets herself be taken without ceasing to be the other, 
and therein she is so necessary to man's happiness and to his 
triumph that it can be said that if she did not exist, men would have 
invented her...They did invent her. But she exists also apart from 
their inventiveness. And hence she is not only the incarnation of 
their dream, but also its frustration.
In other words:
'...woman is necessary in so far as she remains an Idea into which 
man projects his own transcendence; but...she is inauspicious as an 
objective reality existing in and for herself'.33
It is because women are free subjectivities who resist or subvert in various
ways as well as comply with these myths, that coercive social structures
limiting their possibilities are necessary.
33. de Beauvoir, op. cit. p. 218.
Chapter Three
WOMEN, TRANSCENDENCE AND THE FEMALE BODY1
'Her body is not perceived as the radiation of a 
subjective personality, but as a thing sunk deeply 
in its own immanence; it is not for such a body to 
have reference to the rest of the world, it must 
not be the promise of things other than itself: it 
must end the desire it arouses ' . 2
According to de Beauvoir, the opposition which, in addition to that between 
Subject and Other, quintessential^ characterises the ambiguity of the 
hum an situation, is the duality of body and consciousness.
Characteristically, de Beauvoir regards this duality as irreducible. She thus 
rejects both mentalist and materialist explanations of the m ind/body  
relation. In fact her position, like that of Merleau-Ponty, reverses the order 
of priority of Cartesian interactionism. Human beings are not essentially a 
res cogitans somehow conjoined to a res extensa . Rather, existence is 
necessarily em bodied existence. Our bodies define our situation in the 
world; consciousness is a relation to the world from a particular bodily 
perspective: T o be present in the world implies strictly that there exists a 
body which is at once a material thing in the world and a point of view 
towards this world ' . 3
1. My argument in this chapter builds upon an earlier discussion of de Beauvoir which is 
published in my article entitled 'Simone de Beauvoir: Philosophy and/or the Female Body', 
in E. Gross & C. Pateman (eds.) Feminist Challenges: Social and Political Theory, (Allen & 
Unwin, Sydney; Northeastern University Press, Boston, 1986). My later formulation of this 
argument in this chapter is however indebted to Iris Young's critique of the distinction, 
within existential phenomenology, between the body as transcendent and the body as 
immanent. See Iris Marion Young, 'Pregnant Subjectivity and the Limits of Existential 
Phenomenology' in Don Ihde & Hugh J. Silverman, (eds.) Descriptions (State University of 
New York Press, Albany N.Y. 1985).
2. de Beauvoir, S.S. p. 189.
3. de Beauvoir, op. cit. p. 39.
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This duality of body and consciousness entails, according to de Beauvoir, 
that the significance of the body itself is also fundamentally ambiguous. On 
the one hand, as a material 'thing' the body is continuous with the rest of 
the natural world. Hence it is subject to causal laws and represents merely 
one moment in the life of the species. Considered as such the body is pure 
immanence. On the other hand, as the perspective of an individual 
consciousness, the body is the concrete expression of that individuality, the 
instrumentality of the will. It is with this transcendent body that the subject 
undertakes projects and interacts with others. The ambiguity of 
embodiment means therefore that while our bodily situations and capacities 
limit our possibilities they also open out possibilities for us.
But if the body defines our situation then it becomes sensible to ask whether 
sexually different bodies perceive the world from different perspectives, 
whether they limit or open out different possibilities for the embodied 
subject. This question is perhaps the motivating question of The Second 
Sex, and de Beauvoir's answer to it is affirmative. Her claim is that the 
perspectives and possibilities made available by women's embodiment are 
not only different from those made available by men's embodiment but also 
drastically more limited. But the reasons for her answer are not clear. In 
fact she seems to give several complex and interesting, but ultimately 
incompatible, reasons for this answer.
This chapter is an attempt to disentangle these reasons as well as to show 
how the tensions within de Beauvoir's account of women's embodiment 
reveal difficulties with her understanding of autonomous agency. My 
argument is that at least two different reasons for de Beauvoir's answer can 
be discerned in The Second Sex. The first explains women's different bodily 
perspectives and possibilities in terms of their oppression and suggests that 
if women were not socially subordinate then their embodiment would not 
be experienced as so much more limiting than men's. The second reason
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seems to ground the limitation of women's embodiment not just in their 
oppression but also in their reproductive capacities. I want to show that 
although these two answers are incompatible they both arise from the 
distinction between the body as immanent and the body as transcendent. 
What makes a feminist appropriation of this distinction problematic is that 
the very ideal of the transcendent body is defined in opposition to the 
reproductive body. This becomes clear when we disentangle the connection 
between de Beauvoir's characterisation of the female body and the Hegelian 
distinction between life and self-consciousness which she appropriates in 
order to articulate the ideal of transcendence.
I. Oppression and the 'Female' Body as Immanence
De Beauvoir's analysis of women's bodily situation is crucial to the success 
of her argument against women's social subordination. She is explicit that 
one of the main ways in which this subordination has been naturalized is by 
recourse to the supposed 'facts' of female biology, which are said to explain 
women's passivity and dependence, and which bind women to the care of 
children. This is why woman's 'body is not perceived as the radiation of a 
subjective personality, but as a thing sunk deeply in its own immanence'.
In order to counter this view, de Beauvoir needs to show three things.
Firstly she needs to show that women's bodies, like the bodies of men, are 
transcendent bodies. That is, she needs to disconnect women's subjectivities 
and their bodies from this image of the female body as inherently 
immanent. Secondly she needs to show why this conception of the female 
body as immanent is instrumental in maintaining women's oppression. 
Thirdly, she needs to explain why this connection is so readily made, why it 
is that women's bodies are 'not perceived as the radiation of a subjective 
personality'.
De Beauvoir undertakes the first two tasks concurrently by means of a series 
of phenomenological descriptions of women's lived experience of their 
bodies. These descriptions, which occupy most of Parts IV and V of The 
Second Sex, begin with the young girl's experience of her body in childhood 
and then proceed to characterise the way in which that experience changes 
from puberty through sexual initiation, marriage, motherhood and old age. 
De Beauvoir's central argument, which emerges during the course of these 
descriptions, is that the process of becoming a woman is a process of coming 
to experience one's body less and less as transcendent and more and more as 
signifying immanence. In early childhood, she claims, girls as well as boys 
experience their bodies as transcendent, as 'the instrument that makes 
possible the comprehension of the world' .4 This experience of the body is 
primarily neither sexual nor sexually differentiated; the body is rather 
experienced by both sexes primarily as a motility in which the child is not 
aware of his/her body as a physical thing. While this experience of the body 
continues in some ways for girls until puberty, it is simultaneous with an 
increasing awareness of their bodies as sexually marked bodies, that is as 
passive 'objects'.
De Beauvoir is explicit that this experience of the body as passive object 
arises as a result of women's situation, in particular as a result of their 
differential treatment which begins in early infancy. Although both sexes 
experience the loss of unity with the maternal body at the mirror-stage,5
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4. de Beauvoir, op.cit. p. 295.
5. De Beauvoir's discussion here refers to Lacan's analysis of the mirror-stage as crucial in the 
formation of the ego. According to Lacan, the child first experiences its body as fragmentary, 
a body in Tits and pieces'. The constitution of the ego requires the formation of a unified 
body-image. This occurs for Lacan when the infant identifies its body with an 'object', 
paradigmatically with its own reflection in a mirror, or in the gaze of the mother. 
Identification of itself with this object is an attempt by the infant to regain its lost unity with 
the maternal body. See Jacques Lacan, 'The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I 
as revealed in psychoanalytic experience.' in Ecrits: A Selection, translated by Alan 
Sheridan (Tavistock, London, 1977).
90
later experiences of separation are more and more marked for boys because 
mothers withdraw their physical affections from boys more quickly than 
they do from girls. De Beauvoir's claim is that this differential treatment 
begins the girl's experience of passivity because it extends the girl's 
identification with the maternal body for far longer than the boy is able to 
identify himself with the mother.6 As childhood progresses, this 
differential treatment becomes more and more marked. The girl is directed 
towards passivity, especially by her mother; she is given dolls, taught to 
become aware of her appearance and manner, and discouraged from 
participating in active pursuits and developing her strength. Thus while 
the boy becomes 'aware of his body as a means for dominating nature and as 
a weapon for fighting'7, the girl, by contrast, rather than seeing her body as 
instrument, is taught to make herself and her body into an object. This 
difference is reinforced by everything around her: by educational 
differences, by literature and other representational media, by the structure 
of the family, by her awareness that she is destined for motherhood and 
child-bearing, all of which teach her that power and transcendence are the 
privilege of the male sex. As a result, by the time the child reaches puberty, 
she 'feels that her body is getting away from her, it is no longer the 
straightforward expression of her individuality; it becomes foreign to her; 
and at the same time she becomes for others a thing: on the street men 
follow her with their eyes and comment on her anatomy. She would like to 
be invisible; it frightens her to become flesh and to show her flesh' .8
6. More recently Nancy Chodorow has of course developed this psychoanalytic insight into 
an explanation of the differential psychic development of boys and girls. See Nancy 
Chodorow; The Reproduction of Mothering. (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978).
7. de Beauvoir, op.cit. p. 305.
8. de Beauvoir, op.cit. p. 333.
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However de Beauvoir also seems to suggest that the differences between 
male and female anatomy conspire to reinforce these socially-produced 
differences. For instance she seems to accept the weight given by 
psychoanalysis to the difference between the visibility of the male penis and 
the invisibility of the female vagina.9 Thus she claims that the difference in 
the structure of their sexual organs encourages the boy's experience of his 
body as transcendent and the girl's experience of hers as immanent. This is 
because the very visibility of the penis means that it can become for the boy 
not only a plaything and compensation for the lost maternal object, but also 
an objective expression of his subjectivity, an alter ego. By this means even 
bodily acts like urinating, in which the body seems most thing-like, can 
become a means for transcendence -  hence those competitions between 
little boys to see who can urinate the furthest. By contrast, the invisibility of 
the girl's vagina, the fact that it is inside her body, means both that she is 
'from the start much more opaque to her own eyes, more profoundly 
immersed in the obscure mystery of life, than is the male' and that 'the little 
girl cannot incarnate herself in any part of herself' . 10 Instead she identifies 
herself with a passive substitute like a doll which she sees as both her whole 
self but also as an external object. This simply reinforces the child's 
narcissism, unlike the penis which directs attention away from the self, so 
accounting for the precocious narcissism of little girls and its tendency to 
remain throughout women's adult life.
9. Juliet Mitchell argues that de Beauvoir's interpretation of psychoanalysis misreads Freud 
in a crudely determinist way, and that her account of the psychical significance of sex 
differences is derived mainly from the conservative woman psychoanalyst Helene Deutsch. 
See Juliet Mitchell, 'Simone de Beauvoir: Freud and the Second Sex' in Part Two, Section II of 
Psychoanalysis and Feminism, (Penguin, 1975). I tend to agree with Mitchell on this point, 
but my interest here is mainly in the philosophical use to which de Beauvoir puts her reading 
of psychoanalysis.
10. de Beauvoir, op.cit. p. 306.
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Now de Beauvoir makes it clear that it is not this anatomical difference per  
se which gives rise to the difference between the girl's and the boy's 
experiences of their bodies, but rather the social significance of that 
difference, the fact that the penis is a symbol of a socially valorized 
masculinity. Thus the girl experiences her body as immanent because it is a 
socially devalued body. At the same time however de Beauvoir's 
characterisations of the girl's body as 'more profoundly immersed in the 
obscure mystery of life' suggests that she also gives some credence to the 
idea that the female body is inherently more immanent than the male body. 
This ambivalence is particularly evident in some of de Beauvoir's 
descriptions of women's lived experiences of menstruation, sexuality, 
pregnancy and maternity. There are passages for instance which 
characterise female sexuality as at once passive and voracious, passages 
which claim that the female body is an hysterical body, passages which 
describe menstruation as a heavy burden, humiliating and shameful, and 
passages which describe pregnancy and maternity as alienation -  the 
obliteration of the individual by the demands of the species. This point is 
illustrated quite graphically in the four passages from different parts of The 
Second Sex which I cite below.
The first passage describes the young girl's experiences of menstruation,
which de Beauvoir calls 'the untidy event that is repeated each month':
There are children who weep for hours when they realize that they 
are condemned to this fate. And what strengthens their revolt still 
further is the knowledge that this shameful blemish is known also to 
men; they would prefer at least that their humiliating feminine 
condition might remain shrouded in mystery for males. But no; 
father, brothers, cousins, all the men know, and even joke about it 
sometimes. Here disgust at her too fleshly body arises or is 
exacerbated in the girl. And though the first surprise is over, the 
monthly annoyance is not similarly effaced; at each recurrence the 
girl feels again the same disgust at this flat and stagnant odour 
emanating from her -  an odour of the swamp, of wilted violets -
disgust at this blood, less red, more dubious, than that which flowed 
from her childish abrasions.11
The second passage is an account of the girl's experience of the body at 
puberty:
Apprehended through this complaining and passive flesh, the whole 
universe seems a burden too heavy to bear. Overburdened, 
submerged, she becomes a stranger to herself because she is a stranger 
to the rest of the world. Syntheses break down, moments of time are 
no longer connected, other people are recognized but absent- 
mindedly; and if reasoning and logic remain intact, as in 
melancholia, they are put to the service of emotional manifestations 
arising from a state of organic disorder.12
The third passage is an account of the difference between men's and 
women's experiences of their genitalia:
The sex organ of a man is simple and neat as a finger; it is readily 
visible and often exhibited to comrades with proud rivalry; but the 
feminine sex organ is mysterious even to the woman herself, 
concealed, mucous, and humid, as it is; it bleeds each month, it is 
often sullied with body fluids, it has a secret and perilous life of its 
own. Woman does not recognize herself in it, and this explains in 
large part why she does not recognize its desires as hers. These 
manifest themselves in an embarrassing manner. Man 'gets stiff', but 
woman 'gets wet'; in the very word there are childhood memories of 
bed-wetting, of guilty and involuntary yielding to the need to urinate. 
Man feels the same disgust at involuntary nocturnal emissions; to 
eject a fluid, urine or semen, does not humiliate: it is an active 
operation; but it is humiliating if the liquid flows out passively, for 
then the body is no longer an organism with muscles, nerves, 
sphincters, but is rather a vessel, a container, composed of inert 
matter and but the plaything of capricious mechanical forces. If the 
body leaks -  as an ancient wall or a dead body may leak -  it seems to 
liquefy rather than to eject fluid: a horrid decomposition.
Feminine sex desire is the soft throbbing of a mollusc.
Whereas man is impetuous, woman is only impatient; her
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11. de Beauvoir, op.cit. pp. 337-8.
12. de Beauvoir, op. cit. p. 353.
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expectation can become ardent without ceasing to be passive; man 
dives upon his prey like the eagle and the hawk; woman lies in wait 
like the carnivorous plant, the bog, in which insects and children are 
swallowed up. She is absorption, suction, humus, pitch and glue, a 
passive influx, insinuating and viscous: thus, at least, she vaguely 
feels herself to bed3
The final passage is an account of how, according to de Beauvoir, women 
experience pregnancy and maternity:
The transcendence of the artisan, of the man of action, contains the 
element of subjectivity; but in the mother-to-be the antithesis of 
subject and object ceases to be; she and the child with which she is 
swollen make up together an equivocal pair overwhelmed by life. 
Ensnared by nature, the pregnant woman is plant and animal, a store­
house of colloids, an incubator, an egg; she scares children who are 
proud of their young, straight bodies and makes young people titter 
because she is a human being, a conscious and free individual, who 
has become life's passive instrument.
Ordinarily life is but a condition of existence; in gestation it 
appears as creative; but that is a strange kind of creation which is 
accomplished in a contingent and passive manner...With her ego 
surrendered, alienated in her body and in her social dignity, the 
mother enjoys the comforting illusion of feeling that she is a human 
being in herself, a value.
But this is only an illusion. For she does not really make the 
baby, it makes itself within her; her flesh engenders flesh 
only...Creative acts originating in liberty establish the object as value 
and give it the quality of the essential; whereas the child in the 
maternal body is not thus justified; it is still only a gratuitous cellular 
growth, a brute fact of nature as contingent on circumstances as death 
and corresponding philosophically with it.14
It will become clear a bit later why I have quoted these passages at such
length. But what seems to emerge from these descriptions are a number of
recurring motifs. These are that the female body is passive, that it is
13 de Beauvoir, op. cit. p. 407.
14 de Beauvoir, op. cit. pp. 512-14.
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experienced by women as a burden that stands between them and their 
individuality and that it subjects women to the demands of nature. Thus, 
unlike man's body which he experiences primarily as transcendent, the 
female body is experienced by women mostly as immanence.
The question we need to address then is this. How can these motifs be
reconciled with de Beauvoir's analysis of oppression? I want to argue that
de Beauvoir's text presents us with two answers to this question. The first
answer also provides the first reason for her answer to the question posed at
the outset, namely the question of why women's embodiment opens up
more limited perspectives and possibilities than men's embodiment. This
answer is suggested by some fairly explicit instructions de Beauvoir gives as
to how we should interpret passages like those which I have just quoted.
They are, she says, accounts of how women experience their own bodies as a
result of oppression. Thus in her discussion of menstruation she says:
In a sexually equalitarian society, woman would regard menstruation 
simply as her special way of reaching adult life; the human body in 
both men and women has other and more disagreeable needs to be 
taken care of, but they are easily adjusted to because, being common 
to all, they do not represent blemishes for anyone; the menses inspire 
horror in the adolescent girl because they throw her into an inferior 
and defective category. This sense of being declassed will weigh 
heavily upon her. She would retain her pride in her bleeding body if 
she did not lose her pride in being human.15
In other words, these descriptions, far from proving problematic for de
Beauvoir's analysis of oppression, in fact provide powerful proof of
women's oppression. What they show is that oppression constructs
women's subjectivity by marking the body as a passive, sexual object. The
oppressed subject comes to see herself as object because she experiences her
own body as an object, as a physical thing, rather than as transcendent. As a
result of oppression her body is not just an object for others, but an object for
15. de Beauvoir, op. cit. p. 340.
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herself. Thus although she is a subject she becomes an object for herself 
because she does not experience her body as the instrumentality of her will, 
but rather as the plaything of forces over which she has no control. This 
analysis explains my claim in Chapter Two that for de Beauvoir the 
oppressed person is both subject and object for herself because she 
experiences her body as alien to her subjectivity.
It could also be argued that the phenomenological experiences which de 
Beauvoir describes are symptoms of rebellion. The girl's disgust at the smell 
of menstrual blood, the fact that her vaginal emissions provoke in her an 
experience of abjection,16 are her means of revolt against her oppression.
In other words, since she has no other means of fighting her situation, her 
distress with the passivity to which she is condemned manifests itself in a 
self-destructive disgust at her own body. This analysis of de Beauvoir 
would place her much closer to contemporary psychoanalytic feminist 
interpretations of such 'feminine' disorders as anorexia and hysteria than is 
often credited.17
This interpretation is certainly supported by a strong strand of thought in 
The Second Sex. It also conforms to the explicit logic of the text, namely the 
logic of existence preceding essence. Moreover if this interpretation of de
16 In Powers of Horror Kristeva characterises abjection as a feeling of disgust at the 
incorporated/expelled object (food, faeces, vomit, menstrual blood etc.). According to Kristeva 
this disgust both signals the subject's recognition, and protects it from the recognition, that 
the expelled object is never fully expelled. Rather, it is 'something rejected from which one 
does not part' (p.4), reminding the subject of its corporeality and threatening its stability and 
unity. Abjection is caused by whatever 'disturbs identity, system, order. What does not 
respect borders, systems, rules' (ibid). See Julia Kristeva; Powers of Horror, translated by 
Leon Roudiez, (Columbia U.P., N.Y. 1982). For a brief outline of Kristeva's account of abjection 
see Elizabeth Grosz, Sexual Subversions. (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1989).
17 For an example see Grosz' analysis of the case of Dora, pp. 134-9 in Sexual Subversions, op. 
c i t .
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Beauvoir's analysis shows that not only is gender a cultural construct, so too 
is sexual difference.18 Just as there is no necessary connection between 
women and the myths of femininity, so too there is no necessary 
connection between women as transcendent or autonomous subjects and 
the immanent 'female' or 'feminine' body. Like 'femininity', the 'female' 
body is itself just a cultural artifact. Men's and women's bodies are equally 
subject to bodily processes and they are equally both the expression of a free 
individuality and mere moments in the perpetuation of the species. It is 
the cultural construction of femininity alone that signifies woman's body as 
immanent in its relation to reproduction and to its bodily functions. Thus, 
once women are given the space to exercise their autonomy, women's 
bodies will no longer be seen as 'feminine' bodies, that is, as bodies sunk in 
immanence. Rather they will be both perceived and experienced as the 
expression of a sexually undifferentiated and transcendent subjectivity.
While I think that de Beauvoir is certainly making a claim such as this she 
also seems to suggest that the connection between women and the 
immanent 'female body' is not completely arbitrary. Rather it is insofar as 
women's bodies are reproductive bodies that they are connected with this 
immanent 'female body'. This is the second reason for her answer to the 
question posed at the outset, namely that women's bodies open out fewer 
possibilities than men's bodies because they are reproductive bodies. Thus, 
in the passages I quoted above, it is insofar as she experiences her body as a 
reproductive body, that woman feels alienated from herself.
The problem is that on de Beauvoir's analysis the 'female' or 'feminine' 
body has become a metaphor for immanence or heteronomy -  explaining 
the rather disturbing similarity between some of de Beauvoir's
18. Judith Butler argues this case in her article 'Variations on Sex and Gender: Beauvoir and 
Wittig' in Benhabib, S & Cornell, D. (eds.) Feminism as Critique (Cornell University Press, 
1987).
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phenomenological descriptions and Sartre's holes and slime metaphors of 
Being and Nothingness.19 This is why the images de Beauvoir uses to 
describe this body are images which associate it with nature at its most inert; 
the 'female' body is 'fleshly', 'stagnant', swamp-like, 'mucous' and leaky like 
a dead body, smelling like 'wilted violets'; it is an 'involuntary' body. It is 
also why it is insofar as she experiences her body as a 'feminine' body that 
the young girl experiences it as shameful and humiliating. But if the 
'female' body is a metaphor for immanence then on de Beauvoir's analysis 
reproduction can only ever be culturally signified as passivity, as 
immanence, which explains why she regards technological interventions 
into the reproductive process as essential for the liberation of women. 
Ironically, it also explains how de Beauvoir is able so successfully to criticize 
the patriarchal equation of women with their reproductive capacities. If 
reproduction signifies immanence, this gives added strength to the claim 
that women have been oppressed insofar as their possibilities have been 
seen to be limited to reproduction.
But de Beauvoir could argue that these two reasons explaining the 
limitations of women's embodiment are not as incompatible as I have 
suggested. In fact the idea that reproduction itself is limiting can be made 
compatible with the oppression thesis through the notion of 'facticity'. If it 
is a biological 'fact' that reproduction ties women more to the species than 
men, that their physiology renders their sexuality more passive and their 
bodies weaker than men's, then this is simply a question of 'facticity' and
19 See Being and Nothingness, pp. 606-615. Some feminist interpreters of Sartre have argued 
that these metaphors do not render Sartre's whole philosophy irredeemably sexist because 
they function in his text merely as metaphors. See Christine Pierce and Margery Collins, 
'Holes and Slime: Sexism in Sartre's Psychoanalysis.' in Carol Gould & Marx Wartofsky 
(eds.); Women and Philosophy (Perigree, 1976). As I argued in the Introduction to this thesis, 
the idea that one can always distinguish the metaphorical aspects of philosophical texts 
from their conceptual content has been radically questioned by many recent writers, most 
notably by Jacques Derrida. Derrida's analysis aside, in what follows I intend to show that 
in The Second Sex the very notion of the body as transcendent is defined in opposition to the 
immanent reproductive body.
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there is no point rebelling against it. What is important is the way we 
signify our facticity, and constitute ourselves as a transcendence of it. The 
rejection of oppression is a rejection of a particular way of signifying 
women's facticity. This is the second answer suggested by de Beauvoir's text 
to the question of how the passages cited above can be reconciled with her 
account of oppression. It is a neat answer. But it isn't satisfactory because 
the distinction between 'facticity' and 'value' is not quite as neutral as it 
appears. As I will show, neither is de Beauvoir's presentation of the 
biological 'facts'.
In the next section of this chapter I will argue that de Beauvoir's account of 
female biology is founded upon the oppositions between life and self- 
consciousness, and species and individual. These oppositions implicitly 
define transcendence or self-constitution in opposition to reproduction. 
Thus despite the fact that de Beauvoir manages to use the distinction 
between the body as immanent and the body as transcendent to illuminate 
women's oppression in a most remarkable way, the distinction itself is 
deeply problematic. My claim is that in de Beauvoir's text the ideal of the 
transcendent body is in fact premised upon a certain ideal of the masculine 
body which is defined in opposition to the reproductive 'female' body. 
Women's bodies can therefore only be 'the radiation of a subjective 
personality' to the extent that they do not signify reproduction.
II. Life, Self-Consciousness and the Transcendent Body
According to de Beauvoir, at a biological level the lives of both male and 
female individuals are to a certain extent subject to the dictates of the life of 
the species. As individual biological organisms they embody the species 
insofar as their individual lives maintain the species. And they are 
involved, or can be, in the reproduction of the species. But for de Beauvoir 
there is a crucial difference between man's subjection to the species and
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woman's. Man's individuality is thoroughly integrated into the life of the 
species. He senses no contradiction between his own individual projects 
and the demands of the species. W oman's individuality, on the contrary, 'is 
opposed by the interest of the species; it is as if she were possessed by foreign 
forces -  alienated ' .20
At this same biological level, the genitalia and sexual experiences of male 
and female also differ. The penis is animated, a 'tool', the vagina an 'inert 
receptacle ' . 21 For the male, although intercourse represents the 
transcendence of the individual towards the species, it is simultaneously 'an 
outward relation to the world and to others', and a confirmation of his own 
individuality. For the female, intercourse can only be 'an interior event', a 
renunciation of her individuality for the benefit of the species. The 
asymmetry between the single moment in which the male transcends 
himself towards the species in the ejaculation of sperm, and the lifelong 
servitude of the female to her offspring accounts for this difference. The 
result is:
From puberty to menopause woman is the theatre of a play that 
unfolds within her and in which she is not personally concerned. 
Anglo-Saxons call menstruation 'the curse'; in truth the menstrual 
cycle is a burden and a useless one from the point of view of the 
individual...W oman, like man is her body; but her body is something 
other than herself.22
Now de Beauvoir presents 'the enslavement of the female to the species' as 
though it is a simple question of biological 'fact' .23 Actually this
20. de Beauvoir, op. cit. p. 54.
21. de Beauvoir, ibid.
22. de Beauvoir, op. cit. pp. 60-61.
23 Recent feminist critiques of science and the philosophy of science have uncovered the 
extent to which some biological accounts of sex differences are structured on sexist assumptions 
about female sexuality. See for example Ruth Hubbard's article 'Have Only Men Evolved?' 
in Harding, Sandra & Hintikka, Merrill (eds.) Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on 
Epistemology, Ontology, Metaphysics, and Philosophy of Science (Reidel, Dordrecht, 1983).
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presentation of female biology is structured by a distinction between life and 
self-consciousness which derives from de Beauvoir's reading of Hegel's 
account of the origin of self-consciousness in the section of the 
Phenomenology entitled 'The Truth of Self-Certainty' . 24
For Hegel, human self-consciousness is defined as transcendence of the 
natural world: the quest for self-consciousness is what lifts human existence 
out of the realm of the merely natural and into the realm of the spiritual. 
Transcendence of the natural world means transcendence of itself as a 
natural being: the quest for self-consciousness stands opposed to the desire 
for self-preservation -  both of the individual and of the species in general. 
This is because self-consciousness arises when consciousness 
simultaneously recognizes itself merely as a moment in the life and death 
cycle and revolts against its immersion in this cycle. The attempt to achieve 
self-consciousness signals the refusal of the individual to identify its 
interests with the interests both of the species and of itself qua species-being. 
As such it signifies a recognition that human identity, unlike animal 
identity, is not to be found in mere Life, in the perpetual cycle of life and 
death -  in which the species exists through the individual and the 
individual exists for the sake of the species. Rather, human self- 
consciousness asserts a value more important to it than life -  its own value 
as self-consciousness, as individual.
It should now be clear why, for de Beauvoir, the body qua reproductive body 
signifies immanence and why reproduction alienates women from their 
individuality. If human self-consciousness defines itself in opposition to
24. My account here is deliberately partial, concentrating only on those aspects of Hegel's 
discussion which are picked up by de Beauvoir's reading of Hegel, a reading which, as I 
mentioned earlier, is very much influence by Kojeve. Paul Redding, in an as yet unpublished 
paper entitled 'Hermeneutic or Metaphysical Hegelianism? Kojeve's Dilemma', has recently 
argued convincingly that Kojeve's reading presents a very dualistic, metaphysical reading of 
Hegel.
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the desire for self-preservation, and if consequently the interests of the
individual must be defined in opposition to those of the species, then any
bodily process which is associated with the maintenance and preservation of
species-life seems to undermine the autonomous self-constitution of the
individual subject. Such processes therefore cannot be represented as
activities of an agent. Rather, they are merely passive events in nature,
events in which the individual must submit unconsciously to the dictates
of nature -  explaining why, as I pointed out in Chapter Two, de Beauvoir
denies such processes the status of projects:
The woman who gave birth, therefore, did not know the pride of 
creation; she felt herself the plaything of obscure forces, and the 
painful ordeal of childbirth seemed a useless or even troublesome 
accident. But in any case giving birth and suckling are not activities, 
they are natural functions; no project is involved; and that is why 
woman found in them no reason for a lofty affirmation of her 
existence -  she submitted passively to her biologic fate.25
This analysis also explains why, in the lengthy passage quoted above on the
significance of pregnancy, the pregnant woman is 'ensnared by nature', she
is 'plant and animal', 'life's passive instrument'.
What remains unexplained however is why self-consciousness is defined in 
opposition to the maintenance and preservation of life. Again de 
Beauvoir's reading of Hegel is relevant here, for she argues that human 
individuality defines itself only through conscious confrontation with 
death, through the real or metaphorical risk of life. As I argued in Chapter 
Two, for Hegel the attempt to give concrete content to self-consciousness 
requires intersubjective recognition which, in the life-and-death struggle, 
entails confrontation with the possibility of death. Although in the final 
outcome of the dialectic of lord and bondsman it is the servile 
consciousness who finally achieves true self-consciousness by externalizing
25. de Beauvoir, op. cit. p. 94.
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himself in labour, this outcome is only possible because the slave has lived 
through the fear of death and because 'in that experience it has been quite 
unmanned, has trembled in every fibre of its being, and everything solid and 
stable has been shaken to its foundations/ 26
De Beauvoir uses this analysis both to define the ideal of transcendence and
to explain the emergence of male supremacy:
The warrior put his life in jeopardy to elevate the prestige of the 
horde, the clan to which he belonged. And in this he proved 
dramatically that life is not the supreme value for him, but on the 
contrary that it should be made to serve ends more important than 
itself. The worst curse that was laid upon woman was that she should 
be excluded from these warlike forays. For it is not in giving life but 
in risking life that man is raised above the animal; that is why 
superiority has been accorded in humanity not to the sex that brings 
forth but to the sex which kills.
Here we have the key to the whole mystery. On the biological 
level a species is maintained only by creating itself anew; but this 
creation results only in repeating the same Life in more individuals. 
But man assures the repetition of Life while transcending Life 
through Existence; by this transcendence he creates values that 
deprive repetition of all value...[woman's] misfortune is to have been 
biologically destined for the repetition of Life, when even in her own 
view Life does not carry within itself its reasons for being, reasons that 
are more important than life itself...
The female, to a greater extent than the male, is the prey of the 
species; and the human race has always sought to escape its specific 
destiny. The support of life became for man an activity and a project 
through the invention of the tool; but in maternity woman remained 
closely bound to her body, like an animal. It is because humanity calls 
itself in question in the matter of living- that is to say, values the 
reasons for living above mere life -  that, confronting woman, man 
assumes mastery. Man's design is not to repeat himself in time: it is to 
take control of the instant and mould the future. It is male activity
26 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A.V. Miller, with an analysis of 
text and foreward by J.N. Findlay. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977), Part B, Section IV. A 
'Independence and Dependence of Self-consciousness: Lordship and Bondage', p. 117.
that has prevailed over the confused forces of life; it has subdued
Nature and Woman.27
What is to be made of this explanation? Its resemblance to contemporary 
sociobiological explanations has led some commentators to regard it as a 
deliberate non-explanation on de Beauvoir's part. Michele Le Doeuff for 
instance argues that by acting as a non-explanation the purpose of this 
explanation is to show that women's oppression arises without reason, that 
it is completely arbitrary -  hence this story of the origin of women's 
oppression is quite consistent with the oppression thesis.28 I disagree. If my 
analysis of the way in which de Beauvoir's interpretation of male and 
female biology is structured by the oppositions between life and self- 
consciousness, and species and individual, is correct, then this passage is 
crucial for understanding de Beauvoir's views on the significance of 
women's embodiment. For it makes it clear why, oppression aside, 
women's bodies are not and cannot be perceived as 'the radiation of a 
subjective personality': because woman's body qua reproductive body or qua 
'female' body not only signifies but immerses woman in 'Life' as repetition, 
against which transcendence as value is defined. But this in turn makes it 
clear that the distinction between the body as immanent and the body as 
transcendent is itself sexually marked. In the above passage, the 
reproductive body as immanence implicitly defines the ideal of the 
transcendent body. In contrast to the reproductive body which, in its 
passive functioning, dooms the subject to repetition and immerses her in 
nature, the transcendent body, by means of which the autonomous subject 
is able to surpass the brute givens of facticity, is a pure instrumentality of the 
will, an active body which surpasses itself as material thing. Clearly de
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27. de Beauvoir, op. cit. pp. 94-6.
28. Michele Le Doeuff; 'Operative Philosophy: Simone de Beauvoir and Existentialism', 
translated by Colin Gordon, I&C, no. 6, Autumn 1979, pp. 47-57.
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Beauvoir is aware that no human body can always be transcendent; both 
male and female bodies are subject to processes which are beyond the 
voluntary control of the subject. Nevertheless the implicit contrast between 
the transcendent body and the reproductive body makes the reproductive 
'female' body the paradigmatic metaphor of the body as passive and 
involuntary. By contrast, the transcendent body presupposes a certain 
idealized conception of the male body as a body which is, in principle at 
least, under the voluntary control of intellect and will.
This explains why de Beauvoir's appropriation of the distinction between 
the body as immanence and the body as transcendence to illuminate 
women's situation gives rise in her text to two incompatible accounts of the 
significance of women's embodiment. On the one hand, this distinction 
enables her to account for oppression as an experience in which, because she 
feels her body as alien to her subjectivity, as immanent, the oppressed 
subject is both subject and object for herself simultaneously. On the other 
hand, because the ideal of the body as transcendent is defined in opposition 
to the reproductive body, woman's body qua reproductive body will always 
be alien to her qua autonomous subject.
The implication of this argument is that de Beauvoir associates 
autonomous subjectivity with masculinity. I argued in the previous 
chapter that de Beauvoir's analysis of oppression posits a residual, sexually 
undifferentiated subjectivity which remains somehow untouched by the 
mechanisms of oppression and which is the locus of the subject's resistance 
to her oppression. We have also seen that there is an intimate connection 
between the notion of the autonomous subject and the ideal of the body as 
transcendence. The subject asserts herself as freedom in and through her 
body which, as transcendent, is the instrumentality of her will. But if the 
ideal of the transcendent body presupposes a masculine body then the 
human subject as freedom is not sexually undifferentiated at all. De
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Beauvoir's residual subjectivity is in fact a masculine subjectivity. What 
this means is that women can only exercise their autonomy, in projects and 
in relations with others, to the extent that they transcend their bodies qua 
reproductive bodies. In other words, women can only be authentic subjects 
by denying the ethical significance of their sexually specific bodily 
perspectives. De Beauvoir makes this clear when she argues, in the passage 
on the emergence of male supremacy quoted above, that the value created 
by men deprives the reproductive body -  which merely repeats rather than 
transcends Life -  of all value: 'Woman aspires to and recognizes the values 
that are concretely attained by the male. He it is who opens up the future to 
which she also reaches out' . 29
But how does all this square with de Beauvoir's claim that a genuinely 
ethical relation with others requires that we recognize the other in 'his 
otherness and in that freedom by which he escapes'? How does it square 
with de Beauvoir's claim that ethics must start from the recognition that 
human beings are irreducibly plural? For from the preceding analysis it 
seems that de Beauvoir's conception of autonomous subjectivity requires a 
fundamental sameness of the human being which underlies and transcends 
sexual differentiation. Mutual recognition is a recognition of the otherness 
of the other only insofar as s/he is the same as me. I want to suggest that 
the problem with de Beauvoir's account of autonomous agency, and the 
reason why she is unable to incorporate within it a recognition of the 
differences between bodily perspectives, is that the distinction between the 
immanent and the transcendent body commits her to the view that 
transcendence, or autonomous agency, is achieved through an exertion of 
will by means of which the subject gains self-mastery by exercising control 
over his/her immanent body. But given this conception of autonomy it is
29. de Beauvoir, op. cit. p. 96.
almost inevitable that women's bodily processes will be represented as 
passive, natural events and that women will appear as merely subject to 
these processes, rather than as active agents with respect to them.30' 31
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My aim in Part II has been to uncover the source of the tensions in de 
Beauvoir's analysis of women's situation, between her insistence, on the one 
hand, on women's capacity for autonomy, and her representation, on the 
other hand, of women's bodies as obstacles to autonomy. Phave shown that 
the source of this tension must be located in her implicit appeal to the 
distinction between the immanent and the transcendent body. The 
consequence of this appeal, for de Beauvoir's account of autonomous agency, 
is that, despite her awareness of the significance of embodiment, she ends up 
defining autonomy as an exertion of the will, (as embodied in the 
transcendent body), over the immanent, passive, material body.
30 In Chapter 6 I will argue that this representation of women's bodily processes also 
informs much of the contemporary ethical debate over the issue of abortion. One of my 
arguments in that chapter is that an adequate appraisal of the moral issues raised by 
abortion requires a radical questioning both of this representation and of the idea that 
autonomous agency is associated with control over passive bodily processes by the active 
will.
31.1 want to make it clear at this point that my argument in this thesis does not deny the 
importance for women of self-determination with respect to the reproductive process, nor 
does it deny the significance of some technological developments -  especially in the area of 
contraception -  in increasing women's capacities for self-determination in this respect. 
However, technological intervention into the reproductive process has not only had the 
positive effect of increasing women's capacity for bodily self-determination in certain 
respects, in some ways it has also helped reinforce both the representation of women as 
passive with respect to their bodily processes and the idea that self-determination 
involves control over the body. Given this, it seems to me that an adequate appraisal of 
the benefits and disbenefits for women of the new technologies of reproduction, as well as of 
the moral issues raised by these technologies, must also involve a challenge to this kind of 
conception of autonomous agency.
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In the Introduction to Part IV, I shall outline a conception of embodied 
autonomy which tries to preserve de Beauvoir's insistence on women's self- 
determination, as well as some of her insights about the way in which 
oppression functions through representations which latch on through the 
body and the body-image, but which tries to circumvent de Beauvoir's 
dualistic opposition between the active, autonomous agent and her passive, 
natural body. In the next part of the thesis however, I want to substantiate the 
claim, with which I concluded this discussion of de Beauvoir, about the 
inevitability, given a view of autonomy as control by the will over the body, 
of women's bodies being represented as passive obstacles to autonomous 
agency. My claim is not of course that this inevitability is a function of 
biology, but rather that it is the product of a certain intellectual heritage. My 
discussion in Part III shall show that the difficulties faced by de Beauvoir, in 
providing an adequate account of women's autonomy and in adequately 
representing women's embodiment, can be better understood through an 
analysis of the broader context within which modern ideals of autonomy and 
modern conceptions of femininity have arisen. Through a consideration of 
ideals of autonomy and conceptions of femininity in the social and political 
philosophies of Rousseau and Hegel, we shall see that, at crucial points in the 
development of modern views of autonomy, citizenship and political 
participation, women's bodies came to be represented as unruly, purely 
natural bodies, as bodies which are potentially subversive of the social order 
because they are deaf to the voice of reason. This irrational body of woman 
rendered women unfit subjects for political participation, and hence for fully 
autonomous agency. As a result, autonomy and femininity came to occupy 
mutually exclusive theoretical spaces.
Part III
A perspective On Historical Origins
Introduction
In her book Women, Reason and Nature, Carol McMillan is highly critical 
of de Beauvoir's postulation of a sexually undifferentiated subjectivity.1 
Her view is that if human subjectivity is necessarily embodied, then the 
differences between male and female embodiment must give rise to sexually 
different subjectivities. She also argues that these differences must give rise 
to sexually specific forms of ethical agency. On McMillan's view the whole 
project of feminism is based on a fundamental conceptual confusion 
because it has failed to recognize this fact.
McMillan's book suffers from some serious confusions and exhibits a 
profound ignorance of feminism.2 * Nevertheless her analysis provides a 
useful point of entry into the issues I will be discussing in this part of the 
thesis for two reasons. Firstly, McMillan makes some important 
observations about the ways in which moral reflection and moral agency are 
bound up with our ways of life, our relations with others and our bodily 
perspectives. But secondly, the conclusions she draws from these 
observations, as well as her attempt to articulate an ethical perspective 
founded on what she considers to be the 'facts7 of women's embodiment, 
reveal the extent to which, since the Enlightenment, the question of the
1. McMillan, Carol; Women. Reason and Nature: Some Philosophical Problems with 
Feminism, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1982).
2. For example, McMillan’s obvious lack of familiarity with the diversity of feminist
perspectives on the significance of reproduction, let alone with feminism more generally,
leads her to identify the views of Shulamith Firestone as paradigmatic of 'feminism'.
Firestone's feminism is based on a rather crude reading of de Beauvoir's discussions of the
female body. Her view is that women have been vulnerable to oppression because their
biology is inherently limiting and keeps women at the level of animal life. Liberation thus 
requires liberation from this biology: Firestone looks forward to an era when all reproduction 
will be artificial and controlled through technology. See Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic 
of Sex (Bantam Books, New York, 1970). Firestone's feminism has very little credibility 
within contemporary feminist theory. It is thus somewhat startling to find that McMillan 
takes her views as paradigmatic of feminism. To distinguish McMillan's peculiar 
understanding of feminism from my own I insert quotation marks around the term feminism 
when discussing McMillan's views.
109
relationship between women's embodiment and ethical agency has been, 
and still is, caught up within a series of hierarchical oppositions between 
public and private, reason and feeling, culture and nature. These 
oppositions have constructed the political and conceptual matrix out of 
which our contemporary understandings of masculinity and femininity 
have grown. Within this matrix, sexual difference is represented as an 
ahistorical, 'natural' difference, which necessitates and underpins a sharp 
division within social and political life between the ethical possibilities of 
men and women, and which supposedly grounds the claim that woman's 
ethical life is restricted by her embodiment.
The principal aims of Chapter Four are firstly, to sketch out the historical 
origins of this matrix and to locate the ethical and political problems which 
underlie it; and secondly, to show how, within the context of the 
oppositions between public and private, reason and feeling, and nature and 
culture, femininity and autonomy came to occupy mutually exclusive 
theoretical spaces.
Chapter Four is divided into three main sections. The first section focuses 
on McMillan's critique of 'feminism', in the light of her analysis of 
Rousseau and Hegel on the ethical implications of sexual difference, and on 
her own proposals for a feminine ethic. McMillan's complaint against 
'feminism' is that it has uncritically accepted a sexist conception of ethical 
rationality which downgrades women's traditional activities as well as the 
distinctive kinds of exercise of reason and moral agency embodied in those 
activities. Her argument is that this conception of ethical rationality, which 
she identifies as Hegelian, is structured around the oppositions 
reason/nature and reason/feeling. According to McMillan, these 
oppositions operate in Hegel's work in such a way as to locate women, by 
virtue of their bodies, both outside the dialectic of reason and outside the 
truly ethical sphere of social life. McMillan's argument is that the problem
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lies not so much with women and women's bodies as with the Hegelian 
notion of reason. However although McMillan questions the legitimacy of 
the oppositions between reason/nature and reason/feeling, as well as their 
concomitant devaluation of women's contribution to social life, she 
unwittingly reinstates them in her discussion of Rousseau. McMillan 
regards Rousseau as the only philosopher who understood that social life 
must be based on a recognition of the significance of biological difference, 
without also devaluing women's contribution to social life. In fact she sees 
Rousseau's account of the education of Sophie as providing a model for a 
feminine ethic grounded in a recognition of the 'facts' of women's 
embodiment.3
My argument is that, on the question of sexual difference, Rousseau and 
Hegel are actually a great deal closer than McMillan realizes. McMillan's 
failure to see this arises from her failure to locate their discussions of sexual 
difference in the context of their broader ethical and political views. In the 
second and third sections of Chapter Four, I attempt to substantiate this 
claim through an analysis of the way in which the oppositions between 
public and private, reason and nature, and reason and feeling or passion, 
operate in aspects of the work of Rousseau and Hegel. I show that, despite 
the significant differences between their ethical and political philosophies,
3. Rousseau's proposals for the education of Sophie -  or woman -  occupy Part V of Emile 
(Everyman, 1974). This text has traditionally been read simply as an educational treatise 
and the education of Sophie has usually been passed over in embarassed silence as an 
aberration on the part of Rousseau. I follow contemporary feminist readings of Emile and 
argue that it should be read in the context of Rousseau's political philosophy. Viewed from 
this perspective Part V makes it clear that Rousseau's conception of public political life is 
premised on the subordination of women. My reading of Rousseau has mainly been influenced 
by the following texts: Jean Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and 
Political Thought (Martin Robertson, Oxford 1981); Moira Gatens, 'Rousseau and 
Wollstonecraft: Nature vs. Reason' in Women and Philosophy, ed. by Janna Thompson, 
supplement to vol. 64 AJP, June 1986; Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason, (Methuen, London, 
1984), chapters 4 & 5; Susan Möller Okin, Women in Western Political Thought, (Virago, 
1980); Carole Pateman, "The Disorder of Women": Women, Love and the Sense of Justice1, 
Ethics, October 1980, pp. 20-34 and The Sexual Contract (Polity Press, Oxford, 1988), 
especially chapter 4.
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their presentations of woman's ethical life are very similar. I also show that 
their representation of woman's ethical life as necessarily particularistic and 
affective is less a reflection of the ethical implications of women's 
embodiment than it is the result of an attempt to resolve tensions within 
the moral and political ideals arising from the Enlightenment critique of 
sovereign power.
The tensions to which I refer centre on the conflict between the ideals of 
civic equality and justice on the one hand, and what might broadly be 
described as the ethical demands of relations of kinship and community on 
the other. This conflict is problematic for the moral rationalists of the 
Enlightenment because, while the ideals of civic equality and justice are 
defined in opposition to social relations based on kinship and community, 
they nevertheless presuppose the ethical bonds arising from those relations. 
The ethical and political writings of Rousseau and Hegel are interesting in 
this regard because they are very distinctly marked by an attempt to come to 
terms with this conflict. Because of this, their attempt to resolve it by 
sharply and explicitly distinguishing the ethical relations of the family -  
which preserve the ethical bonds characteristic of kinship relations -  from 
those of civil society and, in Hegel's case, the state, simply makes explicit 
what was, and to a large extent remains, a general conceptual and social 
solution to this conflict. Their work also makes explicit the extent to which 
this ’solution’ requires the subordination of women, because while the 
ethical relations of the public sphere presuppose the kind of ethical relations 
embodied in the family, they are also defined in contrast to them.
The ideal of autonomy or, to use his term, independence, plays a central role 
in the philosophy of Rousseau. In his work autonomy is a capacity which is 
both explicitly associated with the activities of the public sphere and, because 
of this, explicitly denied to women. His work thus makes particularly clear 
the way in which, within the matrix I have described, femininity and
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autonomy came to be defined in opposition to one another. However in the 
Philosophy of Right Hegel is critical of the ideal of autonomy which, he 
claims, abstracts the individual from the social relations within which 
his/her actions are made meaningful, and reduces ethical action simply to a 
question of the subjective individual will. At least part of what I am 
arguing in this thesis is that Hegel's criticisms need to be taken seriously in 
order to articulate an adequate ideal of autonomy. His inclusion in my 
discussion here may therefore seem puzzling. My rationale for discussing 
Hegel in this context is that, despite his criticisms of an individualist notion 
of autonomy, Hegel nevertheless articulated a social ideal of autonomy, 
founded in relations of recognition. Unfortunately however, Hegel 
precluded women from attaining autonomy, thus understood, and 
represented women's bodies as passive, 'natural' bodies. His views on the 
ethical significance of women's embodiment thus help articulate and 
reinforce the general conceptual structures which have made autonomy 
incompatible with femininity -  to the detriment of both.
The argument of Chapter Five is that the writings of Mary Wollstonecraft 
are focused by an attempt to challenge these structures. Wollstonecraft 
points out that Rousseau's 'solution' to the conflict within the ideals of the 
Enlightenment not only requires the subordination of women, it is also 
incoherent. How, she asks, can we claim to be interested in individual 
liberty if the liberty of some individuals is achieved at the expense of others, 
and how can we preserve in one sphere of social life those forms of 
authority which we have elsewhere deemed illegitimate, without 
undermining society from within? But the most significant aspect of 
Wollstonecraft's work is not so much her critique of Rousseau or of the 
inconsistencies in the Enlightenment ideals of equality. Rather it is her 
attempt to articulate an account of what it would be for women to be 
autonomous or, to use her term, self-governing. In contrast to some
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Contemporary feminist assessments of Wollstonecraft, I argue in Chapter 
Five that Wollstonecraft does not simply argue that women must have the 
liberty to exercise 'masculine' virtue. Rather her work shows an awareness 
that women's autonomy could not be achieved within the conceptual and 
political structures which she had inherited. In particular, her ideal of 
wom en's self-governance attempts to reconcile the opposition between 
reason and feeling or 'sensibility', to reveal the connection between 
women's social subordination and the representation and construction of 
women's bodies as passive obstacles to autonomy, and to transform the 
structure of both the public and the private spheres, as well as the 
relationship between them. The fact that Wollstonecraft was not completely 
successful in this attempt should not lead us to underestimate the scale of 
her achievements in identifying and attempting to resolve a problem which 
is still of relevance.
Chapter Four
THE BONDS OF LOVE : McMILLAN, ROUSSEAU AND HEGEL 
Section 1: McMillan
According to Carol McMillan, de Beauvoir's failure to articulate an ethical 
perspective capable of adequately theorising women's embodiment is 
symptomatic of a gross confusion within 'feminism' more generally. The 
confusion centres on the relationship between sex and gender which 
'feminists' have mistakenly understood in terms of the following 
conditional: If gender is not a direct causal effect of sex then there can be no 
relation between them, gender must be completely arbitrary. McMillan 
understands the terms 'sex' and 'gender' in the standard way. 'Sex' refers to 
biological characteristics at the hormonal and chromosomal level, gender to 
the social roles and characteristics usually associated with persons of a 
particular sex.1 * McMillan argues that, on the basis of the above conditional, 
'feminists’ have concluded that there cannot be any connection whatsoever 
between sex and gender because the cross-cultural diversity of 'gender' 
characteristics and social relations between the sexes undermines the 
credibility of any claim that gender is the causal effect of sex. McMillan's 
view is that, while the success of the ’feminist’ claim that women are 
oppressed hinges crucially on this argument, the premise on which it is 
based is fallacious. For if it is true that the link between sex and gender is
1. The sex/gender distinction was originally formulated by Robert Stoller in his book Sex and 
Gender in an attempt to understand the phenomenon of transexualism. The distinction and its
implications for feminism have recently been questioned from a number of different 
perspectives by feminist critics. Some of the issues raised by McMillan are addressed in these 
discussions. For two somewhat contrasting perspectives, compare Judith Butler, Gender 
Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, (Routledge, NY, 1990), and Moira Gatens,
'A Critique of the Sex/Gender Distinction' in Beyond Marxism? Interventions after Marx,
Allen, Judith & Patton, Paul (eds), (Intervention Publications, Leichardt, 1983), pp. 143-162.
See also the articles in 'Sex/Gender7, ed. S. Magarey, Special Issue of Australian Feminist
Studies, no. 10, Summer 1989. My discussion in the Introduction to Part IV of this thesis raises
issues relevant to this debate, but does not specifically address it.
arbitrary then why is technological control over reproduction considered to 
be so essential for the liberation of women? On the one hand, she argues, 
'feminists' want to claim that gender is simply an effect of power relations 
between the sexes by means of which biological sexual differences, in 
themselves as insignificant as the biological differences between skin or hair 
colour, take on vast social significance. On the other hand, is not the 
'feminist' insistence on the issue of reproductive control indicative of a 
recognition that the social situation of women, no matter what the cultural 
context, is in some way connected with the facts of female biology?
McMillan's critique of ’feminism’ raises some important questions about 
how we should understand the relationship between bodily processes and 
the constitution of subjectivity.2 However, although much of her analysis is 
not incompatible with a feminist perspective (although McMillan herself 
seems unaware of this), the conclusions she draws from her analysis are 
explicitly anti-feminist. The aim of McMillan's book is to show that, 
although gender is not in any straightforward way a causal effect of sex, 
there is nevertheless what she calls an 'internal relation' between women's 
biology and their social situations. By this, McMillan means that the 
diversity of social relations between the sexes should be understood as 
different ways of making sense of biological differences within the context of 
different 'forms of life' . 3 Seen from this perspective, McMillan argues, the 
organization of social life around some form of family life, in which women 
have primary responsibility for the care of children and for domestic labour,
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2. In the Introduction to Part IV I re-raise these questions and try to suggest a way of 
answering them that does not commit us to the conclusions reached by McMillan.
3. McMillan draws here on Winch's elaborations on Wittgenstein's notion of 'forms of life' in 
his books The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy, (RKP, London, 1958) 
and Ethics and Action, (RKP, London, 1972). In my discussion of McMillan in Chapter III I do 
not focus on McMillan's use of Winch, but in her review of McMillan Jean Grimshaw argues 
that McMillan's analysis makes clear the implicit conservatism of Winch's philosophical 
outlook. See Radical Philosophy 34, Special Issue on Women, Gender and Philosophy, 
Summer 1983, pp.33-35
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is not oppressive to women but is rather a rational way of coming to terms 
with the implications of biological difference. 'Feminists' are therefore 
mistaken about the nature of the problem facing women. It is not so much 
that women are subordinated within social life and denied the scope to 
exercise autonomy, but rather that certain ways of thinking about social life, 
which are embodied in certain conceptions of rationality, devalue women's 
contribution to social life. To the extent that ’feminism’ takes over and 
concurs with these conceptions of rationality, it is indistinguishable from 
the sexism which it denounces.
What seems to lie behind McMillan's critique of feminism is the worry that 
the instrumental rationality of contemporary social and political life 
systematically erodes the non-instrumental ethical relationships based on 
love and trust which make social life possible. For McMillan these 
relationships are primarily exemplified in the family and in particular in 
the ethical bonds between parents, especially women, and their children.
She thus sees the 'feminist' argument that women's oppression is 
connected with their social role within the family as the privileging of 
instrumental reason. Now McMillan is right to point out that an ethical 
perspective which underestimates the importance of the social relationships 
within which moral agents are embedded is impoverished. She is also right 
to claim that there is a tension between instrumental reason and ethical ties 
based on kinship. But the problem with her analysis is that it fails to 
question the general p o litica l structures, in particular the organization of 
public life, which are the sources of this tension. Rather, by upholding the 
family as the haven which resists the encroachments of a social life 
dominated by instrumental relationships, and by arguing that women's 
ethical life should be directed towards preserving this haven, McMillan 
simply reinforces the distinction between public and private spheres by 
means of which women's contribution to social life is devalued. In the
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discussion that follows I want to show that McMillan's account of the 'facts' 
of women's biology is in fact structured by this distinction.
The connection between McMillan's understanding of women's 
embodiment and her conception of the ethical significance of affective, 
familial relationships emerges in the context of her discussions of Rousseau 
and Hegel. While she links her own proposals for a feminine ethical 
perspective with the work of Rousseau, she identifies the conception of 
ethical rationality common to both sexism and 'feminism' as the 'Hegelian 
rationalistic conception of reason' which she mistakenly conflates with a 
form of instrumental reason. In fact, as I shall argue, McMillan's account of 
the ethical significance of sexual difference is much closer to Hegel's than 
she realizes.
McMillan correctly points out that Hegel develops his accounts of 
knowledge and of ethical rationality in the context of a critique of 
subjectivism. In his critique of Schelling in the Preface to the 
Phenomenology, for example, Hegel is particularly critical of the idea that 
immediate intuitions can provide the basis for knowledge, and in the 
section on 'Morality' in the Philosophy of Right he is scathing of the claims 
to ethical authority made on behalf of 'subjective' feeling. Consequently, 
Hegel explicitly rejects the idea that reason and freedom can arise out of a 
state of immediate, undifferentiated harmony with nature. Rather, these 
distinctively human capacities require that the relation between human life 
and nature is mediated by the 'labour of the spirit', that is by work, society 
and culture. However McMillan misunderstands Hegel's conception of 
Spirit and his understanding of the relation between reason and nature.4
4 McMillan's interpretation of Hegel's conception of the relationship between reason and 
nature seems to have been shaped by her reading of Simmel's appropriation of Hegel in his 
discussion of sexual difference. She refers to Simmel's discussion of sexual difference in 'Das 
Relative und das Absolute im Geschlechter-Problem' in Philosophische Kultur (Kroner, 
Leipzig, 1919), translated as 'The Relative and the Absolute in the Problem of the Sexes' in
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Whereas Hegel thinks that in Spirit the abstract oppositions between 
subjective and objective perspectives is superseded (aufgehoben), on 
McMillan's reading Hegel simply rejects the subjective standpoint.
Similarly, she takes Hegel to be implying that reason as a, if not the 
distinctively human activity, must be defined in simple opposition to the 
animal and natural worlds and hence to all those aspects of human life 
which are involved with nature or which we share in common with 
animals. Her argument is that, on Hegel's view, because women's 
involvement in reproduction connects them inescapably with 'nature', 
then women must be outside the dialectic of reason, they must exist in an 
immediate, pre-rational state. This is why for Hegel women's mode of 
cognition is not through rational reflection but through intuition and 
feeling.
McMillan has two objections to Hegel's conception of reason as she presents 
it. The first is that it ignores the fact that human beings are part of and 
continuous with nature. That is, it ignores the fact that, like all natural 
beings, every aspect of our existence is caught up in bodily processes and 
needs -  we require shelter and food, we digest, excrete, reproduce and so on. 
Certainly what is distinctive about human beings is that we attribute 
significance to these processes, that is, they form the basis of our social and 
cultural systems of representation and interpretation. But this is in itself an 
activity of reason. In other words reason cannot be defined in 
contradistinction to the natural facts of human existence but rather shows 
itself in the way in which we transform these facts into culturally 
meaningful activities. Further, because our relation to these bodily needs 
and processes is always already mediated by their cultural meanings for us, 
we cannot even make sense of the idea that these aspects of our existence are
Georg Simmel: On Women, Sexuality and Love, trans. by Guy Oakes (Yale U.P. 1984). With 
respect to Hegel's own work she refers in particular to Hegel's Logic and to the Philosophy of 
Right.
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somehow 'outside' cultural systems of representation, that is, outside 
reason. For this reason it is simply a mistake to assimilate women's 
reproductive capacities, their sexuality, and their relationships with their 
partners and children, with the reproductive life of animals.
The argument that reason is not ’a separate faculty operating in isolation 
from, and in contradistinction to, man's "animal nature '"5 certainly has 
some force, as does McMillan's complaint about the way in which women's 
sexuality and reproduction have been thought of as merely instinctual and 
devoid of reason. However McMillan's objection is not in fact inconsistent 
with Hegel's conception of reason. In the Hegelian dialectic what is 
superseded or aufgehoben in the dialectical process is not simply left behind 
but is rather incorporated into the subsequent stages of the dialectic. Thus 
for Hegel 'nature' does not stand 'outside' reason. The distinction between 
reason and nature is itself a product of universal reason, or Spirit. The 
point of his critique of ’immediacy’ is rather that there can be no recourse to 
'intuition' outside of reason. Contrary to what McMillan argues therefore, 
Hegel's claim that women live in the 'vague unity of feeling' does not 
contradict his critique of subjectivism. As I shall argue later, although Hegel 
connects women with 'feeling' and with 'nature', he does not regard 
women in any straightforward way as 'outside' reason. More to the point, 
in his discussion of Antigone in the Phenomenology, Hegel makes it clear 
that woman's contribution to ethical life is precisely to mediate between 
nature and self-consciousness. By attaching consciousness to merely natural 
processes -  in this case death and the processes of corruption -  and so 
'interrupting the work of nature', Antigone, or woman, rescues human life 
from the indifference of nature and gives it ethical significance. Ironically, 
McMillan seems to be arguing for a position very similar to Hegel's.
5 McMillan, op. cit. p. 12.
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McMillan's second objection is to the conception of ethical agency that is 
implicit in Hegel's understanding of reason. Although McMillan agrees 
with Hegel's critique of ethical subjectivism, she thinks that by contrasting 
reason with 'mere' feeling Hegel ends up with a purely rationalistic ethic, 
one in which the only actions that can be considered truly ethical are those 
that conform to universal ethical principles. According to McMillan there 
are two problems with this view of ethical agency. The first is that it ignores 
the complexity and particularity of moral dilemmas. Moral dilemmas arise 
in situations where our ethical principles may conflict and where there is no 
straightforward or dispassionate way of deciding what to do. In such cases 
moral decisions are irreducibly particular. Ultimately a decision can only be 
made by the individuals concerned from within a particular context and 
judgments as to the rightness or wrongness of that decision cannot be made 
in abstraction from that context.6 The second problem is that Hegel's 
opposition between reason and 'mere' feeling misunderstands both the 
nature of emotion and the nature of moral motivation. Although 
emotions are certainly connected with certain bodily sensations or 'feelings', 
they are not reducible to those sensations. Rather, emotion necessarily 
involves cognition -  which is why we are able to make moral judgments 
about them. Further because moral decisions are always embedded in the 
context of people's lives, a person's emotions, far from undermining 
rational ethical deliberation, actually provides the motivational context for 
it. According to McMillan, these mistakes explain why Hegel sees women as 
incapable of justice -  because their relationships to men and children within 
the family are necessarily particularistic and emotional. McMillan argues 
however that the problem lies not with women but with the Hegelian 
conception of reason.
6. McMillan's position here is similar to that of some of the feminist interpretations of 
Gilligan's work which were mentioned in Chapter 1.
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McMillan claims that Hegel valorizes a highly abstract notion of reason -  
reason as it expresses itself in art, religion and philosophy. It is thus not 
surprising that he fails to see activities such as those of the mother as 
embodying reason. What she tries to show is that this narrow conception of 
reason, which identifies reason simply with its abstract and universal 
applications, is inadequate for understanding the scope of human reason. 
What is needed, she thinks, is an extended conception of reason, one which 
is continuous with, rather than defined in opposition to, sensuous activity. 
The extent to which McMillan's view here echoes Rousseau's critique of 
abstract reason and his account of the continuity between reason, sensation 
and the body will become evident in the second section of this chapter.
McMillan characterises the extended conception of reason by making a 
distinction between 'reason' and what she calls 'intuitive knowledge'. 
'Reason' in its narrow sense she identifies with abstract forms of thought, 
such as those employed in scientific activity and mathematics. 'Intuitive 
knowledge' by contrast, is identified with craft-type and practical activities 
involving certain skills. McMillan gives as examples of 'intuitive 
knowledge' the skills of the wheelwright, the Trukese navigator and the 
mother. The characteristic feature of 'reason' narrowly defined is that it 
involves justification and proof by reference to general laws or universal 
principles. Hence it gives rise to the sort of knowledge which involves 
systematising and theorising. 'Intuitive knowledge', on the other hand, 
requires neither this sort of justification nor systematisation. Rather it is 
knowledge which 'cannot be learned from books or through formal study 
but only through experience' . 7 This does not mean that 'intuitive 
knowledge' does not require training. But it requires a different sort of 
training than that required by scientific activity, the sort of training provided
7. McMillan, crp. cit. p. 41.
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by apprenticeships and 'vocational' training. Whereas McMillan seems to 
conceive of scientific training as a matter of acquiring a body of systematic 
and theoretical knowledge grounded in universal principles, she regards 
vocational training as necessarily particularistic and individual: 'Every new 
initiate must learn for himself in his distinctly individual way, what is right 
and what is wrong' .8 McMillan's argument is that such 'intuitive 
knowledge' also requires the exercise of reason, but in a different form to 
that required by scientific and mathematical pursuits.
For the purposes of my argument it is not really relevant to assess the 
adequacy of McMillan's extended conception of reason.9 However, it should 
be noted that McMillan's argument does not question the distinction 
between 'abstract' reason and 'intuitive knowledge', nor does it question the 
adequacy of the abstract conception of reason for such pursuits as those of 
science and mathematics. Rather, it preserves this opposition and simply 
questions the exclusion of 'intuitive knowledge' from a broader conception 
of reason.10
McMillan argues that on the basis of this extended conception of reason it 
becomes clear that women's 'traditional' activities -  in particular mothering 
-  are not devoid of reason at all. Rather they involve a different use of 
reason to the abstract reason which is so valued by a technologically-minded
8. ibid.
9. Despite their gross misinterpretation of feminist critiques of reason, such as that of Lloyd, 
which they identify with McMillan's position, Pargetter and Prior argue convincingly that 
McMillan's discussion of this issue is confused. See Robert Pargetter and Elizabeth Prior, 
’Against the Sexuality of Reason’ ATP, vol. 64 June 1986 Women and Philosophy Supplement.
10. McMillan's position must thus be distinguished from the views of recent feminist critics of 
science, such as Evelyn Fox Keller, who argue that the conception of reason associated with 
'abstract masculinity' in fact yields inadequate science. See for example Evelyn Fox Keller, 
'Gender and Science' in Harding & Hintikka (eds.) Discovering Reality: Feminist 
Perspectives on Epistemology, Ontology, Metaphysics, and Philosophy of Science (Reidel, 
Dordrecht, 1983); and Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism, (Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, 1986).
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culture, that is a culture which values only those exercises of reason which 
involve technological mastery over and transformation of nature. Again, 
this claim has some force. The problem is that McMillan uses it to argue that 
'feminists' are making a mistake when they object to women's forced 
exclusion from those spheres of social life in which abstract reason is 
exercised. According to McMillan, this objection is mistaken, in fact it is 
complicit with the sexism it denounces, because it simply endorses both the 
abstract conception of reason and the cultural valuation of women's 
'traditional' activities as devoid of reason.
McMillan concedes that the 'feminist' argument is not altogether 
incomprehensible. One of the distinctive features of the modern world is 
that technological mastery has gradually encroached upon, and taken over, 
many employments requiring the practical and skilled craft activities which 
embody for McMillan her extended conception of reason. One of these is 
motherhood and the domestic sphere in which the traditional skilled 
activities of women have simply become outmoded. This has gone hand in 
hand with an erosion of the extended family to its modern caricature, the 
nuclear family. As a result there is less and less scope for women to exercise 
reason, skill and ethical agency within the domestic/private sphere. 
McMillan thinks that this explains why 'feminists' set so much store in 
abstract reason. That this solution to the problem is both unsatisfactory and 
indicative of the poverty of the Hegelian conception of reason on which it is 
based, is evident, according to McMillan, in the fact that feminists like de 
Beauvoir and Firestone, in agreement with Hegel, see women's 
reproductive capacities as obstacles to the achievement of reason and 
autonomy.
McMillan is right to question ideals of reason and autonomy which require 
that women can only be autonomous agents if they are able artificially to 
control their own reproductive capacities. But how does she get from here
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to the claim that women's rational capacities should be exercised mainly in 
mothering and 'traditional' female occupations, rather than in abstract 
reason? Further what justifies the assertion that some form of family life in 
which women have primary responsibility for childcare and domestic 
labour is necessary? McMillan's argument here, which appeals to the 
notion of 'forms of life', is decidedly slippery. She argues that although 
women's social role within the family is based not on 'nature' but on 
convention, this convention is not merely a result of patriarchal 
oppression. Rather it is a convention which is the most 'rational' way of 
coming to terms with biological difference (but which notion of reason is 
being appealed to here?); it is a convention grounded in nature, that is in 
the inescapable limits imposed upon women by their reproductive 
capacities. Similarly, she argues that mothering skills, for example, are not 
innate but are rather acquired by training, explaining why both the training 
and the skills vary from culture to culture. Nevertheless she thinks it is 
culturally appropriate for women to be trained to use their reason in 
'intuitive knowledge', and in particular in the forms that it takes in 
mothering and domestic activity, rather than in 'abstract' reason. Thus, as 
Jean Grimshaw has argued, 'nature (in the guise of biology) is expelled only 
to be reinstated (in the guise of culture) '.11
McMillan develops her notion of conventions grounded in nature in the 
context of an appeal to Rousseau's discussion, in Part V of Emile, of the 
significance of sexual difference. She finds Rousseau appealing for three 
connected reasons. Firstly, she thinks, Rousseau recognizes that social life 
can only flourish if it is based upon and takes account of 'certain inexorable 
facts about human life' . 12 Secondly, he does not presume a sexually
11. Grimshaw, op. cit. p. 35
12. McMillan, op. cit. p. 90
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undifferentiated human subject. Rather his proposals for the education of 
Sophie start from the recognition that although the only significant 
differences between men and women are biological, these differences make 
all the difference as far as the ethical lives of men and women are 
concerned. Thirdly, although Rousseau recognizes that social conventions 
must be grounded in certain biological givens, he does not think that 
biology determines the shape of social life in any straightforward way. Thus 
he recognizes that although 'maternity' is based in female biological reality, 
it is not a mere instinct; rather it is a cultural institution for which women 
have to be educated.
Following Rousseau, McMillan claims that if women are to be educated in 
such a way as to enable them properly to undertake their maternal role then 
their education needs to be different from the education which men receive. 
In particular women need to be educated to accept the restraint and 
curtailment of freedom which their biological role imposes upon them. 
Thus not only do they need to be educated in the care of infants, their 
education needs to be based on a model of ethical agency which is structured 
upon an acceptance of the limitations placed upon them by their biology. 
McMillan calls this notion of agency 'intentional passivity'; passive because 
it involves 'accepting rather than fighting' the inherent 'limitations' of the 
female body, but intentional because it is the means by which a purposive 
rational being comes to terms with these limitations. The examples 
McMillan gives of intentional passivity are natural childbirth and the 
rhythm method of contraception.
McMillan's recommendations are unclear to say the least. Firstly, in her 
discussion of 'intentional passivity' McMillan correctly points out, as have 
many feminists, that increasing technological intervention into the 
reproductive process has undermined our sense of women as active agents
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in this process, and with respect to their own bodies.13 But it is not clear 
how she gets from here to the claims that abortion and all forms of 
contraception other than the rhythm method are morally wrong. Secondly, 
although McMillan is right to point out that infants need continuity of care, 
love and nurturance, how does this claim justify the assertion that it is 
primarily up to the mother of the child alone to provide for these emotional 
needs and to fulfill 'her obligations to her children by providing for their 
needs in the form of nursing, cleaning, sewing, cooking, ironing, washing 
and so on '?14 Thirdly, apart from suggesting that women must learn both to 
accept the inescapable limitations of their biology and somehow because of 
this, to structure their lives around the needs of others, McMillan's 
discussion does not provide a coherent account of a specifically feminine 
ethic. She points to Rousseau's account of feminine virtue as a model in 
this respect, but, as I shall argue in the next section of this chapter, the 
hallmark of this account is that, because it is constructed entirely around 
needs other than Sophie's own, its explicit intention is to undermine the 
possibility that Sophie will become an autonomous agent. But then this 
seems to be precisely what McMillan is recommending for women.
In fact, although she appeals to Rousseau, McMillan seems to be unaware of 
the connection between Rousseau's politics and his account of the ethical 
significance of sexual difference. For a consideration of Rousseau's political 
philosophy shows that, despite his own claims about the passivity of 
women's bodies, his account of 'feminine virtue', and his representation of 
women's bodies as ethically restrictive and politically subversive, have very 
little to do with any intrinsic properties of women's bodies. Rather once
13 In Part IV of this thesis, especially in Chapter Six, I try to develop an account of bodily 
autonomy which can incorporate a recognition of women's autonomous agency with respect to 
bodily processes such as those occurring in pregnancy.
14 McMillan, op. cit. p. 98.
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Rousseau's proposals about 'feminine virtue' are understood from within 
this political context it is obvious that Rousseau does not think of 
masculinity and femininity either as biological categories or as having an 
equal and complementary social weight. In fact they get their meaning from 
a series of hierarchical oppositions within which femininity is associated 
with the devalued but necessary underpinnings of masculine ethical and 
political life.
What seems to be going on in McMillan's book is that while she claims that 
she is questioning the social devaluation of femininity, and in particular of 
maternity, she is oblivious to the fact that her analysis is in fact structured by 
the very same oppositions within which that devaluation occurs. 
Consequently, while she presents her account of the ethical significance of 
women's embodiment as an argument based on inescapable, if not 
determining, biological realities, the truth is that her analysis is structured 
by a historically specific contrast between the public and the private spheres. 
This is evidenced by the extent to which McMillan's argument fails to 
question two very questionable, and connected presumptions. Firstly, 
McMillan fails to question the adequacy of conceptions of civic equality and 
justice which abstract from the particular and different needs and situations 
of different social groups. Rather, she simply wants to point out that our 
conception of morality is impoverished if it values only the characteristics 
and values paradigmatically embodied in the public sphere, namely abstract 
reason and ethical impartiality. The full implications of this failure become 
clear in McMillan's criticisms of childcare and of any form of compensatory 
legislation -  such as maternity leave -  for working women. These 
measures, according to McMillan, not only attempt to deny the natural 
limitations which their biology imposes upon women, but also erode the 
particularistic relationships which are the foundation of social life. What 
seems to elude McMillan however is the realisation that by failing to
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question the adequacy, for our conception of the public sphere, of the ideals 
of formal equality and justice understood as abstract impartiality, she is in 
fact preserving the conceptual structures by means of which the ethical 
significance of these relationships is devalued. Consequently and secondly, 
McMillan fails to question the representation of women's bodies as 'passive' 
and 'limiting', in implicit contrast to the representation of men's bodies as 
'active' and 'autonomous'. But this representation does not simply mirror 
the biological 'facts'. Rather it is itself produced by a contrast between the 
public and the private spheres within which women's sexuality and 
reproductive capacities come to signify an ahistorical and 'natural' 
difference, and which situates women ambiguously both within and 
without social and political life. In the following two sections of this chapter 
I present an analysis of the problems underlying this contrast. I also show 
how the ideal of autonomy has been constructed within the terms of this 
contrast as an ideal defined in opposition to femininity.
Section 2: Rousseau
Near the beginning of Emile Rousseau relates his famous story of the 
Spartan mother, ideal citizen but somewhat lacking in maternal virtue, who 
gives thanks for a Spartan victory which has cost the lives of her five sons. 
The theme of the story is familiar to readers of The Social Contract, namely 
that the duties of the individual as citizen often seem to conflict with the 
private interests of that same individual. But whereas in The Social 
Contract Rousseau argues that in a just society a person's private will 
should coincide with the general will, the moral of this story is that the 
Spartan mother cannot respond to the news of her sons' deaths both as a 
good citizen and as a good mother. The response that is appropriate from 
the impartial perspective of the citizen is completely inappropriate, in fact 
immoral, from the perspective of the mother.
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Rousseau was not the first philosopher to be worried by the ethical and 
social conflicts, between love and justice, partiality and impartiality, 
individuality and communality, which are epitomised in this story. Plato's 
story of Euthyphro, for example, who feels compelled in the name of public 
duty to prosecute his own father, is centred on a similar set of conflicts. But 
in Rousseau's ethical and political thought these conflicts take on new 
meaning because Rousseau locates the conflicting virtues in different 
spheres of moral and political life and attaches them to different genders. 
While social relations between citizens within the public sphere are 
characterized as rational and contractual, and are organized around the 
ideals of autonomy or moral independence, impartial justice, and civic 
equality and liberty, relations within the private sphere are unequal, 
dependent, particularistic and affective. According to Rousseau, social life 
will only flourish if these two spheres are kept quite distinct, that is if 
citizenship is a masculine duty while women uphold the virtues of the 
private sphere. The apparent inconsistencies between the moral of the story 
of the Spartan mother and the theme of public good versus private interest 
thus disappear. For it is because she is a mother that the Spartan mother 
cannot be a good citizen. Further it is because she is a woman that the 
Spartan mother cannot, or rather should not, achieve the kind of moral 
independence and autonomy that is required for citizenship.
Rousseau claims in Emile that the differences between the positions of men 
and women in social life arise from the 'natural', biological differences 
between male and female bodies, which ground moral differences between 
the sexes. I want to argue however that it is a mistake to take Rousseau at 
his word on this issue. Rather, Rousseau's appeals to both 'nature' and 
'woman' to resolve the conflicts within social life are symptoms of a 
profound tension at the heart of his moral and political philosophy. This 
tension concerns Rousseau's ideals of autonomy, justice and public life.
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Rousseau is vehement that social equality and liberty can only arise if civil 
life is founded as if on a contract between self-sufficient individuals, and if 
contractual relations between these individuals are regulated by the ideal of 
impartial justice. Given his own analysis of socialised human nature 
however, Rousseau recognises that human beings are not self-sufficient 
individuals and that impartial justice and relations of contract cannot 
provide the foundation for moral life. Since for Rousseau human beings 
are mainly motivated by their passions, morality will have no hold if it is 
not in some way grounded in passion. But passion is necessarily partial and 
particular, and makes us inescapably dependent upon others. Rousseau's 
difficulty then is that the very aspects of human nature that give rise to 
moral and social life have a tendency to undermine autonomy, justice and 
the contractual ordering of civil life. Rousseau's appeals to 'nature' and 
'woman' are an attempt to preserve, but also to contain, those aspects of 
human nature which Rousseau regards as both essential to moral and social 
life yet potentially disruptive of the civic, contractual order.
However Rousseau's attempt to resolve the tensions within his moral and 
political philosophy by means of a sharp distinction between the public and 
the private spheres only displaces these tensions into the private sphere 
itself. On the one hand the partial, affective relationships of the 'natural' 
private sphere are supposed to provide the non-contractual basis for civil 
life. On the other hand because these relationships arise from passions 
which are potentially disruptive to the social order they must be carefully 
regulated. But, as Wollstonecraft points out, Rousseau's attempt to regulate 
familial relationships, by subjecting women and children within the family 
to the authority of men, and by denying women the space to achieve 
autonomy, in fact undermines the moral life of the private sphere. She 
argues that not only is women's submission to male authority unlikely to 
encourage the conjugal relationships of trust and love that provide the
foundation for civil life, but Rousseau's account of feminine ’virtue' makes 
it impossible for women to educate their children to be virtuous citizens.
My argument is that there are a number of reasons why Rousseau gets 
himself into this contradictory position with respect to his claims about 
women's moral role and capacities: firstly, because there is a tension 
between Rousseau's excessively individualist account of autonomy and his 
views about the moral importance of feeling and passion, a tension which 
arises from his ambivalence about the passions; secondly, because he makes 
explicit the fact that the distinction between public and private spheres 
functions not only to preserve the non-contractual foundation of moral life 
but also to ensure claims to paternal right; and thirdly because he displaces 
onto women's bodies a difficulty which plagues his whole social and 
political philosophy. The difficulty is that, within the terms of his account 
of human nature, the distinction which is so central to his moral and 
political philosophy between those aspects of human social life that are 
beneficial and those that are destructive, cannot easily be sustained.
Because my argument is that Rousseau's conception of autonomy and his 
account of 'feminine virtue' must be understood from within the broader 
context of his moral and political philosophy, it is important to begin by 
outlining this context. My discussion starts with an analysis of the 
distinction between nature and social life in The Discourse on the Origin of 
Inequality and then moves to an analysis of Rousseau's ideals of social 
justice and individual virtue in The Social Contract and Emile, concluding 
with a reading of Part V of Emile on the education of Sophie.15
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15. The editions to which I refer are: Emile, (Everyman, 1974); The Social Contract and The 
Discourse on the Origin of Inequality in The Social Contract and other Discourses (Everyman, 
1973); and On the Social Contract; Discourse on the Origin of Inequality; Discourse on 
Political Economy, translated and edited by Donald Cress, (Hackett Publishing Company, 
Indiana, 1983). Hereafter I often refer to The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality as the 
Second Discourse.
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I: 'Nature' vs. Social Life
As many commentators have pointed out, Rousseau uses the category 
'nature' in a number of different ways in different texts, contrasting it with 
different categories on different occasions. In The Discourse on the Origin of 
Inequality, 'nature' designates a primitive, asocial, but peaceable 'state of 
nature' which contrasts favourably with his presentation of sociality as 
dominated by vicious conflicts. In The Social Contract, the category is used 
sometimes to designate this primitive 'state of nature', at other times to 
refer to a pre-social contract state, which is very similar to Hobbes' picture of 
the 'state of nature' as anarchic and violent, and which Rousseau contrasts 
with the civic freedom and justice made possible by the social contract. In 
'The Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Priest' in Emile, 'nature' refers to 
the harmonious 'natural order' created by God. Here and elsewhere in 
Emile, as well as in the Second Discourse, 'nature' is also used adjectivally to 
commend the beneficent feelings and instincts which Rousseau wishes to 
contrast with the destructive social passions which undermine social life. 16 
Nevertheless I think the key to understanding the function of the category 
'nature' in Rousseau's philosophy is his discussion in the Second Discourse. 
Here not only are the conflicts within social life which so preoccupied 
Rousseau presented most vividly, but also the pessimistic sense, which 
always marks his work, that ultimately these conflicts may be irresoluble, 
emerges most strongly.
Rousseau begins the Second Discourse with a distinction between two kinds 
of inequality - natural inequality and moral or political inequality. Natural 
inequality ’is established by nature, and consists in a difference of age,
16. For a detailed analysis of Rousseau's different uses of the category 'nature' see Bloch, 
Maurice «Sc Bloch, Jean H.; 'Women and the dialectics of nature in eighteenth century french 
thought', pp. 25-41 in MacCormack <Sc Strathern (eds.) Nature, Culture, Gender, (Cambridge 
U.P. 1980). They argue that for Rousseau 'nature' seems to operate more as "a category of 
challenge rather than an element in a stable binary contrast".
health, bodily strength, and the qualities of the mind or the soul'. Moral or
political inequality, on the other hand,
depends on a kind of convention, and is established, or at least 
authorized, by the consent of men. This latter consists of the 
different privileges which some men enjoy to the prejudice of 
others; such as that of being more rich, more honoured, more 
powerful, or even in a position to extract obedience.17
Rousseau argues that while natural inequalities of capacity or differences
between individuals are inescapable, such inequalities in themselves are
morally insignificant. Because moral relations between people only arise in
the context of social and political relations, it is only in society that natural
differences assume moral significance. The aim of the distinction is thus to
enable Rousseau to distinguish fortuitous differences between individuals
from political inequalities and to argue that no natural difference can justify
the establishment of political relations of domination and subordination
between human beings who are by nature free. The Discourse attempts to
explain how, given the natural liberty of human beings, political inequality
can have arisen. Rousseau is explicit that this explanation is a fiction, but it
is a fiction which in a sense can ’explain the nature of things' more
adequately than 'historical truths' are able to do.
Following Hobbes, Rousseau's fiction takes the form of a contrast between a 
'state of nature' and a state of sociality. Unlike Hobbes, however, Rousseau 
is famously ambivalent about sociality and the capacities which give rise to 
it. On the one hand sociality is the condition of possibility of human 
excellence and virtue. On the other hand sociality is also the condition of 
possibility of corruption -  the other side of excellence and virtue. In the 
Second Discourse, Rousseau uses the device of the 'state of nature' to try to 
distinguish those aspects of human sociality which he thinks are conducive 
to the promotion of justice and virtue from those which give rise to
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17. Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, Everyman edition, p. 44.
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corruption and injustice. More than any other of his texts, The Discourse 
on the Origin of Inequality reveals the extent to which the desire which 
founds Rousseau's moral and political philosophy is, in his own terms, an 
impossible desire. It is a desire for excellence without corruption, for virtue 
without vice, for justice without inequality. But in the terms of Rousseau's 
own discourse this desire is impossible because it is the very same aspects of 
human sociality and the very same capacities which give rise to both 
excellence and corruption, virtue and vice, justice and inequality.
In the Second Discourse, Rousseau distinguishes three different phases of 
human development: the 'state of nature'; an idyllic early social state which 
Rousseau refers to as the 'youth of the world'; and a state of anarchic vice 
and inequality preceding the formation of a social contract. Although 
Rousseau attempts to account for the transitions between these states, the 
differences between the pre-social and the social states are striking. In the 
'state of nature', nature herself is abundant. As a consequence, human life is 
peaceable because human beings are individually self-sufficient and live in a 
state of nomadic, asocial, dispersal. Their bodies are robust and resistant to 
disease. As a result there is no need for tools; the human body itself is the 
only tool needed for survival and the body is at one with the desires and 
purposes of the individual. Most interestingly, biological differences 
between the sexes have no significance. Women are as well adapted to 
survival as men because there are no affective bonds either between 
individual adults or between mothers and their children.18 The emergence 
and subsequent development of human social life, by contrast, is marked by 
conditions of scarcity and competition, the increasing interdependence of 
human individuals and groups and the formation of larger and larger social 
groupings, and an ever-increasing dependence upon technology. The
18. As I shall argue later in this chapter, this account of independence as self-sufficiency is 
echoed in Rousseau's conception of autonomy, or moral independence.
catalyst and underlying basis for the development of sociality however is the 
abandonment of a nomadic lifestyle, the chief effect of which is the 
formation of family life which 'gives rise to the first expansions of the 
human heart':
The habit of living together soon gave rise to the finest feelings 
known to humanity, conjugal love and paternal affection. Every 
family became a little society, the more united because liberty and 
reciprocal attachment were the only bonds of its union. The sexes, 
whose manner of life had been hitherto the same, began now to adopt 
different ways of living. The women became more sedentary, and 
accustomed themselves to mind the hut and the children, while the 
men went abroad in search of their common subsistence.19
Rousseau is aware that his explanation of the transition from the 'state of
nature' to social life is arbitrary. He admits that a 'vast space' separates the
two states, that it is very difficult to imagine how this space could possibly
have been traversed and that only a chance concurrence of events can have
brought human beings together. At one level this is not a real problem for
Rousseau, for it allows him to claim that the disorder which characterizes
human social life is a not a product of God's 'natural order', of which
human life in the 'state of nature' forms a part. Rather it is the product of
specific forms of social organization which have produced a socialized
human nature that bears little resemblance to human nature in the 'state of
nature'. At another level however, the weakness of Rousseau's explanation
of this transition points to Rousseau's difficulty in making and sustaining a
distinction between those aspects of human sociality that are beneficial and
those that are harmful. No sooner does a distinction appear than it is
shored up by another distinction which in its turn requires a further one.
Rousseau uses the category 'nature' to try to make these distinctions hold, to
enact some kind of theoretical closure. But, as I shall argue, this attempt
ultimately results in incoherence.
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Rousseau's conception of socialized human nature, like that of many other 
Enlightenment thinkers, is structured around the central categories of 
'reason' and 'passion'. At one level the conflicts within human nature and 
social life can be understood as the result of a straightforward conflict 
between these two faculties, a conflict in which passion undermines reason. 
However, although in Rousseau's philosophy the distinction between 
reason and passion is clearly hierarchical, Rousseau also recognizes that 
without passion reason is not only sterile but dangerous. He thus supports 
the distinction by making further distinctions, within the categories of 
reason and passion themselves, between 'reason' or 'understanding' on the 
one hand, and 'abstract reason' on the other, and between the beneficial and 
the destructive passions. The category 'nature' functions to mark off from 
one another the two terms within each opposition.
In the Second Discourse, Rousseau claims that in the 'state of nature' 
human understanding is in harmony with the body and with sensation; 
they share a unity of action and of purpose. The development of 'abstract' 
reason, by contrast, enacts a separation between reason, the body, and 
sensation, in which the desires and needs of the body often conflict with the 
dictates of reason, or in which reason generates needs and desires beyond 
those required for bodily survival. Rousseau explains the difference 
between these two kinds of reason by connecting the understanding with 
certain instincts which are common to both human beings and animals, 
while aligning 'abstract' reason with certain distinctively human capacities. 
The divisions internal to reason are thus supported by further distinctions: 
between animal and human life; between instincts and non-instinctual 
capacities, and between the body and reason. The two instincts governing 
both human and animal life are the instinct for self-preservation, or self- 
love {am our-de-soi), and compassion or pity. Self-love ensures that 
individuals have a proper regard for their own survival and act in such a
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way as to maximise their chances of survival. In the 'state of nature' it is 
fostered by the unity between the understanding, sensation and the body. 
Compassion, or an aversion to the suffering of all sentient beings, tempers 
self-love and ensures that the instinct for survival is kept in check by a due 
regard for the suffering of other creatures. Understood in its connection 
with these instincts, understanding is thus not a distinctively human 
capacity.
What distinguishes human from non-human animals in the 'state of 
nature' are two capacities which help transform the understanding into 
'abstract reason'. These capacities are 'liberty', and the faculty of 'self- 
improvement' or 'perfectibility'. What Rousseau means by 'natural liberty' 
is not completely clear. When contrasting 'natural liberty' with social 
inequality, he seems to equate it with self-sufficiency and independence.
But this account of 'natural liberty' would not be sufficient to distinguish 
human from non-human animals in the 'state of nature'. When 
contrasting human liberty with the life of non-human animals, Rousseau 
thus seems to equate it with free will. Whereas the actions of non-human 
animals are governed by instinct alone, human liberty means that human 
beings are free either to act in accordance with instinct or to choose to go 
against it. Further while the life of non-human animals, according to 
Rousseau, shows no self-motivated evolution, the faculty of self- 
improvement enables human beings to alter the conditions of their 
existence. In the 'state of nature' however, perfectibility exists only in a 
rudimentary form. Its proper development requires the development of 
'abstract reason', for perfectibility requires both foresight and the ability to 
make comparisons, neither of which arise when the understanding is used 
only to satisfy the needs and appetites of the present moment.
Rousseau's attitude towards 'abstract reason' and 'perfectibility' is 
ambivalent. On the one hand, without them any form of moral life would
be impossible because the exercise of moral choice presupposes the ability to 
make comparisons. Thus, without them, neither virtue nor human 
excellence would be possible. On the other hand, the exercise of these 
capacities fragments the natural unity of understanding, sensation and the 
body, and undermines the harmony between human beings and the natural 
world. With the development of the capacity for comparison, human 
beings no longer see themselves as part of the natural world, but come to see 
themselves as different from and superior to it. This is why Rousseau 
asserts that "a state of reflection is one contrary to nature and that the man 
who meditates is a depraved animal" .20
Rousseau points out that both perfectibility and the abstract use of reason are 
dependent upon and presuppose the use of language. In the absence of a 
language which is able not only to name particulars, but also to discern 
resemblances and differences between particulars, that is, a language which 
can form general and abstract ideas, it would be impossible to engage in any 
form of reflection or comparison. But how could language arise in a state of 
asocial nomadic dispersal? Rousseau argues that it cannot. In fact he claims 
that Hobbes7 mistaken picture of the 'state of nature7 is based upon the 
preposterous presumption that the inhabitants of that state had linguistic 
capacities. Rousseau's position however leads him to a paradox. The 
paradox is that while the development of language does not seem possible 
outside sociality, sociality does not seem possible without language.21 But if 
language cannot arise in a state of asocial nomadic dispersal, yet is necessary 
for the development of those capacities which distinguish human from 
non-human animals, then is it at all coherent to posit a human pre-social
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21. Derrida raises a similar paradox with respect to the account of the origin of languages in 
Rousseau's Essay on the Origin of Languages. See his discussion of Rousseau in 'Nature, 
Culture, Writing' in Of Grammatology, translated Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, (Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London 1976).
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state? Rousseau attempts to salvage his position by claiming that human 
beings in the 'state of nature7 enjoyed 'natural liberty'. But we have seen 
above that the only sense in which human beings can be said to enjoy a 
liberty which is not shared by non-human animals is if liberty is understood 
to mean 'free will'. But is it coherent to postulate anything remotely 
resembling free will in the 'state of nature'? Does not the exercise of free 
will presuppose the capacity for reflection which is only possible through 
the use of language, a necessarily social ability? If the notion of a human 
pre-social state is incoherent, as it seems to be, then Rousseau's appeal to 
'nature' cannot be used to sustain a distinction between those aspects of 
human sociality which are beneficial and conducive to virtue and those 
which are conducive to vice. Human sociality is always already corrupt 
because the very aspects of human nature which, according to Rousseau, 
engender social life also undermine it.22 I shall argue later that the 
instability of the distinction between the beneficial and the destructive 
passions emerges most clearly in Rousseau's views on sexual passion. I 
shall also argue that in his discussion of women's sexual passion, Rousseau 
projects onto woman the inability of his own system to sustain this 
distinction.
Abstract reason and perfectibility however are not alone responsible for vice, 
according to Rousseau. It is rather that the capacity to which they give rise, 
the capacity for comparison, although essential for moral life, has a tendency 
to corrupt self-love, transforming a natural instinct into the destructive 
social passion of egoism (amour-propre). This passion, which lies at the
22. Hegel presents a similar critique of Rousseau in the Philosophy of Right, paragraphs 194- 
5, p. 128. He argues that Rousseau's 'state of nature' in which needs are confined to the merely 
physical needs of the organism cannot be characterized as a condition of freedom. Freedom is 
found 'only in the reflection of the mind into itself, in mind's distinction from nature, and in 
the reflex of mind in nature'. Furthermore, Rousseau's attempt to check the excesses of civil 
society by distinguishing 'natural' from 'social' needs (the beneficial vs. the harmful) is 
mistaken because this distinction 'has no qualitative limits'. G.W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of 
Right, translated with notes by T.M. Knox, (Oxford University Press, 1967).
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root of all social inequalities, "is a purely relative and factitious feeling, 
which arises in the state of society, leads each individual to make more of 
himself than any other [and] causes all the mutual damage which men 
inflict on one another" .23 Despite this characterization of amour-propre  
however, amour-propre  is the pivotal category of Rousseau's moral and 
political philosophy. On the one hand, it is the source of all the conflicts 
within social life and socialized human nature. On the other hand, 
without it human life would never have progressed beyond the 'state of 
nature'. Human beings are only motivated to improve their reason, to 
develop their technological skills, and to better the conditions of their 
existence, because they are driven by the desire for pre-eminence. Further, 
without amour-propre  Rousseau's conceptions of virtue and justice would 
have no hold.
Rousseau's view was that contemporary European society was afflicted by an 
excess of amour-propre. But it would be a mistake to think that Rousseau's 
desire was for a return to the state of nature. Rather the desire that governs 
his moral and political philosophy is the desire for a form of social life in 
which human life is enriched by passion without being torn apart by the 
conflicts which passion generates. Rousseau's image of the 'youth of the 
world' in the Second Discourse portrays such a state -  an idyllic early social 
state in which the bonds of social interdependence were still loose, in which 
needs were few and life was relatively uncomplicated, in which social life 
expressed itself in the abandon of the festival. But again it would be a 
mistake to think that the aim of Rousseau's political philosophy is to 
recreate such a state for, however idyllic, it is a state which is now lost to 
humanity. The only way beyond the conflicts of social life is through social 
justice and individual virtue.
23. Rousseau, op. cit. p. 66.
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II: Social Justice and The Virtuous Citizen 
II. i
One of the strongest themes of Rousseau's moral and political philosophy is 
that unequal relations of dependence, whether at the level of the state or at 
the level of social groups or individuals, are the precondition for servitude. 
Liberty is best preserved, he thinks, under conditions of maximal self- 
sufficiency, which is why human beings in the 'state of nature' allegedly 
enjoyed 'natural liberty' and an existence free from conflict. In the context of 
The Social Contract, Rousseau seems to equate liberty with independence 
from others, and with the pursuit of one's own particular self-interest which 
is here presented as 'natural' -  that is, natural to socialised human nature. 
The problem which preoccupied Rousseau therefore, is that of how it is 
possible to create a system of social relations in which each person is 
maximally self-sufficient, and free to pursue their own particular self- 
interest, and yet equally dependent upon all others. For if people are mainly 
motivated by selfish and partial interests, that is by the desire for pre­
eminence or amour-propre, then if society favours the particular interests 
of some more than others, social relations will inevitably tend towards 
unequal relations of dependence. A society can only be just if it is founded 
on impartial laws equally binding on all its citizens.
In The Social Contract Rousseau provides one resolution to this problem in 
the form of the 'general will'. Rousseau defines the 'general will' in contrast 
to an association of particular wills or 'the will of all'. Whereas the 'will of 
all' is the sum of different wills when they are directed by the concerns of 
their particular private interests, the 'general will' is the sum of different 
wills when directed by the general interest, an interest which is impartial as 
far as particular interests are concerned. Rousseau's view is that a society 
can only be just if it is founded on the 'general will'. The social contract
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creates the conditions of possibility for the expression of the 'general will' 
because it institutes a form of government in which each individual is both 
equally bound by the conditions imposed upon all and enjoys the same 
rights as all others. Rousseau's view is that under such a contract each 
individual becomes equally dependent upon the social whole of which he 
forms a part and without which he is nothing, because the social contract 
effectively delegitimizes an individual's right to natural liberty and 
independence. Rather, in the social contract natural liberty is exchanged for 
protection and civil liberty is acquired through obedience. But doesn't this 
arrangement simply substitute one form of servitude for another? For 
doesn't the citizen's dependence on others and upon the contract itself 
enslave him just as much as the other forms of dependence from which the 
social contract was supposed to be a liberation?24 Rousseau's defence of the 
social contract against this charge is that the citizen cannot really be said to 
be enslaved by this form of dependence, because by promoting the common 
interest each individual in fact best promotes his own interest. Through the 
social contract the parties to it gain civic liberty and equality, and protection 
of their persons and property. Thus in a just society, that is one which is 
impartial as regards the private interests of its members, the general will 
actually should coincide with the particular will of each individual. The 
citizens are thus subject only to their own collective will.
In this context it should be pointed out that, for Rousseau, one of the 
greatest threats to justice or the equality of the social contract is the existence 
of interest groups or partial associations, which attempt to use the 
conditions of dependence created by the contract to further their own 
particular interests. Although they reduce the number of different interests
24. In her book The Sexual Contract (Polity Press, 1988), Carole Pateman argues such a case 
with respect to the very idea of a social contract. Her claim is that while theories of the 
social contract present contract as the only means of achieving social equality and liberty, the 
political structures that they institute are in fact structures of domination and subordination.
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within the body politic, these associations do not further social harmony, 
but rather allow the particular interests of a few, namely the most powerful, 
to dominate. At the same time however, given his account of socialised 
human nature, it is almost inevitable that such partial associations will be 
formed and that the very citizens who constitute the body politic will come 
to represent its greatest threat. As we shall see, for Rousseau the family is 
just such a partial association, but it is an association which, unlike other 
such associations, is nevertheless essential for the life of the body politic. 
Whereas the form of coercion required to maintain the 'general will' is 
subordination masking as civic liberty, the form of coercion required to 
ensure that the family can thrive without undermining social justice is 
subordination masking as love.
Despite the claim that the 'general will' reconciles private interest with the 
public good, or self-interested motivation with reason, Rousseau is aware of 
the tension between his ideal of justice and his account of socialized human 
nature as mainly motivated by amour-propre. For justice presupposes trust, 
but trust cannot arise if people are motivated entirely by their own self- 
interest. Hence Rousseau acknowledges that social justice cannot be brought 
about solely by the institution of a republic founded on the social contract. 
Rather it requires a transformation and strengthening of human nature by 
means of which 'each individual (who by himself is a perfect and solitary 
whole)' is transformed 'into a part of a larger whole from which this 
individual receives, in a sense, his life and his being', and which substitutes 
'a partial and moral existence for the physical and independent existence we 
have all received from nature'. Thus the founder of a just republic, adds 
Rousseau,
must deny man his own forces in order to give him forces that 
are alien to him and that he cannot make use of without the 
help of others. The more these natural forces are dead and
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obliterated, and the greater and more durable are the acquired 
forces, the more too is the institution solid and perfect.25
The question is how this view is to be reconciled both with Rousseau's 
favourable account of human beings in the 'state of nature' and with his 
account of the education of Emile, the aim of which, as we shall see, is to 
produce the ideal, virtuous citizen by encouraging in Emile self-sufficiency 
and the development of certain 'natural' dispositions. I think there are two 
somewhat different, although connected, answers to this question. Firstly, 
as I claimed earlier, Rousseau uses the category 'nature' somewhat 
differently in The Social Contract than in the Second Discourse. Here it 
seems to designate not the peaceable 'state of nature' of the Second Discourse 
but a Hobbesian immediately pre-social contract state.26 Given this, 
Rousseau's account of the transformation in human nature required by the 
social contract pertains to socialized human nature. Secondly however, 
Rousseau makes a distinction in The Social Contract between the individual 
qua citizen and the individual qua private person. His account of the 
transformation in socialized human nature required by the social contract 
pertains to the individual qua citizen. As a citizen the individual must 
identify his private interests with the good of the collectivity and so ’deny 
his own forces’, forfeiting natural liberty for civil liberty. However the 
collectivity can only require the individual to alienate 'that portion of his 
power, his goods, and liberty whose use is of consequence' to it.27 As a 
private person therefore, the individual has a natural right to the pursuit of 
his own partial self-interest. The problem however is that the citizen and
25 Rousseau, On the Social Contract, Hackett edition, p. 39.
26 The question of the relationship between the social contract of the Second Discourse and 
the social contract of The Social Contract is the subject of a debate among scholars of 
Rousseau's political philosophy. It is beyond the scope of my concerns in this discussion to 
assess this debate.
27 Rousseau, op. cit. p. 33.
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the private person are the one individual. The tensions between Rousseau's 
account of justice and his account of socialized human nature thus get 
displaced onto a tension between individual qua citizen and individual qua 
private person. In The Social Contract Rousseau intimates that in the end 
this tension might have to be reconciled through force: 'in order for the 
social compact to avoid being an empty formula, it tacitly entails the 
commitment -  which alone can give force to the others -  that whoever 
refuses to obey the general will will be forced to do so by the entire body.
This means that he will be forced to be free' .28 In Emile however he 
indicates that a better way to deal with this tension is through the 
cultivation of a virtuous disposition, the aim of which is not to eliminate 
'man's natural forces' or the passions, but to harness them in the service of 
morality. Rousseau's account of virtue thus complements his ideal of 
justice by providing the ideal of individual moral character necessary for the 
social contract to function non-coercively. In this context Rousseau 
associates the category 'nature' with those beneficial passions which 
underpin virtue.
II. ii
In Emile Rousseau characterises virtue in these terms:
The word virtue is derived from a word signifying strength, and strength is 
the foundation of all virtue. Virtue is the heritage of a creature weak by 
nature but strong by will; that is the whole merit of the righteous 
man...What is meant by a virtuous man? He who can conquer his 
affections; for then he follows his reason, his conscience; he does his duty; 
he is his own master and nothing can harm him from the right way...To feel 
or not to feel a passion is beyond our control, but we can
28. Rousseau, op. cit. p. 26.
control ourselves. Every sentiment under our control is
lawful; those which control us are criminal. 29
Virtue then, according to Rousseau, is achieved not by eliminating passion, 
but by controlling it. But how is passion to be controlled? For Rousseau the 
answer is through the formation of the right kind of moral character, one in 
which reason is grounded in feeling but not subject to the vicissitudes of 
passion.
If Emile is read in conjunction with The Social Contract, it becomes clear 
that for Rousseau the key to the formation of the right kind of moral 
character is to achieve the correct balance between dependence and 
independence. As we have seen, the just citizen is the person who 
understands the extent of his dependence on the social body as a whole and 
who is able to identify his private will with the 'general will'. But the kind 
of dependence required for social justice actually presupposes moral 
independence, which Rousseau defines in contrast to amour-propre. As I 
stated earlier, Rousseau is aware that moral relations can only arise in the 
context of social life, in our relations with others. More importantly, our 
moral identities are closely connected with the evaluations of others. This 
is why amour-propre  can gain such a strong foothold in human social life. 
But for Rousseau there is a crucial difference between being held in high 
esteem by others and seeking out the esteem of others. Whereas in the first 
case the judgment is made on the basis of our independent actions, in the 
second case what motivates our actions is our concern for the opinions of 
others. According to Rousseau, amour-propre is characterized by such an 
over-dependence on the opinion of others, and it is this kind of over­
dependence which leads a person to put their own interests ahead of the 
good of the collectivity. By contrast, the first requirement of virtue, and 
therefore of justice, is moral independence or autonomy.
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29. Rousseau, Emile, pp. 408-9.
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Rousseau's conception of autonomy emerges most clearly in his detailed 
proposals for the education of Emile. These proposals bring together in a 
rather revealing way two somewhat inconsistent aspects of Rousseau's 
account of autonomy. On the one hand, Rousseau is clearly aware that 
autonomy is a capacity which is the end result of a lengthy developmental 
process, a process which is of necessity social. On the other hand, he 
presents this process as one which occurs within the solitary individual, in 
relative isolation from broader social relations or from reciprocal, 
interdependent relations with others. For although Rousseau stresses that 
Emile's tutor plays a crucial role in his development, and although Emile is 
dependent upon the tutor in various ways, their relationship is always 
unequal and carefully manipulated by the tutor, and Rousseau stresses that 
Emile should not become aware of his dependence. Rather he should be 
encouraged to see himself as a completely independent and self-sufficient 
being.
This inconsistency points to some difficulties with Rousseau's account of 
autonomy, the significance of which will emerge later. Firstly, although 
Rousseau is quite explicit about the importance of sociality in shaping the 
capacities of the individual, he views the influence of society as a largely 
negative influence. At one level this is connected with his claims about the 
corruption of contemporary social life. At another level however it arises 
from a very deep-seated individualism which in Emile is represented by the 
isolated environment in which Emile is raised. On Rousseau's view, 
although sociality is necessary to the development of the individual, others 
always represent a potential threat to the natural integrity and independence 
of the individual; an idea connected of course with the central theme of his 
political philosophy -  that dependence is the pre-condition for servitude. 
The role of the tutor is supposedly to provide the necessary social context for 
Emile's development, but without threatening his integrity. Yet Emile's
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'natural' individuality is very carefully nurtured and produced. Rousseau's 
account of autonomy thus attempts to disavow, while yet acknowledging, 
the importance of social relations.
Secondly, there is a tension between the individualism of Rousseau's 
conception of autonomy and his recognition that, given the moral 
importance of the passions, emotional dependence on others is both 
inescapable and necessary. This tension arises from his ambivalence about 
the role of passion in human life. Rousseau attempts to resolve this tension 
by trying to distinguish the kind of dependence which undermines the 
autonomy of the individual, and so undermines social justice, from the 
kind which enables him to preserve his independence. In this context he re­
introduces the distinction between the beneficial 'natural' passions, and the 
harmful social passions. In the final analysis however, Rousseau ends up 
resolving this tension by associating autonomy and dependence with two 
different spheres of social life.
There are three central and connected characteristics which combine to form 
Rousseau's ideal of the autonomous individual: self-sufficiency; moral 
autonomy; and self-mastery. Rousseau's conception of self-sufficiency is 
interesting because while much of what he says seems correct, and while 
many of the educational proposals to which it gives rise are revolutionary, it 
nevertheless promotes a very individualistic view of human life. Rousseau 
claims that in developing in Emile the capacity for self-sufficiency his aim is 
to re-create the kind of 'natural' self-sufficiency which characterised human 
life in the 'state of nature', by re-integrating reason, sensation and the body. 
The first step in this process is to develop physical self-sufficiency. To this 
end, Emile is encouraged from birth to develop physical strength and 
endurance through exercise and freedom of bodily movement. In addition 
he is encouraged to develop the minimum of bodily needs and to satisfy 
these needs as far as possible himself. He is also discouraged from
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developing tastes for luxury or bodily indulgence. This physical training 
continues throughout the period of Emile's education, but it is emphasized 
most in infancy and childhood. Now on the one hand Rousseau's emphasis 
on the importance of physical health and strength, especially for children, is 
laudable, as is his view that reason is continuous with the body and with 
sensation. On the other hand however Rousseau clearly regards physical 
dependence and incapacity as detrimental to a person's autonomy because it 
makes them over-reliant upon others. Already then we see the beginnings 
of a tension between autonomy and relations of dependence and 
interdependence.
The second requirement for self-sufficiency is the development of 
emotional self-sufficiency. Again some of Rousseau's recommendations 
here are salutary. Emile is to learn that he cannot always get what he wants 
and that emotional manipulation is unacceptable. He is also to learn how to 
play by himself and to entertain himself. However, Rousseau also seems to 
equate emotional self-sufficiency with solitude and with not needing others 
-  hence his appeal to 'man's "natural" state' to provide the model for self- 
sufficiency. For example Emile's main friend seems to be his tutor. He 
rarely has anything to do with other children, except when the tutor wishes 
to teach him a moral lesson about the need for humility or the need to pay 
heed to the sufferings of others. In addition, his relationships with his 
parents or with other adults play no significant role in his emotional life as 
Rousseau presents it. Given the care and thoroughness of Rousseau's 
account of Emile's education, this is no mere oversight. Rather it reflects 
the excessive individualism of Rousseau's conception of autonomy.30
30. One of Wollstonecraft's main criticisms of Rousseau's educational programme for Emile is 
its individualism. In her recommendations on education in Chapter 12 of A Vindication of the 
Rights of Woman, entitled 'On National Education', she argues that children need 
relationships with other children in order to learn reciprocity and equality. She thus 
recommends the introduction of a system of publicly-funded co-educational day-schools for all
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The third aspect of self-sufficiency is intellectual self-sufficiency, a capacity 
which, according to Rousseau, is undermined by the early development of 
abstract reason. Rousseau's view is that whereas an emphasis on abstract 
reason in a child's early education inculcates reliance upon the authority of 
others, an emphasis on practical reason (the 'understanding' of the Second 
Discourse) encourages the child to work things out for himself. Thus 
Emile's education aims to develop the more practical uses of reason, those 
grounded in experience and requiring problem-solving skills and sensual 
acuity. So Emile learns geography by being made to find his way home on 
an empty stomach with only a compass to guide him, and he learns 
arithmetic by having to use it in carpentry. It is only once the capacity for 
practical reason has been fairly well developed in these kinds of ways that 
Emile is encouraged slowly to develop the capacity for abstract reason, a 
capacity which, if developed appropriately, will enable him to acquire the 
capacity critically to appraise the opinions of others. There is no denying the 
educational importance of Rousseau's emphasis on contextual learning and 
the development of problem-solving skills. But Rousseau also seems to see 
intellectual self-sufficiency as a matter of protecting oneself from the 
corrupting views of others, which is why Emile cannot be exposed to the 
opinions of others until he has already acquired fairly well established views 
of his own.
The theme of protecting oneself from the corrupting views of others re- 
emerges in Rousseau's conception of moral autonomy, which Rousseau 
understands as the idea that morality must be grounded in the individual 
conscience. The notion of conscience figures throughout Emile, but it 
emerges particularly clearly in 'The Profession of Faith of the Savoyard 
Priest'. The notion of conscience looks two ways. On the one hand,
children. These criticisms reflect Wollstonecraft's awareness of the inadequacy of an 
individualist ideal of autonomy. Mary Wollstonecraft, Vindication of The Rights of Woman, 
(Penguin, 1975).
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Rousseau sees the development of moral conscience as crucial to the 
independence of the individual, and the idea that morality must be 
grounded in the individual conscience provides the moral foundation for 
Rousseau's emphasis on the self-sufficiency of each individual. On the 
other hand, one of the important roles of moral conscience is to act as a 
check to the kind of self-centred individualism engendered by amour-  
propre .
Rousseau argues that a sense of right and wrong cannot be taught through 
the abstract precepts of organised religion or through moral instruction. For 
religion and morality teach the individual to rely on authority and distract 
him from developing for himself a sense of right and wrong. For this 
reason, Emile is given no moral or religious training. Rather he is taught to 
look to his own conscience to assess the moral worth of his actions and 
desires. While conscience presupposes the capacity for comparison and 
abstraction, and hence requires abstract reason, according to Rousseau the 
wellsprings of conscience are the 'natural' feelings of compassion for the 
sufferings of others. These feelings restrain the impulses of amour-propre  
by alerting us to the effects of our actions upon others. Rousseau's view is 
that these feelings can only arise through experience, by being made to be 
aware of the sufferings of others. Thus it is because they substitute the 
lessons of authority for the lessons of experience, and so divorce reason 
from feeling, that the precepts of religion and morality are positively 
dangerous unless they are conjoined with conscience.
There is a tension however between Rousseau's presentation of conscience 
in 'The Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Priest' and his attempts in the 
rest of Emile to develop Emile's conscience. In educating Emile Rousseau 
seems to think it possible for Emile to gain experience of the suffering of 
others without at the same time being corrupted by interaction with others. 
Fie seems to think that this can be achieved by removing Emile to the
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isolation of the country and carefully controlling his interactions with 
others. Yet the Savoyard priest only learns conscience after having first been 
corrupted. This tension points once again to the impossible desire which 
governs Rousseau's system -  a desire for virtue without vice, for goodness 
without corruption -  and to his attempts to use the notion of 'nature' to 
conceal its impossibility. It also points to his ambivalence about the 
passions, and to the resultant tension between the individualism of his 
conception of autonomy and his views about the importance of feeling and 
passion.
Despite the importance of 'conscience' to Rousseau's conception of 
autonomy however, the most crucial of the three characteristics required for 
autonomy is the capacity for self-mastery, which Rousseau equates with 
virtue. Self-mastery or virtue is the capacity to control passion through 
strength of will. Rousseau's view is that this capacity provides the 
foundation for moral and intellectual independence because if a person is 
not in control of his passions he can neither follow his conscience nor 
exercise his reason. The development of this capacity is the aspect of Emile's 
education which is attended to last, because it builds upon the dispositions 
which his earlier education has inculcated. It is also the most precarious 
aspect of his education, because it is his passions which render him most 
vulnerable to the kind of dependence on others which undermines 
autonomy.
Given Rousseau's views, however ambivalent, about the importance of 
feeling on the one hand, and his emphasis on independence on the other, 
the difficulty he faces, as I suggested earlier, is to find a way of distinguishing 
between those passions which enhance self-mastery and those which 
undermine it. To this end Rousseau appeals initially to ’nature’, 
contrasting the ’natural’, ’gentle’, passions which arise from the instincts of 
self-love and compassion and which are allied with the understanding (as
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opposed to 'abstract reason'), with the destructive 'social' passions, such as 
greed, pride, envy, jealousy, arising from amour-propre. His view is that 
the kind of emotional dependence on others encouraged by the passions 
arising from amour-propre  is best countered through a different kind of 
emotional dependence, the kind arising from the 'natural' passions. The 
best way to control those passions which undermine reason is through 
those passions which are allied with it. The first step in developing in 
Emile the capacity for self-mastery is thus to guide Emile's passions away 
from the destructive social passions and toward the natural passions, in 
particular towards compassion, the wellspring of conscience. Initially Emile 
learns the meanings of compassion and dependence through his encounters 
with those less privileged than himself and through his friendship with his 
tutor. The real test however is Emile's encounter with the passion which 
for Rousseau dominates the moral landscape and can represent either the 
greatest threat to virtue or its greatest aid -  sexual love. It is in Rousseau's 
discussion of sexual love that the distinction between the beneficial and the 
harmful passions threatens to collapse in upon itself, bringing to the surface 
the implicit tension between his individualist conception of autonomy and 
his recognition of our necessary dependence on others.
In the Second Discourse, Rousseau makes a distinction between physical 
and moral love: The physical part of love is that general desire which urges 
the sexes to union with each other. The moral part is that which 
determines and fixes this desire exclusively upon one particular object/ 31 
Intercourse between the sexes in the 'state of nature' is restricted to love in 
the physical sense because moral love involves comparison and a grasp of 
abstract ideas such as beauty and merit, which, as we have seen, presuppose 
linguistic capacities and the capacity for abstract reason. Rousseau's view is
31. Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, Everyman edition, p. 70.
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that it is first and foremost the absence of moral love that preserves peace in 
the 'state of nature'. For while moral love as exemplified in loving family 
ties is the foundation of the moral and social order, when conjoined with 
amour-propre  it is the source of many of the most destructive passions 
known to humanity. It is the passion of sexual love above all that must be 
mastered in order to develop a virtuous disposition. According to 
Rousseau, sexual love can only be mastered by conjoining it with the 
'natural' passions. When directed by these passions moral love gives rise to 
what Rousseau regards as 'one of the noblest sentiments known to man' -  
conjugal love. The problem is however that, because conjugal love has the 
same source as the destructive passions, it can very easily be transformed 
from the cornerstone of social life to one of its greatest threats. The 
ambivalent character of moral love emerges in the contradictions implicit 
in Rousseau's characterization of the social role of Sophie and in his 
recommendations for her education.
Ill: 'Everything reminds her of her sex'
Although Rousseau begins his discussion of the education of Sophie by 
claiming that 'But for her sex, a woman is a man', it soon becomes clear that 
in the case of woman 'sex' is not just a physiological attribute. Rather for 
woman sex difference ramifies into moral and intellectual difference until 
'everything reminds her of her sex'. It is for this reason, argues Rousseau, 
that the education and social role of Sophie must not only be different from 
those of Emile but almost their antithesis. Thus while Emile's physical and 
intellectual training is directed towards fostering autonomy, understood as 
independence and self-sufficiency, Sophie's education (or lack thereof) is 
characterized chiefly by physical restraint and intellectual under­
stimulation. Similarly we have seen that virtue for Emile is connected with 
moral autonomy and self-mastery. By contrast, for Sophie virtue involves 
obedience to the authority of others, the development of sensibilities
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directed towards the needs of others, and a repression of her own passions, 
and in particular her sexual passions, through the virtues of modesty and 
chastity, as well as by means of the iron grip of social opinion. Further, 
while Emile as a man has access to the virtues of both public and private 
realms, Sophie is excluded from citizenship and hence the moral 
transactions and obligations of the public sphere. Not only this, although 
ethical relations within the public sphere are founded on conventions freely 
negotiated by equal individuals, Rousseau claims that ethical relations 
within the private sphere are founded on supposedly natural sexual, and 
hence moral, inequalities which subject women in the family to the 
authority of men.
But the problem is that while Rousseau attempts to justify the specific 
character of Sophie's education and social role by recourse to 'nature', 
arguing that the physiological differences between the sexes ground moral 
differences between them as well as differences in reasoning capacity, he 
never explains exactly how the striking contrast between the educations and 
social roles of Emile and Sophie is grounded in their difference of sex. Nor 
does he explain how he gets from physiological differences to claims like 
this: '...in their moral relations...The man should be strong and active: the 
woman should be weak and passive; the one must have both the power and 
the will; it is enough that the other should offer little resistance'.32 In fact 
however, even before we reach Rousseau's appalling proposals for the 
education of Sophie, the narrative development of Emile's education has 
already made it clear that Sophie's education and social role are not based on 
the exigencies of 'nature'. Rather her role is literally to embody certain 
'natural', gentle passions -  in particular, love, devotion, self-sacrifice -  
which are necessary both to the preservation of the social order and to the
32. Rousseau, Emile, Everyman p. 322.
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moral life of Emile, but which are inconsistent with the kind of self- 
sufficient independence and autonomy required of the citizen. Her role is 
also to act as a safeguard against the possible failure of Emile's own attempts 
at self-mastery. Sophie thus does not require the kind of education which 
Emile has received, for since she is his ’complement’ she does not need to 
acquire the skills and virtues that he already has. The function of her 
education is to supplement what his lacks.
These two aspects of Sophie's role as complement are nicely encapsulated by 
two particular events in Emile. The first is Emile's introduction to Sophie 
which occurs initially only in Emile's imagination. Before submitting Emile 
to the final test of his educational training -  his introduction to the 
corruption of Parisian society -  Rousseau, Emile's tutor, directs Emile's 
sexual passion towards Sophie, an as yet unknown and unseen woman 
whom Emile, not surprisingly, does not find in Paris. It is the explicit 
intention of the tutor in doing this to innure Emile against the possibility of 
corruption by passion, and he justifies his action (to the reader) by 
proclaiming: 'Only through passion can we gain the mastery over passions; 
their tyranny must be controlled by their legitimate power, and nature 
herself must furnish us with the means to control her' . 33 The role of 
Sophie, or the virtuous woman, is thus clear. Through his love for Sophie 
and his attachment to her, Emile learns the self-mastery which is the 
hallmark of virtue and autonomy. He also learns to substitute conjugal 
love for sexual passion. But ultimately it is not Emile's masculine 'virtue' 
but Sophie's ’feminine' modesty, that sustains the distinction between the 
beneficial and the harmful passions, that is between conjugal love and 
sexual passion. This is one reason why there can be neither reciprocity nor
33. Rousseau, op. cit. p. 292.
equality in their passion. Her subordination is the condition of possibility of 
his autonomy.
The second event occurs after Emile's and Sophie's engagement, when the 
tutor informs them that before they can be married Emile must go abroad 
for two years to learn the duties of citizenship. What this event reveals is 
that although it is through his love for Sophie that Emile learns the kind of 
dependence which civilizes him and prepares him for citizenship, his first 
duty as a man is as a citizen and not as a husband. In other words, although 
love is an essential part of moral life, it can play no direct part in the ethical 
life of the body politic. Emile's separation from her also tests the virtues 
which Sophie is supposed both to embody in herself and to foster in others -  
the virtues of love, loyalty, trust, and devotion, those virtues which 
supposedly characterise the ethical bonds of the family.
In sum, if Rousseau's characterisation of Sophie's relationship to Emile is 
conjoined with his remarks on the family in both The Social Contract and 
the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, it is evident that for Rousseau 
woman's role in social life is to provide the necessary complement to the 
self-sufficient autonomy of the male citizen, ensuring that love and the 
partial passions provide the basis for moral life without disrupting the 
impartial contractual relations of civil society. By distinguishing the private 
sphere of the family from the public sphere of free and equal citizens, and by 
characterizing the family as both the sphere of affectivity and the foundation 
of social and political life, Rousseau attempts to preserve the particularistic, 
affective, passional foundation of social and moral life while upholding the 
Enlightenment ideal of civic equality and impartial justice.34
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34. Genevieve Lloyd presents an argument to this effect in The Man of Reason. Chapter 4.
The irony of Rousseau's position however, is that this solution displaces the 
tensions within social life into the private sphere itself. Thus while the 
family is the foundation of civil life it is also the most partial of all partial 
associations. Similarly, while women embody love and the partial passions, 
their passion is also ’boundless’ and ’disorderly’. Because of this, while 
conjugal love transforms sexual passion from a destructive to a beneficial 
passion, the precarious balance between the two can all too easily be 
undermined. This theme emerges in Rousseau’s discussion of the sexual 
relationship between Sophie and Emile. Rousseau begins this discussion by 
claiming that, 'nature has endowed women with a power of stimulating 
man's passions in excess of man's power of satisfying those passions' . 35 His 
solution to this problem is the marriage contract which both satisfies sexual 
passion (or men’s right of sexual access to women) and contains its 
damaging effect by transforming it into moral love. But this solution can 
only be effective if moral love does not become entirely divorced from 
sexual passion. One of Sophie's, or woman's, major tasks therefore is to 
make sure that moral love does not lose its sexual aspect. By means of a 
series of coquettish ruses which she learns as part of her education Sophie is 
supposed to keep Emile both sexually enthralled and virtuous. But this 
sexual power that Sophie has over Emile, though necessary, is also 
potentially very dangerous. For Sophie could use it not only with Emile, 
but with other men. This is why, for Rousseau, although conjugal love is 
the best way of maintaining the precarious balance between the beneficial 
and the destructive passions, it is a resolution which is hedged about with 
dangers and can only be maintained in the first instance by the repression of 
women's needs and passions through modesty (Sophie must reserve her 
sexual ploys for her husband only) and the need to preserve a good 
reputation. Ultimately however conjugal love (men's right of sexual access)
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35. Rousseau, Emile, Everyman, p. 323.
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must be maintained by force, that is through the subordination of women in 
the family to the authority of men. Although Rousseau describes this 
subordination as 'natural', the post-social contract family of Emile is a far cry 
from the early family of the Second Discourse which, you will recall, was 
described as 'a little society, the more united because liberty and reciprocal 
attachment were the only bonds of its union'.
Rousseau asserts in Emile that women's subjection is necessary because 
women's passions are unruly. But Rousseau's explanation as to why this is 
the case hinges on the different relations men and women bear to 
reproduction, that is because maternity is a fact that cannot be doubted, 
whereas paternity is always only an abstraction. Rousseau's 'argument' is 
worth quoting in full:
The mutual duties of the two sexes are not, and cannot be, equally 
binding on both. Women do wrong to complain of the inequality of 
man-made laws; this inequality is not of man's making, or at any rate 
it is not the result of mere prejudice, but of reason. She to whom 
nature has entrusted the care of the children must hold herself 
responsible for them to their father. No doubt every breach of faith is 
wrong, and every faithless husband, who robs his wife of the stern 
duties of her sex, is cruel and unjust; but the faithless wife is worse; 
she destroys the family and breaks the bonds of nature; when she 
gives her husband children who are not his own, she is false both to 
him and them, and her crime is not infidelity but treason. To my 
mind, it is the source of dissension and of crime of every kind. Can 
any position be more wretched than that of the unhappy father who, 
when he clasps his child to his breast, is haunted by the suspicion that 
this is the child of another, the badge of his dishonour, a thief who is 
robbing his own children of their inheritance. Under such 
circumstances the family is little more than a group of secret enemies, 
armed against each other by a guilty woman, who compels them to 
pretend to love one another.
Thus it is not enough that a wife should be faithful; her 
husband, along with his friends and neighbours, must believe in her 
fidelity; she m ust be modest, devoted, retiring; she should have the 
witness not only of a good conscience, but of a good reputation. In a
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word, if a father must love his children, he must be able to respect 
their mother. For these reasons it is not enough that the woman 
should be chaste, she must preserve her reputation and her good 
name. From these principles there arises not only a moral difference 
between the sexes, but also a fresh motive for duty and propriety, 
which prescribes to women their conduct, their manners, their 
behaviour. Vague assertions as to the equality of the sexes and the 
similarity of their duties are only empty words; they are no answer to 
my argument.36
Sex difference is thus not an issue of concern in Rousseau's 'state of nature' 
because there is no claim to paternal right. Paternal right only arises in civil 
society and, as Rousseau makes clear in the Second Discourse -  anticipating 
Engels -  with the rise of private property. But paternal right can only be 
assured by a marriage contract which, by subordinating women to the 
authority of men and debarring them from access to the opportunities of 
public life, functions to provide some guarantee of the certainty of paternity. 
This is a further reason why there can be neither reciprocity nor equality in 
sexual relations between men and women, for when it comes to sexual 
passion man's self-mastery requires that he is also master of women's 
bodies. Flence, contra McMillan, for Rousseau sexual difference as moral 
and social difference arises not from nature but from the patriarchal 
organisation of civil society.37
There is a further explanation however for Rousseau's obsession with 
women's 'disorderly' passions. I have argued that one of the functions of 
Rousseau's distinction between the beneficial and the destructive passions is
36. Rousseau, op. cit. pp. 324-5.
37. In her discussion of Rousseau in The Sexual Contract Carole Pateman presents a forceful 
argument to show the extent to which Rousseau's social contract presupposes a sexual contract 
among men for the orderly exchange of women. While my discussion here is much indebted to 
her analysis, Pateman's claim is that the aim of the sexual contract is primarily to ensure 
men's sexual access to women, rather than to ensure paternal right. On my reading, Rousseau's 
obsession with Sophie's marital fidelity, although obviously connected with an interest in 
men's sexual right of access to women, is motivated more by the concern to ensure paternal 
right. Okin also makes this point in her discussion of Rousseau in Women in Western Political 
Thought (Virago, 1980; Princeton U.P. 1979).
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to reconcile the tension between his individualist account of autonomy and 
his views on the moral importance of feeling. I have also shown that 
Rousseau is painfully aware of the fragility of this distinction, and it is the 
double character of the passion of sexual love which especially exposes this 
fragility. I want to suggest that Rousseau attempts to resolve this 
vulnerability within his system by displacing the difficulty onto sexual 
passion itself, making sexual passion the source of his problem, and of social 
disorder more generally, rather than their symptom. The real problem is 
that, given Rousseau's account of socialized human nature, it is the very 
same aspects of human nature that give rise to both virtue and vice, to what 
is excellent and what is destructive in human beings, which is why the 
distinction between the 'natural', beneficial, and the social, destructive 
passions cannot easily be sustained. However Rousseau projects the 
tensions within his system onto sexual passion itself. Given Rousseau's 
concern with paternal right, it is an easy step from here to claim that the 
ultimate source of the tensions within social life is women's sexual passion 
and so to see women's subordination as the only solution. Woman thus 
becomes both the safeguard and the potential destroyer of social life, the 
embodiment of both the beneficial and the destructive passions.
Conclusion
The question which Rousseau's account of masculine autonomy and 
feminine virtue inevitably seems to raise is whether Rousseau's ideal of 
autonomy is inescapably bound up with ideals of masculinity, that is 
whether Rousseau's sexism could be countered by making his ideal of 
autonomy an ideal for women. To conclude my discussion of Rousseau I 
want to try to pull together the numerous strands of my argument by 
addressing this question. My answer is that, as it stands, Rousseau's ideal of 
autonomy cannot simply be appropriated by women, nor is it an appropriate
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ideal for women -  or indeed for men. Nevertheless certain aspects of this 
ideal are worth preserving.
In my discussion I have shown that there are a number of problems with 
the Rousseauian ideal of autonomy. Firstly I have argued that this ideal is 
excessively individualist, and that as a result it is in tension with social 
relationships based on bonds of interdependence and affectivity. Secondly I 
have shown that this tension arises because this ideal is not simply a moral 
ideal, it is also a political ideal connected with a particular conception of 
political life. The salient features of this conception are that it is built upon 
the presumption that people are self-sufficient individuals motivated 
primarily by the pursuit of their own self-interest, and that it is structured 
upon a conception of social justice based upon notions of formal equality 
and impartiality. Thirdly I have shown that, because Rousseau is 
ambivalent about the passions yet recognises the moral importance of 
relationships based on feeling and interdependence, he supplements the 
lacks within his conceptions of autonomy and political life by representing 
women, within the private sphere, as the embodiment of the kinds of 
partial affections upon which social life depends. The result of Rousseau's 
attempt to reconcile autonomy with interdependence however is that they 
end up being defined in opposition to one another, with autonomy a 
characteristic of the masculine public sphere and dependence a characteristic 
of the feminine private sphere. Despite Rousseau's claim that these two 
spheres of social life, as well as the characteristics which they embody, are 
complementary, we have in fact seen that the private sphere must be 
subordinated to the public sphere for two reasons: firstly, to ensure paternal 
right; and secondly, because the passions, though necessary, are always 
potentially disruptive to social life.
I have argued that the representation of women's bodies as both passive and 
disruptive is the product, rather than the cause, of this conception of social
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life. Nevertheless, this representation latches onto certain aspects of 
women's embodiment, in particular to aspects of women's role in 
reproduction, which seem incompatible with the Rousseauian ideal of 
autonomy, especially with the notions of self-sufficiency and self-mastery.38 
The conclusion to be drawn from this however is neither McMillan's 
conclusion that woman's ethical life must be centred in the private sphere, 
nor de Beauvoir's conclusion that woman's embodiment is an obstacle to 
autonomy. The appropriate conclusion is rather that this kind of ideal of 
autonomy, and the conception of social life with which it is connected, are 
inadequate. In the next chapter I want to show that this is Wollstonecraft's 
conclusion and that her response to it was to try to articulate an ideal of 
autonomy which could incorporate Rousseau's recognition of the 
importance of independence and individual self-determination, without 
defining these in opposition either to the passions or to relations of 
interdependence.
Before turning to Wollstonecraft however I want to conclude this chapter 
with a discussion of Hegel's account of the relationship between the family 
and civil society. In Hegel's work, Rousseau's still somewhat 
underdeveloped sense of the tensions between the ethical demands of 
relations of kinship and community on the one hand, and the 
Enlightenment ideals of civic equality and justice on the other, emerges in a 
self-conscious form. In fact Hegel's theory of the State is an explicit attempt 
to articulate these tensions and to reconcile them through the idea that 
freedom and autonomy can only be achieved in rational social institutions 
which are an embodiment of self-conscious Spirit. While these rational 
institutions include the family, as well as those institutions associated with 
civil society, Hegel claims that the family is Spirit's self-expression in an
38. I discuss this claim about women's embodiment in detail in Part IV, although not in 
connection with Rousseau.
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immediate, unconscious form, because the kinds of social relationships 
which characterise the ethical life of the family are based not on reason but 
on feeling. Moreover, while men have scope for an ethical life beyond the 
family, in the rational ethical relations of the State, women's ethical life is 
circumscribed within the family. Hegel therefore self-consciously makes 
explicit the recognition that underlies Rousseau's discussion of Sophie -  
that in the modern world 'Woman' has become the symbolic embodiment 
of the kinds of 'natural' ethical relations which must be both presupposed 
and transcended in the ethical relations of the public sphere.
Section 3: Hegel39
In the Philosophy of Right Hegel's descriptions of 'civil society' echo 
Rousseau's critique of the degeneracy of modern civil society. Hegel 
describes civil society as atomistic, dominated by particularistic self-interests, 
and characterised by a tendency to spawn inequalities, excesses and moral 
corruption: "...civil society affords a spectacle of extravagance and want as 
well as of the physical and ethical degeneration common to them both".40 
However whereas Rousseau sees the particularistic excesses of civil society 
as arising from tendencies inherent in socialized human nature, Hegel 
regards civil society as a historically specific, but necessary, moment in the
39. My analysis of Hegel's discussion of women and the family concentrates primarily on its 
place within the Philosophy of Right. However I also discuss his reading of Antigone in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel's accounts of the symbolic significance of femininity are to be 
found in the following places: Phenomenology of Spirit, paragraphs 444-476; Philosophy of 
Right, paragraphs 158-181 plus Additions 101-115; Philosophy of Nature, translated by M.J. 
Petry (George Allen and Unwin, London 1970), paragraphs 366-369 (on reproduction). My 
reading of Hegel here has been particularly influenced by Genevieve Lloyd's discussion of 
Hegel in The Man of Reason, (Methuen, London, 1984) pp. 70-93, and by Carole Pateman's 
discussion in The Sexual Contract (Polity Press, Oxford, 1988), pp. 173-81. I have also found 
Luce Irigaray's reading of Hegel's version of the Antigone story fascinating and illuminating. 
By tracing the significance of the metaphors of blood and of the cave in the story of Antigone 
she shows that it is no accident that women come to be associated with the unconscious 
principle of social life. See Luce Irigaray, 'The Eternal Irony of the Community' in Speculum 
of the Other Woman, translated by Gillian C. Gill, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1985).
40. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, Knox translation, para 185, p. 123. For Hegel Roman society 
epitomized this kind of degeneracy.
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constitution of the State. Rousseau's attempt to overcome the tensions 
within civil society through an appeal to 'man's natural state' is thus 
mistaken. Civil society is specifically characterized by an infinite 
particularity of interests which, if left unchecked, will generate a 
multiplication ad inf ini tum  of needs and desires, that is excess and the 
degeneracy which it entails. But since ’the distinction between natural and 
refined needs, has no qualitative limits'41, no appeal to 'nature' can curb 
this excess. Rather it can only be curbed by absorbing civil society within the 
higher unity of the State, a unity in which particular self-interest is 
consciously aimed towards a universal end because each separate member of 
the state regards the affairs of the state as his particular affair.
Hegel is also scathing of Rousseau's idea that the tension between private 
interest and public good will be overcome if the state is founded on a social 
contract. He thinks that, far from resolving the difficulties of civil society, 
the assumptions of the doctrine of the social contract reinforce them.
Hegel's objection to the idea of a social contract is that, while the notion of 
contract is appropriate in the context of transactions involving private 
property, it is a gross mistake to transfer the characteristics of these 
transactions, which arise from the subjective caprice of the parties to them, 
into the political relations of the state. If the state is seen as founded on a 
contract whose sole end is to promote the particular interests of individuals 
by protecting their property and personal freedom, then it becomes a purely 
contingent institution based on the capricious consent of its members. On 
Hegel's view the institution of the state is a necessary embodiment of self- 
conscious universal reason, or Spirit, actualizing itself as will, that is as 
freedom. The aim of the state therefore cannot solely be to promote the 
particular interest of individuals, nor can freedom be identified with a
41. Hegel, op. cit. para 195, p. 128.
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purely subjective freedom. Rather 'since the state is mind objectified, it is 
only as one of its members that the individual himself has objectivity, 
genuine individuality, and an ethical life'.42 Freedom in the rational state is 
therefore the unity of subjective freedom and objective freedom (freedom of 
the universal will). Thus while Rousseau was right to see the state as the 
expression of will, the social contract reduces the universal will embodied in 
the state to the 'general will' which is simply a union of subjective, 
arbitrary, individual wills united by a common interest. But this common 
interest cannot possibly unite the infinitely particular wills of civil society 
unless it is subordinated to a 'higher principle', namely universal reason as 
embodied in the state.
Despite his criticisms of Rousseau however, Hegel's conception of civil 
society, and in particular his understanding of the relationship between the 
family and civil society, owe a great deal to Rousseau. Themes in the 
Second Discourse and The Social Contract are reiterated, for example, in 
Hegel's claim, in the Philosophy of Right, that it is in response to the 
particularistic excesses of civil society that universal reason first expresses 
itself, even if inadequately, in social life -  in the Enlightenment ideals of 
abstract equality, individual freedom, the 'rights of universal man', and 
impartial justice embodied in civil law. For Hegel, as for Rousseau, these 
ideals are defined in contrast to the 'natural' ethical life of the family, an 
ethical life which is rooted in the bonds which characterise kinship relations 
-  the bonds of custom, habit and love. Rousseau's depiction of the family as 
the foundation-stone of social life is also restated in Hegel's conception of 
the family as the pre-condition and ethical root of the state. Further, like 
Rousseau, Hegel claims that woman finds 'her substantive destiny' in the 
ethical life of the family, while 'man has his actual substantive life in the
42. Hegel, op. cit. para 258, p. 156.
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State'.43 Finally, Hegel's distinction between physical love and what he calls 
'ethico-legal love' echoes Rousseau's distinctions between physical and 
moral, and sexual and conjugal love. However while Rousseau grounds 
conjugal and familial love in the passions, thus according to Hegel making 
them mere expressions of the subjective will, for Hegel the purest 
expressions of familial love are not based solely on feelings for particular 
individuals but are rather grounded in universal principle, a principle 
which embodies Spirit although in an 'unconscious' form.
It is because Hegel sees familial love as an embodiment of universal 
principle rather than as an expression of mere feeling that one recent 
feminist commentator has attempted to defend Hegel's views against 
feminist criticisms.44 In her article 'Hegel and Feminism', Susan Easton 
argues that feminist critiques of Hegel's discussions of woman and the 
family attribute to Hegel what she calls a 'biological reductionist' position.
By this Easton means a view which reduces sexual relationships between 
men and women to relationships rooted in biological necessities and which 
sees woman's position within the family as an inevitable function of her 
role in reproduction. Easton's argument is that quite to the contrary,
Hegel's understanding of familial love as grounded in universal ethical 
principles, not only provides a means for transcending the purely biological 
dimensions of human sexual relationships, but also offers an account of 
love which goes beyond the simple view of love as passion standing in 
contrast to reason. In addition, according to Easton, in both his discussion of 
Antigone in the Phenomenology and in his discussion of marriage and the 
family in the Philosophy of Right, Hegel sees the ethical bonds of the family
43. Flegel, op. cit. para 166, p. 144.
44. See Susan Easton's article ’Hegel and Feminism’, pp.30-55 in David Lamb (ed.) Hegel and 
Modern Philosophy (Croom Helm, UK, 1987). Easton refers to the work of Okin, Elshtain and 
Lloyd as representative of the 'orthodox' feminist position.
as redemptive and as a 'counter to the fragmenting forces of civil society' .45 
She concludes that Hegel's conception of woman's contribution to ethical 
life, far from endorsing a reductionist view of women's position in social 
life, actually counters such a view.
As I have already pointed out in my discussion of McMillan, Easton is right 
to argue that Hegel does not situate woman's ethical life merely in the realm 
of biological necessity but sees it as an embodiment of self-conscious Spirit 
in social life. However there are two problems with Easton's analysis.
Firstly she overlooks the fact that although for Hegel the family is an 
expression of Spirit in social life, it is nevertheless an inadequate expression 
of Spirit and therefore one which must be superseded by the more adequate 
forms of Spirit's self-expression in civil society and the state. She also 
overlooks the fact that although the ethical bonds of the family -  the bonds 
of love -  create the conditions of possibility for ethical life in general, love is 
not the highest form of ethical relationship. Rather the highest expression 
of ethical life is reason as embodied in the relationship between the state 
and the citizens of the state. Further for Hegel the ethical bonds of the 
family can only be ethical to the extent that they are directed towards the 
interests of the state. Easton's analysis thus ignores the fact that while Hegel 
indeed recognizes the ethical significance of love, the family and woman's 
place within it, Hegel's understanding of this significance is structured by a 
network of hierarchical oppositions -  between Spirit as expressed in love 
and Spirit as expressed in universal reason, between the 'natural' 
unconscious unity of the family and the self-conscious 'rational' unity of the 
state -  which entail the political subordination of women. In addition, 
these oppositions function within the family itself, in the relationship 
between husband and wife, resulting in the subordination of women within
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the family to the authority of men. Secondly, Easton asserts that 'drawing 
attention to the 'feminine' quality of love does not in itself entail a 
reductionist position provided that it is clear that this quality is not 
biologically based' .46 But she fails to ask why love is seen as a 'feminine' 
quality and why woman's ethical life should be restricted to maintaining the 
ethical bonds of the family and resisting the encroachments of the self- 
interested and fragmented life of civil society. In the context of an ethical 
and political matrix in which woman's identification with love and with 
the ethical bonds of the family entails women's subordination both inside 
and outside the family, the claim that Hegel's position is amenable to 
feminism because he regards love as an ethical relationship misses the 
point.
For the remainder of this chapter I want to show that Hegel's discussion of 
woman's ethical life in the family provides Hegel with a way of preserving 
the 'natural' bonds of love and kinship which are essential to sociality but 
which Hegel, perhaps more than anyone else, realized are necessarily in 
conflict with the ethical and political structures of the modern, post- 
Enlightenment, state. As a result, woman is precluded from attaining the 
kind of autonomy which characterises the social life of the citizens of the 
state. Further, although Hegel does not situate woman's ethical life outside 
reason or in the realm of biological necessity, he nevertheless symbolically 
aligns woman and woman's body with 'nature' because woman plays the 
same function with respect to social life as Nature does with respect to self- 
conscious Spirit.
In the Introduction to Part III, I claimed that Hegel articulates what I called a 
social ideal of autonomy. In the Philosophy of Right this ideal is tied to 
Hegel's notion of 'ethical life', which he contrasts with the notion of
46. Easton, op. cit. p. 40
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'morality'. According to Hegel, in 'ethical life' Spirit becomes ethically self- 
conscious. Hegel claims that the sphere of ethical life supersedes the sphere 
of 'morality' because in ethical life the opposition between subjectivity and 
objectivity which characterises morality is transcended. From the 
standpoint of morality the essential factor in moral life is the freedom and 
autonomy of the individual will and it is in relation to this will that both 
the morality and immorality of actions are grounded. The moral attitude is 
governed by a dialectical interplay between the subjective purpose, intention 
and conscience of the individual moral subject, and notions of 
responsibility, welfare and good which hold the actions of individuals 
accountable to objective norms. For Hegel this dialectic is expressed in its 
purest form in the conflict between Kant's categorical imperative, which 
embodies universality and objectivity in the highly abstract form of duty, 
and the subjectivism of the romantics, including Rousseau, which grounds 
morality in the particularity of the individual conscience. Hegel argues that, 
to the extent that both positions locate the essence of morality in the 
subjective will they are identical. For they both regard freedom as abstract 
and individual, while 'duty' is presented as something external to the 
individual moral subject, and as a limitation, however necessary, of his 
freedom .47
The sphere of 'ethical life' preserves the important insight of the attitude of 
'morality', the insight that moral action must arise out of conscience and 
subjective dispositions. However, for the ethical subject, subjective 
disposition and duty are not opposed, and for two reasons: firstly, because 
the ethical subject recognises that his subjective freedom can only be 
actualized in rational social institutions, and to the extent that his particular
47. Hegel's critique of the sphere of 'morality' echoes his critique of 'civil society'. In fact 
Hegel's claim is that the moral attitude arises from, and is founded in, the kind of conception 
of social and political relations which characterise 'civil society'.
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interests concord with his duties as a member of those institutions; and 
secondly, because the legitimacy of the institutions of the ethical state 
derives from the fact that they embody and preserve the subjective freedom 
of the citizens of the state. Consequently, 'ethical life is a subjective 
disposition, but one imbued with what is inherently right748, while the 
ethical order, in contrast to the abstract Kantian notion of duty, is a concrete 
system of duties in which 'the individual acquires his substantive 
freedom ' . 49 Autonomy, or 'substantive freedom' can thus be achieved only 
in the context of social institutions in which ethical subjects recognise 
themselves and in which they recognise others as the condition of 
possibility of their freedom.
Hegel distinguishes three different moments of ethical life which each 
embody distinctive forms of recognition. These are the Family, Civil 
Society, and the State.50 The family is ethical life in the phase of 
substantive, but immediate, unity, by which Hegel means that while the 
ethical bonds of the family form the basis for social life, and while the unity 
of the family prefigures the unity of the state, social life does not find its 
highest expression in the family. This is because the unity of the family is a 
unity based on feeling and custom, rather than reason, a unity which is 
therefore contingent and potentially capable of dissolution. In the family, 
recognition takes the form of love. In contrast to the unity of the family, 
where what is essential to the individual is his/her membership of the 
family, civil society is structured around two main principles, the primacy of 
the self-interested individual, and the interdependence of all individuals on 
one another. On the one hand civil society thus introduces into social life
48. Hegel, P.R. para 141, p. 102.
49. Hegel, op. cit. para 149, p. 107.
50. In what follows I will not follow Hegel's practice of capitalizing these terms.
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difference, particularity and plurality. On the other hand, acting as a curb to 
the free play of particularity, it introduces universality in the form of 
justice -  understood as the abstract rights and abstract equality of 'universal 
man', which are embodied in law. In civil society however, universality 
and particularity do not form a unity because these two principles are 
defined in opposition to one another; it is only by compulsion (as a curb on 
the excesses of self-interested particularity) that universality (in the form of 
justice and law) arises. The kind of recognition embodied in civil society is 
thus the recognition by each individual that he requires others in order to 
pursue his self-interested ends, and therefore recognition by each of the 
liberty of others. In the state, the oppositions internal to civil society, and 
between the family and civil society, are reconciled and the individual lives 
a universal life founded on reason. However the state is not something 
existing over and above, or separate from, the family and civil society. The 
state is rather the ground of the family and civil society, which are its two 
moments or manifestations. When the interests of the family and the 
interests of civil society are directed toward the interests of the state, the 
'substantive unity' of the former and the particularity of the latter are 
preserved, but the opposition between them is overcome because they are 
both grounded in a universal end. The kind of recognition embodied in the 
state is the recognition of the citizens of the state that their substantive 
freedom can only be achieved in rational institutions which express the self- 
conscious reason of each citizen. These 'rational institutions' include the 
institutions of civil society and the state -  corporations, the judiciary, the 
parliament- as well as the institutions of the family -  specifically marriage 
and property.
Hegel's discussion of the relationship between the family and civil society 
occurs at a number of different levels. At one level the transition from the 
family to civil society is a necessary development in the unfolding of the
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Idea of freedom to its final expression in the state. At another level, the 
transition between them is a historical transition. Thus the kinds of ethical 
relationships embodied in the family represent Spirit's immediate self- 
expression in social life, in forms of social recognition self-consciously 
founded on custom and kinship relations. According to Hegel, this 
immediate self-expression of Spirit corresponds with the ethical life of the 
Greek polis .51 His claim is that although the polis embodied the unity and 
universality characteristic of the state, this unity could not incorporate a 
recognition of the subjective freedom of individuals. With the emergence 
of this principle 'in an inward form in the Christian religion and in an 
external form...in the Roman w orld '52, the demise of the polis and the 
corruption of its ethical principle were inevitable. As a result, social 
relations founded on the unity of custom gave way to civil society and to 
social relations founded on a recognition of the difference and particularity 
of separate individuals. At yet another level, the historical development 
and the development of the Idea of freedom are the same, and both preserve 
within them the moments which have been superseded. Thus, the 
'substantive unity' of kinship relations and the 'particularity' of social 
relations founded on the idea of subjective freedom are both preserved in 
modern social life in the idea of the state, which manifests itself in the two 
moments of the family and civil society.
At all three levels however, woman's ethical life is confined to the sphere of 
the family. As a consequence, woman is symbolically aligned with Spirit's 
immediate and unconscious self-expression in social life. Despite the fact 
that they relate to two different forms of social organisation -  characteristic 
of antiquity and modernity respectively -  and hence to two different
51. Hegel, op. cit. para 185, pp. 123-4; para 356, p.221; Addition 154, p. 280.
52. Hegel, op. cit. para 185, p. 124.
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moments of Spirit's self-expression, Hegel's accounts of woman's ethical life, 
in his discussion of Antigone in the Phenomenology and in his discussion 
of the modern family in the Philosophy of Right, complement each other in 
bringing out the meaning of this symbolism. I want to begin to analyse this 
symbolism by first looking at Hegel's discussion of woman's role within the 
modern family.
We saw earlier that in the Philosophy of Right Hegel claims that the unity 
of the family is a unity based on feeling. The first moment or expression of 
this unity is the love between husband and wife which, according to Hegel, 
has two aspects, physical and ethico-legal. The physical aspect of love may 
be viewed from both an objective and a subjective point of view.
Objectively, it involves the reproduction and maintenance of the species, 
which for Hegel is the rational ground of sex differences. Subjectively, it is 
experienced as sexual desire. However Hegel argues that although the 
physical aspects of love are essential to marriage, marriage cannot be 
founded on sexual passion alone. Rather, marriage is primarily an ethical 
relation which transcends 'the contingency and caprice of bodily desire' 
because it involves the renunciation of selfish independence in mutual 
recognition: 'From this point of view, their union is a self-restriction, but in 
fact it is their liberation, because in it they attain their substantive self- 
consciousness' .53 For Hegel this renunciation cannot be merely a private 
affair between two individuals, for then it is indistinguishable from a 
contingent inclination. Genuine ethical recognition, as we have seen, can 
only occur in the context of social institutions. The form of recognition 
expressed in love must thus be objectively realised in marriage and
53. Hegel, op. cit. para 162, p. 111.
mediated through a public and symbolic action, a wedding -  hence the 
importance of the legal tie.54
In his characterisation of love Hegel is explicit that both sexes renounce 
their individual personality in the love relation. However this 
renunciation seems to have a different meaning for the woman than it does 
for the man. For although Hegel does not deny to woman either the right to 
subjective freedom or the right to recognition within the love relation, she 
is nevertheless precluded from engaging in the activities and forms of 
recognition characteristic of citizenship. Her freedom is thus a very 
attenuated form of freedom, freedom grounded in feeling rather than in 
reason. Because of this, her ethical life within the family is different from 
that of her husband. Further, her freedom within the family and within the 
love relation must always be subordinate to his.
Firstly, the man leads a double ethical life. On the one hand in the family
'he lives a subjective ethical life on the plane of feeling'. On the other hand
he leads 'his actual substantive life in the state, in learning, and so forth, as
well as in labour and struggle with the external world and with himself' . 55
The ethical life of woman however is bound up entirely with marriage and
the family 'and to be imbued with family piety is her ethical frame of mind'. 
Thus one sex is mind in its self-diremption into explicit personal self­
subsistence and the knowledge and volition of free universality, i.e. 
the self-consciousness of conceptual thought and the volition of the 
objective final end. The other sex is mind maintaining itself in unity
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54. For Hegel the ethical and the legal aspects of marriage are equally significant. He 
berates Kant for regarding marriage only as a civil contract and so reducing it to the 'level of a 
contract for reciprocal use'. According to Hegel, although marriage originates in a contract it 
is a 'contract to transcend the standpoint of contract, the standpoint from which persons are 
regarded in their individuality as self-subsistent units', op. cit. para 163, p. 122.
55. Hegel, op. cit. para 166, p. 114.
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as knowledge and volition of the substantive, but knowledge and 
volition in the form of concrete individuality and feeling.56
Secondly, and because of this, sexual desire has a different meaning for the
two sexes. Because a man's principal sphere of ethical action is outside the
family, it matters less if he gives way to sensual impulses before marriage
than it does for a woman who 'in surrendering her body loses her
hon o u r'57. In the Phenom enology Hegel even claims that while the man
acquires the right of desire within marriage, 'and at the same time, preserves
his freedom in regard to it', 'in her vocation as an individual and in her
pleasure, [woman's] interest is centred on the universal and remains alien
to the particularity of desire ' .58
There are similar asymmetries in Hegel's accounts of the relations the man 
and the woman bear to the two external moments or manifestations of the 
love relation -  the family property and children. Although he deplores the 
Roman system of law which made children the property of their fathers and 
which precluded women from inheritance rights, Hegel, like Rousseau, 
nevertheless sees the institutions of monogamous marriage and private 
property as clearly linked, and as necessitating the political subordination of 
women both inside and outside the family. Thus, despite his claim that 
women have a right to inheritance of the family capital, which is common 
capital, he regards the husband as both the legal representative of the family 
and as having the 'prerogative to go out and work for its living, to attend to 
its needs, and to control and administer its capital.'59 W oman's role in the 
family by contrast is to instill in the child 'ethical principles in the form of 
feeling' 'so that thus equipped with the foundation of an ethical life, his
56. ibid.
57. Hegel, op. cit. Addition 106 to para 164, p. 263.
58. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, para 457, p. 275.
59. Hegel, P.R. para 171, p.116.
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heart may live its early years in love, trust and obedience'. In addition to 
this positive aim, the child's early education also has 'the negative aim of 
raising children out of the instinctive, physical, level on which they are 
originally, to self-subsistence and freedom of personality and so to the level 
on which they have the power to leave the natural unity of the family' .60 
But while woman's role is to promote this kind of 'self-subsistence' in 
others, she herself is precluded from attaining it.
Like Rousseau, Hegel claims that these ethical differences in the lives of 
men and women arise from physiological differences between the sexes. 
Again like Rousseau, he characterises these differences in terms of the 
difference between passivity and activity. Whereas men are like animals, 
women are like plants 'because their development is more placid and the 
principle that underlies it is the vague unity of feeling', rather than the 
unity of reason.61 Similarly, he compares the state with the nervous system, 
with the family corresponding to 'sensibility' -  'feeling in the abstract, 
keeping oneself self-enclosed, the dull movement which goes on internally, 
reproduction, internal self-nutrition, growth, and digestion' -  and civil 
society corresponding to 'irritability', 'sensation moving outwards' .62 In the 
context of my earlier discussion about the relationship between the family 
and civil society, what this comparison makes clear however is that the 
representation of woman's body as passive is the product of an ethical and 
political matrix in which woman's role is to preserve the ethical bonds
60. Hegel, op. cit. para 175, p. 117 & Addition 112 to para 175, p. 265.
61. Hegel, op. cit. Addition 107 to Para 166, p.263.
62. Hegel, op. cit. Addition 157 to Para 263, p. 281; cf. also the Philosophy of Nature, para. 
368, p. 175: The clitoris moreover is inactive feeling in general; in the male on the other 
hand, it has its counterpart in active sensibility...Thus, the simple retention of conception in 
the uterus, is differentiated in the male into productive cerebrality and the external vital.
On account of this difference therefore, the male is the active principle; as the female 
remains in her undeveloped unity, she constitutes the principle of conception'. Hegel's account 
of the significance of sex differences seems to owe a great deal to Aristotle.
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which modern masculine ethical and political life both presupposes and 
transcends. The specific character of these ethical bonds emerges most 
clearly in Hegel's discussion of Antigone in the Phenomenology. This 
discussion also makes it clear that woman's identification with the bonds of 
kinship is rooted in her role as mediating the relationship between Nature 
and Spirit.
Hegel characterises the ethical world in which the conflict between 
Antigone and Creon is played out -  the world of the Greek polis -  as a world 
in which social recognition takes the form of custom. In this ethical world 
individuality or subjective freedom has not yet emerged as such.
Individuals know themselves only as members of the social whole, the 
community, which is actualized and has objective form in the customary 
laws of the community. As a consequence, ethical life takes the form of 
unreflective duty:
In it there is no caprice and equally no struggle, no indecision, since 
the making and testing of law has been given up; on the contrary, the 
essence of ethical life is for this consciousness immediate, 
unwavering, without contradiction.63
In this immediacy of duty lies both the strength and the weakness of the
ethical world of custom. Its strength derives from the fact that individuals
know their existence depends on their belonging to the social whole. Its
weakness derives from the fact that, because individuals simply 'know' the
rightness of their duty, when their different duties conflict the conflict
undermines the social whole, as is the case in the struggle between
Antigone and Creon, or rather between the opposing laws which they
respectively embody.
Hegel describes the opposing laws embodied by Antigone and Creon in a 
number of different ways: as an opposition between divine law and human
63. Hegel, Phenomenology, para 465, p. 279.
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law; between the law of the heart and public law; between the law of the 
family and the law of the nation; and between the law of woman and the 
law of man. What causes the ultimate downfall of the ethical world of 
custom is the fact that, although opposed to it, human law is rooted in 
divine law because the world of custom emerges out of, and has its essence 
in, the 'natural7 community of the family. Human law is the outward 
expression or actual, self-conscious existence of its unconscious, 'inner 
Notion7, that is divine law or the law of the family. Thus the world of 
custom gets its strength as an ethical community from the fact that its 
substance lies in the ethical ties of the family. Hegel describes the family as a 
'natural7 community because it is founded on ties of kinship, or what he 
calls 'blood relations'. These relations are 'natural7 because they arise out of 
the natural processes by means of which the species reproduces and 
maintains itself through the births and deaths of individuals. However 
'blood relations' are only ethical relations to the extent that they transcend 
these natural processes. The function of 'woman7 in the ethical life of 
communities based on custom, is to enact this transformation of natural 
relations into ethical relations, through rites and symbolic gestures which 
mediate natural processes and imbue them with ethical significance.
In the Phenomenology Hegel claims that the most significant symbolic rites 
are those associated with death, that is funeral rites. This is because while 
living individuals are able to give their lives spiritual significance through 
their own actions, the dead individual is threatened with becoming merely 
a meaningless corpse, prey to the processes of corruption and consumption 
by other living things. The role of the family, embodied in woman, is to 
rescue the dead individual from this fate, through funeral rites which make 
him a member of the divine underworld which watches over and protects 
the daylight world of living human beings. Hegel also claims that of the 
blood relations within the family -  those between husband and wife,
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parents and children, and brother and sister -  the most ethical is the 
relationship between brother and sister because in this relationship the 
'natural' aspects of blood relations are least present. In the relationship 
between husband and wife, ethical recognition firstly takes the form of 
natural desire and then is mediated through a third term, the child, a 
natural product of this desire, while in the relationship between parents and 
their children recognition is not mutual -  the child can only achieve 
independence by breaking away from his natural tie to his parents.
However in the brother-sister relation, their ties of kinship preclude the 
possibility of desire and so 'they are free individualities in regard to each 
other', hence capable of mutual ethical recognition.
However despite Hegel's claim that brother and sister 'are free 
individualities in regard to each other', their positions both within the 
family and in the public world are not the same. While the sister remains 
within the family, the brother becomes also a member of the broader 
community. It is this difference between the positions of women and men 
that brings about the downfall of the world of custom, for it creates within 
the community an internal enemy -  womankind. The opposition between 
woman and the broader community surfaces in the event of war.64 Hegel 
claims that the community can only survive if the male members of the 
family leave the inward-looking sphere of the family and become active 
participants in the public world. But this public world contains within it an 
implicit recognition of individuality, for it has a tendency to become 
fragmented, with individuals losing sight of their dependence on the social 
whole. At such times the unity and survival of the community can only be 
recovered through war, which confronts individuals with the possibility of
64. Genevieve Lloyd gives a detailed analysis of Hegel's account of the opposition between 
femininity and war in her article 'Selfhood, War and Masculinity' in Feminist Challenges, C. 
Pateman & E. Gross (eds.) (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1986).
death, 'their lord and master', and in doing so makes them realise that their 
survival depends upon the survival and unity of the whole community. In 
war, however, the community asks the ultimate sacrifice from the family, 
for it robs the family of its male members. The family's compensation is the 
right to reclaim its dead for itself through its own funeral rites and 
ceremonies. This is why Creon's refusal to Antigone of the right of a sister 
to bury her brother is so blasphemous -  because it embodies a refusal to 
recognise the dependence of the community on the family from which it 
emerged. Creon's refusal, and Antigone's insistence on the sacredness of 
familial ties, thus upsets the whole tenuous relationship between the family 
and the public world, between divine law and human law, and so brings to 
the surface the contradiction at the heart of the world of custom -  that the 
community can only survive at the expense of those very bonds of kinship 
from which it emerged and on which it depends. Although a recognition of 
the value of individuality does arise out of this conflict, partly through 
Antigone's insistence on the importance of the spirit of Polyneices, it is 
achieved only through the downfall of the kinds of substantive ethical 
relationships which characterise the world of custom.
According to Hegel, what distinguishes modernity from the ancient world 
of custom is that the modern world has gone through the necessary phase of 
rampant individuality which characterised the Roman world. As a 
consequence, modern social life incorporates a recognition of the subjective 
freedom of individuals. However Hegel's concern is that this recognition 
can give rise to a very soulless and legalistic form of social life, a world in 
which individuals become abstract and isolated persons. At its worst this 
can give rise to forms of totalitarianism, as happened with the Roman 
emperors.65 At its best it can give rise to the recognition of the 'rights of
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65 See the section of the Phenomenology of Spirit entitled 'Legal Status', paras 290-294. 
Interestingly, in the Philosophy of Right Hegel connects women's financial
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man7 which characterises the Enlightenment. But what Hegel desires is a 
form of social life which can recognise the subjective freedom of 
individuals, but which preserves the substantive kinds of ethical bonds of 
kinship and community characteristic of the world of custom. This is only 
possible however if these substantive bonds are rooted in universal reason, 
rather than in Nature.
Hegel's account of the State, which, as we have seen, grounds the freedom of 
individuals in their relationship to the rational institutions of the State, is 
an attempt to articulate such a conception of social life. But Hegel's modern 
community, like the ancient community, can only achieve a substantive 
ethical life by being rooted in the ethical bonds which characterise the 
modern family -  the bonds of love. Within this family woman still has the 
function of mediating between Nature and Spirit -  remember it is the 
mother who is charged with the duty of 'raising children out of the 
instinctive, physical, level on which they are originally, to self-subsistence 
and freedom of personality and so to the level on which they have the 
power to leave the natural unity of the family'. Further, as this quotation 
makes explicit, because the bonds of the family are bonds of feeling, rather 
than bonds of reason, and so retain their roots in natural desire, masculine 
ethical and political life is still defined as a transcendence of the 'natural' 
harmony and unity of the family sphere. Because of this, modern life 
preserves, through woman's position within the family, not only the ethical 
bonds characteristic of kinship relations, but also the tension between the 
private world of the family and the public world of citizenship. In fact, 
speaking of Antigone, Hegel claims that this opposition is 'the supreme 
opposition in ethics and therefore in tragedy; and it is individualized in the
disenfranchisement within Roman law to the rampant individualism of Roman society. See 
the discussion in para 180, pp. 120-122.
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same play in the opposing natures of man and wom an ' . 66 The preservation, 
within the modern State, of the substantive ethical life which characterises 
kinship relations can therefore only be achieved by denying woman the 
kind of social autonomy or 'substantive freedom' which arises from the 
rational recognitive relations of the public sphere.
In the next chapter I will argue that Wollstonecraft was also aware of the 
tensions within modern social life, and recognised, although in a much less 
self-conscious way than Hegel, that social life must be grounded in what 
Hegel calls 'substantive' ethical relationships. However she rejected the idea 
that these substantive relationships can only be m aintained by denying 
women the scope to exercise autonomy and by making woman the 
embodiment of ethical relations founded on feeling. Her claim was that this 
'solution' to the tensions within modern social life is in fact the main source 
of the problem. In trying to articulate an ideal of autonomy for women she 
also made brilliantly clear, and for the first time, what the effect is on 
women of those symbolic structures which associate woman with feeling as 
opposed to reason.
66. Hegel, P.R. para 166, p. 115
Chapter Five
REASON AND SENSIBILITY: THE IDEAL OF WOMEN'S SELF- 
GOVERNANCE IN THE WRITINGS OF MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT
'...when morality shall be settled on a more 
solid basis, then, without being gifted with a 
prophetic spirit, I will venture to predict 
that woman will be either the friend or 
slave of man. We shall not, as at present, 
doubt whether she is a moral agent, or the 
link which unites man with brutes.'1
I
In a letter written in 1795 while she was travelling in Scandinavia doing 
business on behalf of Gilbert Imlay, the man who had recently abandoned 
both her and her child by him, Wollstonecraft wrote of herself: Tor years 
have I endeavoured to calm an impetuous tide -  labouring to keep my 
feelings to an orderly course. -  It was striving against the stream. -  I must 
love and admire with warmth, or I sink into sadness.'2 It is reflections such 
as these, as well as the tempestuous events of Wollstonecraft's own personal 
life, which have led one of her biographers to suggest that Wollstonecraft 
was unable in her own life to live by the ideal of self-governance which she 
proposed for women in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman.3 The
1. Mary Wollstonecraft, Vindication of the Rights of Woman, (Penguin, 1975) p. 120. 
Hereafter cited in footnotes as V.R.W. I use the terms 'autonomy' and 'self-governance' 
interchangeably in this chapter although only the latter term was used by Wollstonecraft. 
My tendency however is to stick with Wollstonecraft's own term.
2. Mary Wollstonecraft, Letters Written during a Short Residence in Sweden, Norway, and 
Denmark in Janet M. Todd (ed.) A Wollstonecraft Anthology (Indiana U.P. 1977), Letter VIII,
p. 160.
3. This view is expressed by Claire Tomalin in The Life and Death of Mary Wollstonecraft, 
(Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, New York, 1974). Between the time of the publication of 
Vindication of The Rights of Woman in 1792 and her death following childbirth in 1797, 
Wollstonecraft had lived in revolutionary circles in Paris during the French Revolution, had
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explanation proffered for this apparent discrepancy is that the Vindication 
was written when Wollstonecraft was childless and inexperienced in sexual 
relationships with men. Her later experiences taught her however that 
passion cannot always, or very easily, be governed by reason. More recent 
feminist commentators have rejected this rather patronizing view of the 
relationship between Wollstonecraft's life and her writings.* 4 However the 
idea that Wollstonecraft defined self-governance in opposition to passion 
has not been challenged and still prevails even in feminist interpretations 
of her work. Jane Martin for example argues that Wollstonecraft adopts 
what Martin calls a 'sovereignty model of personality', which posits reason 
in opposition to feeling as the 'ruling element' of the soul and which allows 
between reason and feeling 'no give and take, no interaction, no sensitivity 
to context. '5
My argum ent in this chapter is that the overriding preoccupations of 
Wollstonecraft's work, as well as of her life, were to articulate what it means 
for women to think and act as autonomous moral agents, and to envisage 
the kind of social and political organisation required in order for them to do 
so. Although at times she seemed to identify autonomy with reason, 
defining it in opposition to passion, in a context in which, as we have seen,
an affair with the American Imlay who was the father of her first child Fanny, attempted
suicide on two occasions following the break-up of her relationship with Imlay, and lived
with and then married William Godwin who was the father of her second child Mary 
(Shelley). By the standards of her time, and indeed even by our own, her life was extremely 
unconventional. It is partly because of this that since the publication of Vindication the 
nature of her personal life has often provided the main context for the reception and 
interpretation of her work.
4. See especially Miriam Kramnick's 'Introduction' to the Penguin edition of Vindication and 
Moira Gatens, 'The Oppressed State of My Sex: Wollstonecraft on Reason, Feeling and 
Equality' in C. Pateman & M.L. Stanley (eds.) Feminist Interpretations of Political Theory 
(Polity Press, forthcoming). Although my interpretation of Wollstonecraft differs in some 
respects from that of Gatens it was her discussion in this article which in part provoked a re­
thinking of my views on Wollstonecraft.
5. Jane Roland Martin, 'Wollstonecraft's Daughters', Ch. 4 of Reclaiming a Conversation: The 
Ideal of the Educated Woman. (Yale U.P., 1985).
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woman 'is always represented as only created to see through a gross 
medium, and to take things on trust'6, Wollstonecraft also struggled to 
develop an account of women's moral agency which would incorporate a 
recognition not only of women's capacity to reason, but also of their right to 
experience and give expression to passion, including sexual desire. Of 
particular concern to her was the need to create the possibility for genuinely 
reciprocal friendships and love relationships between men and women.
She was also vehement that women's bodies should be regarded neither as 
mere objects of use, pleasure and exchange among men, nor by women as 
objects of narcissistic attention. Rather, respect for the body is an integral 
part of both self-esteem and respect for others. Wollstonecraft's view was 
that such reciprocity and respect could only be realised in a context where 
women are able to exercise control of both the external -  financial, 
educational and political -  circumstances of their lives, and the direction of 
their own affections.
This interpretation of Wollstonecraft does not entail a denial of the claims 
that there are tensions within her account of women's autonomy, as well as 
difficulties with it for contemporary feminists. In particular,
Wollstonecraft's treatment of the distinctions between reason/passion and 
public/private seems to raise problems from a feminist perspective for her 
understanding of self-governance. But I want to suggest that these problems 
are not as clear-cut as they are sometimes made to seem. Firstly it is true 
that at many points in the Vindication Wollstonecraft is explicit that virtue 
must be founded on reason, not sensibility. She also ties virtue to the 
notion of the perfectibility of the soul. This lends credence to the view that 
she regards self-governance as a matter of reason's control over unruly 
passions associated with the body. From a feminist perspective this is
6. Wollstonecraft, VRW p. 142.
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problematic because it allies Wollstonecraft's account of self-governance 
with hierarchical oppositions between soul/body, reason/passion and 
masculine/feminine. The supposedly sex-neutral 'self7 which controls the 
body is thus implicitly associated with 'masculine' virtues while 
downgrading 'feminine' virtues associated with affectivity. While not 
denying that Wollstonecraft does appeal to the idea of a 'soul which knows 
no sex', I will try to show that, within the inevitable limits posed by this 
idea, Wollstonecraft was also struggling to articulate a more subtle view of 
self-governance, one which would not pit women's reason in opposition 
either to their bodies or to affectivity. The outlines of this view are certainly 
present in the Vindication but they are more fully developed in 
Wollstonecraft's posthumously published novel The Wrongs of Woman 
and in some of her travel writings and personal letters.7
Secondly, in the Vindication Wollstonecraft makes much of the claim that, 
although virtue must be regarded as the same in both sexes, men and 
women have different 'duties'. Women's 'duties', duties associated with the 
care of children and the running of the household, are considered by 
Wollstonecraft to follow 'naturally' from women's role in reproduction.
But, as feminists have pointed out, this division of the sexes according to 
duties, as well as the idea that certain duties are 'natural' to women, derives 
from and preserves the distinction between public and private which is at 
the root of women's subordination. Moira Gatens argues that
7 Mary Wollstonecraft, The Wrongs of Woman: or, Maria. A Fragment, in Mary and The 
Wrongs of Woman, edited by James Kinsley and Gary Kelly (World's Classics, Oxford U.P. 
1980). This unfinished novel, which Wollstonecraft tells the reader is the story 'of woman, 
rather than of an individual', is set in an asylum -  Wollstonecraft's metaphor for women's 
'civil death' in eighteenth century English society (see footnote 10 below). Its three central 
characters are Maria, a woman who has been committed and had her child abducted by an 
unfaithful and impecunious husband (George Venables) seeking to gain control of her 
inheritance; Jemima, Maria's warder, a working-class woman whose basically virtuous 
character has been deadened by poverty, sexual abuse, hard labour and lack of affection; and 
the ambivalent Darnford, Maria's lover, who seems to embody both the virtues and the vices 
which Wollstonecraft discovered in men.
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Wollstonecraft's endorsement of a sexual division of labour is a 
consequence of her attempt to extend the liberal ideal of equality to women.8 
According to Gatens, Wollstonecraft assumes that the liberal notion of 
equality, and the reason which grounds it, are sex-neutral. In fact however, 
the characteristics of the 'equal' liberal citizen are defined in opposition to, 
but also presuppose, those affective virtues associated with women. As a 
result the liberal public sphere is a sphere of male equality which can only 
function through the subordination of women in the private sphere. 
Wollstonecraft's argument that women can fulfill dual roles as mothers- 
daughters-wives and as equal citizens thus overlooks the fact that within 
liberalism women's duties are necessarily tied to women's subordination. 
According to Gatens, Wollstonecraft attempts to deal with this difficulty by 
denying the ethical significance of those virtues associated with women, and 
adopting a supposedly sex-neutral but in fact masculine ideal of virtue in 
both public and private spheres. But given the facts of women's 
embodiment, while the ethical significance of sexual difference is denied, 
difference re-emerges at the level of the division of labour.
While I do not deny that the idea that women have certain 'natural' duties 
must be rejected, I want to suggest that Wollstonecraft's views on the 
relation between public and private spheres are more complex than perhaps 
Gatens allows. Although Wollstonecraft certainly wants nothing to do with 
the Rousseauian idea of specific 'feminine' virtues, she does not deny the 
ethical importance of the affections. Nor does she overlook the ethical 
significance of sexual difference.9 Her concern is to understand the kind of
8. Gatens, op. cit. See also Moira Gatens, 'Rousseau and Wollstonecraft: Nature vs. Reason' in 
Women and Philosophy, ed. by Janna Thompson, supplement to vol. 64 ATP, June 1986.
9. Gatens' arguments in both her articles on Wollstonecraft seem to assume that a recognition 
of the ethical significance of sexual difference entails the idea of a specific feminine ethic. 
My argument in this thesis is that while sexual difference gives rise to different bodily
189
moral character required in order to achieve justice in the public realm and 
genuine reciprocity in the private. But what motivates this concern is a 
recognition that male and female embodiment are different and that this 
difference has ethical and political significance. It was for this reason that 
she called not only for a 'revolution in female manners' but also for a 
complete transformation of the legal and economic relations of both public 
and private spheres.
I do not claim that Wollstonecraft was entirely successful in her effort to 
combat the dominant Enlightenment philosophical and cultural 
representation of women's bodies as obstacles to women's moral agency. At 
times she certainly seems to take over the view that women's bodies are 
more 'dependent' than men's and hence that they may be impediments to 
virtue. Particularly in The Wrongs of Woman and in some of her 
reflections on own her feelings for her daughter, she also seems to suggest 
that women are by nature more susceptible to the 'attached affections' than 
men. And, as I stated above, she seems to endorse the idea that certain 
duties are natural to women. But even here Wollstonecraft shows an 
awareness that perhaps her views, as well as her own susceptibilities, arise 
more from 'the imperfect state of society' than from the nature of women's 
bodies.
n
When reading Wollstonecraft it is important to try to disentangle her 
somewhat sketchy conception of self-governance from the arguments for 
equality out of which it arises. In her defense of equality she puts a great 
deal of stress on women's capacity to reason and on the idea that virtue 
must be founded on reason. This gives rise to the impression that for
perspectives, a recognition of the ethical significance of these different perspectives need not 
entail a sexually specific ethic.
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Wollstonecraft self-governance is equivalent to the rule of reason. I want to 
suggest however that Wollstonecraft does not straightforwardly endorse the 
extreme rationalism of the arguments for equality. Rather these arguments 
serve the strategic function of directly answering the charges against 
women's equality that were raised by Enlightenment thinkers, but in 
particular by Rousseau. Although the arguments for equality provide the 
necessary theoretical underpinning for her account of self-governance, my 
claim is that in this account the role of reason figures more as a necessary 
part of a virtuous character than as the sole authority in all matters.
Wollstonecraft's argument in defense of women's equality works by 
extending the Enlightenment critique of sovereign power to relations 
between the sexes. Her claim is that if sovereign power is deemed 
illegitimate because it sanctions arbitrary power, then logical consistency 
requires that any exercise of arbitrary power be deemed illegitimate. What 
she seeks to show is that women's subordination to men is purely arbitrary, 
that is, it cannot be justified by reason. Wollstonecraft's main method of 
exposing the arbitrary nature of patriarchal power is via a critique of 
Rousseau's arguments against women's claims to equality. Her targets are 
firstly Rousseau's claim that women are by nature inferior to men with 
respect to those capacities which ground equality, namely reason, 
independence and virtue, and secondly his claim that women's equality 
would subvert the social order. In the Vindication Wollstonecraft presents 
two main arguments against the first claim, an environmental argument 
and an argument based on an appeal to the perfectibility of the soul. The 
environmental argument involves a straightforward appeal to empiricist 
psychology. Following Locke she argues that our capacities are developed 
and our characters formed in response to our environments, or what she 
terms 'the effect of an early association of ideas'. For Wollstonecraft one of 
the most significant features of the environment is education or its lack, but
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environment also embraces customs, habits, opportunities, parental 
influences and so on. Her response to Rousseau concedes that women 'in 
the present state of society' do seem to be less capable of both reason and 
virtue than men but seeks to show that this is simply a product of women's 
education and environment, rather than a natural incapacity.
The environmental argument has of course been rehearsed repeatedly 
under a number of different guises by feminists since Wollstonecraft. A 
more interesting argument from our point of view is the appeal to the 
perfectibility of the soul. At one level this argument works simply to 
challenge the coherence of any claim that certain groups of human beings 
can be naturally subject to others. Women, says Wollstonecraft, are either 
human beings or they are not, that is, they either have an immortal soul or 
they do not. To postulate the possibility of a being which is neither one 
thing nor the other is to suggest that women are 'beautiful flaws in nature. 
Let it also be remembered that they are the only flaw. '10 If women are not 
human beings then they must be regarded as subject to their impulses and 
hence incapable of freedom of the will. If this is the case then their 
subjection to the authority of others is perfectly justifiable. However if 
women are human beings then their subjection to the will of others is 
completely unjustifiable. Furthermore if this is the case it is morally 
requisite that women be given the liberty and the scope to perfect their souls 
through the exercise of their reason. Underlying this challenge is the idea 
that human beings have a duty to improve their souls, more than this, that 
the highest aim of human life is self-improvement. Wollstonecraft's 
argument against Rousseau is thus that by denying women equality he 
undermines the foundation of morality, because he denies women the 
possibility of undertaking what is in fact the sternest duty of beings
10. Wollstonecraft, VRW, p. 122.
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accountable for themselves to God. Shortly we shall see how this doctrine 
of perfectibility underpins Wollstonecraft's conception of self-governance.
In response to Rousseau's claim that women's equality would subvert the 
social order, Wollstonecraft seeks to show that precisely the reverse would 
be true. Her argument to this effect focuses on Rousseau's conception of 
feminine virtue which, she claims, is not virtue at all but a sham more 
likely to corrupt and degrade women and the social order than to improve 
either. The strategy of Wollstonecraft's argument is to concede to Rousseau 
certain assumptions but to deny the inferences he makes on the basis of 
those assumptions. Firstly, she concedes that public virtue must be 
founded in private virtue, conceding also the importance of modesty and 
fidelity in relationships between men and women. However she argues 
that Rousseau's recommendations for the education of women and his 
subjection of women to the authority of men will not in fact bring about the 
desired result. According to Wollstonecraft, modesty must be founded in 
self-respect and in respect for the integrity of one's body, while fidelity is 
only a virtue if it arises out of genuine affection. Understood thus, modesty 
and fidelity are not sexually specific virtues at all. But Rousseau adopts a 
sexual double standard and makes modesty and fidelity the paramount 
virtues for women. Furthermore, he grounds these allegedly 'feminine' 
virtues not in women's self-respect and capacity for affection but in male 
needs. It is clear that for Rousseau the function of so-called 'feminine' 
virtue is in fact to make women pleasing to men and to ensure that 
women's own needs are subordinated to this end. Wollstonecraft cites as 
evidence of this claim Rousseau's injunctions to Sophie to ensure that she 
is always alluring for Emile, while at the same time insisting that her 
chastity is her main asset. But, pointing to the behaviour of the leisured 
middle-class and aristocratic women whom Wollstonecraft so despised, she 
suggests that Rousseau's advice is more likely to produce infidelity, or at
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least sham fidelity than genuine fidelity because it focuses women's whole 
attention on 'corporeal embellishments', rather than on attaining genuine 
v irtue .11 The fact that feminine 'virtue' must in the end be assured through 
force indicates that Rousseau was in fact aware of this. Wollstonecraft's 
suggestion is that he abandoned logic on this issue because he succumbed to 
his own lasciviousness! Wollstonecraft is also outraged by Rousseau's 
insistence that it is not sufficient for a woman to be faithful, everybody must 
know of her fidelity. By making virtue a function of the opinions of others, 
rather than a function of a person's own integrity and honesty, Rousseau 
deliberately undermines women's independence. More than this, he quite 
openly incites women to duplicity and cunning. But by depriving women 
of integrity and of every legitimate means of exercising power, Rousseau 
ensures that women will in fact create social disorder because despotism 
becomes the only path open to them. By being civil and political slaves
11. In many places in the Vindication Wollstonecraft is quite scathing about the coquettish, 
pleasure-seeking, self-obsessed behaviour of these women who could take as long as five 
hours to get dressed! Her observations, as well as her animosity, arose from her experience 
working as governess to the children of a landed Irish aristocratic couple, the Kingsboroughs. 
Wollstonecraft felt that there was little hope, short of revolution, in changing the ways of 
the aristocracy. However she hoped to influence the middle-classes, to whom, she claims, 
her book is addressed. Wollstonecraft was appalled by the way in which the newly leisured 
middle-class women were attempting to emulate their aristocratic sisters, but, despite her 
scorn, the argument of the Vindication is that the behaviour of these women has only one 
source -  their social position. As Miriam Kramnick makes clear (op. cit.), the social position 
of both middle- and working-class women, as well as the opportunities open to them, were 
dramatically different at the end of the eighteenth century than they had been one hundred 
years previously. The rapid expansion of industrialisation and mechanisation in production 
had shifted much productive work out of the domestic economy and out of family-based 
businesses and into factories removed from the home. As a result middle-class women, who 
previously had played a significant role in the economy, had become a very leisured class 
dependent entirely upon their husbands for economic support and 'protection', while working- 
class women spent increasingly long hours outside the home, performing badly paid menial 
work with very little time left to care for their children. While working-class women thus 
ruined their health in factories, middle-class women ruined their health through idleness 
and through attempts to achieve ideals of 'feminine' beauty. Women's economic 
disenfranchisement became 'civil death' when Blackstone announced in 1757 that 'the very 
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage or at least is 
incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband' (quoted by Kramnick, op. cit. p. 34). 
As I will suggest later in this chapter, sensitivity to this context makes some of 
Wollstonecraft's more drastic pronouncements against pleasure more comprehensible.
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women thereby become private tyrants.12 Wollstonecraft's conclusion is 
that Rousseau's recommendations teach women manners rather than 
morals -  hardly an adequate basis for the virtue required to perfect the soul.
Rousseau's second argument in support of the claim that women's equality 
would subvert the social order is that women's primary function in life is to 
raise and educate children. Were women themselves to be educated to 
participate as equal citizens who would take responsibility for this crucial 
task? Wollstonecraft's response is simple but devastating. Once again she 
concedes certain assumptions to Rousseau, namely that the family is indeed 
the foundation of social life and that women's primary social duty is to raise 
and educate children. However she points out that if women are trained to 
be dependent upon men, and required to base their judgements upon the 
authority of men, then they will be incapable of raising and educating 
children. Wollstonecraft's argument is that the task of education demands 
independence of judgement. This in turn requires a capacity for reflection 
and generalization. But the education and social position which Rousseau 
recommends for women denies them the opportunity of developing these 
capacities. Furthermore if women are ignorant of virtue and are 
themselves subjected to arbitrary authority how likely is it that they will 
inculcate virtue in their own children? What is more likely is that they in 
turn will subject their children to arbitrary authority, rather than teaching 
them virtue through the use of reason. Having conceded that women's 
primary social duties are maternal duties however, Wollstonecraft also 
argues that women have a duty to which their social duties must always be 
secondary. This is their duty to themselves as beings accountable to God.
12. Wollstonecraft, V.R.W. esp. Chs. 4, 5 & 12. cf. Wollstonecraft, The Wrongs of Woman (op. 
cit.), vol. 1, Ch. 8, p. 137 'By allowing women but one way of rising in the world, the fostering 
the libertinism of men, society makes monsters of them, and then their ignoble vices are 
brought forward as proof of inferiority of intellect'.
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Wollstonecraft's views on the perfectibility of the soul are beautifully 
captured in one of her travel letters written in Tonsberg, Norway. The letter 
is interesting because it shows that Wollstonecraft's belief in the 
immortality of the soul did not prevent her from reflecting on the moral 
significance of human embodiment. In the letter, Wollstonecraft recounts 
her horror at discovering in the town's church a recess full of coffins 
containing embalmed bodies. Her horror arose from a sense that it degrades 
humanity to attempt to preserve the body when all active life has been 
extinguished, when 'the enchantment of animation' is broken. In contrast 
to the 'noble ruins' which are reminders of the exertions and efforts of 
earlier generations and which 'exalt the mind', these futile attempts at 
prolonging life bring home the 'littleness' and mortality of the individual. 
Reflecting on her reaction, Wollstonecraft writes 'Life, what art thou?
Where goes this breath? this /, so much alive? In what element will it mix, 
giving or receiving fresh energy...I feel a conviction that we have some 
perfectible principle in our present vestment, which will not be destroyed 
just as we begin to be sensible of improvement...'13
Although at times Wollstonecraft's belief in the immortality of the soul led 
her to adopt an attitude of stoicism and resignation in the face of life's 
sorrows and injustices, her more considered view was that it is by learning 
from error and experience and fighting injustice that the soul is improved.14 
As we shall see, Wollstonecraft's views on what constitutes virtue or the
13. Letters Written...in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, Letter VII in J. Todd (op. cit.), p. 158- 
9.
14. The attitude of stoic resignation is most evident in Wollstonecraft's early novel Mary, A 
Fiction, published in 1788. At the end of the novel the heroine's response to sorrow and sexual 
injustice is resignation mixed with joy at the prospect of death and the thought that 'she was 
hastening to that world where there is neither marrying, nor giving in marriage' (op. cit. p. 
68). Even here however Wollstonecraft's irony gets the better of her resignation.
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perfection of the soul shifted somewhat from the Vindication to The 
Wrongs of Woman. But the idea that self-governance is essential to virtue, 
and to the possibility of perfectibility or self-improvement, remained a 
constant theme in her work, as did the idea that sexual inequality is 
immoral because it deprives women of self-governance.
Central to Wollstonecraft's notion of perfectibility and to her account of self-
governance is a contrast -  not accidentally echoing the same contrast in
Rousseau- between independence and dependence. To be dependent is 'to
act according to the will of another fallible being, and submit, right or
wrong, to power' . 15 However independence, which Wollstonecraft calls 'the
grand blessing of life, the basis of every virtue', is not the mere converse of
dependence, namely being self-willed, but is a more complex virtue.16 In
the Vindication Wollstonecraft lays great stress on the importance of reason
to independence. She characterises reason in the following terms:
'Reason is...the simple power of improvement; or, more 
properly speaking, of discerning truth. Every individual is in 
this respect a world in itself. More or less may be conspicuous 
in one being than another; but the nature of reason must be the 
same in all, if it be an emanation of divinity, the tie that 
connects the creature with the Creator; for, can that soul be 
stamped with the heavenly image, that is not perfected by the 
exercise of its own reason?17
According to Wollstonecraft, a person must exercise her reason in a number 
of different ways in order to achieve independence. The most important of 
these ways, and the one to which she remains committed throughout her 
writings, is that exercise of reason which counters the effects of prejudice 
and which refuses blind obedience to authority. Our actions can only be free
15. Wollstonecraft, V.R.W. Ch. 3, p. 135.
16. Wollstonecraft, V.R.W. Dedication, p.85.
17. Wollstonecraft, V.R.W. Ch. 4, p. 142.
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and virtuous, she wants to say, if they are based on reasoned judgements, 
rather than arising out of conformity to social expectations or from notions 
of duty which require the individual to submit her own judgement to the 
arbitrary authority of others. In the Vindication this view leads 
W ollstonecraft to condemn military training and discipline as incompatible 
w ith freedom .18 In The Wrongs of Woman she has Darnford declare that 
'm inds governed by superior principles...were privileged to act above the 
dictates of laws they had no voice in framing ' . 19 These 'superior principles' 
are principles founded in respect for the rights of rational beings, including 
self-respect, as opposed to the principles of social utility which justify, 
among other things, the subordination of women and the exploitation of 
the poor. Her view was that a knowledge of such principles could only be 
arrived at by 'enlarging the m ind' through education, sensibility and 
experience. By 'cramping the understanding', wom en's education and social 
position, as well as Rousseau's recommendations on these matters, put the 
capacity for making independent judgements out of the reach of most 
women, condemning them to be slaves to the opinions of others.
In the V indication Wollstonecraft seems to follow Rousseau in linking 
dependence on the opinions of others to being subject to one's own
18. Wollstonecraft, V.R.W. Ch. 1, p. 97. Cf. also her remarks in Ch. 2, p.106: 'Standing 
armies can never consist of resolute robust men; they may be well-disciplined machines, but 
they will seldom contain men under the influence of strong passions, or with very vigorous 
faculties; and as for any depth of understanding I will venture to affirm that it is as rarely to 
be found in the army as amongst women...The great misfortune is this, that they both acquire 
manners before morals, and a knowledge of life before they have from reflection any 
acquaintance with the grand ideal outline of human nature. The consequence is natural. 
Satisfied with common nature, they become a prey to prejudices, and taking all their opinions 
on credit, they blindly submit to authority'.
19. Wollstonecraft, The Wrongs of Woman, Vol II, Ch. 15, p. 187. Cf. also Maria's picture of 
her uncle who 'inculcated, with great warmth, self-respect, and a lofty consciousness of acting 
right, independent of the censure of the world', Vol. I, Ch. 7, p. 128.
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inclinations and passions.20 In some places she therefore connects that 
exercise of reason which leads to independence of judgement and virtue 
with the control of the passions and with a kind of self-denying fortitude. 
Her complaint against the indolent women of the middle-classes for 
example is that their senses are inflamed by the pursuit of pleasure and by 
momentary feelings. As a result their reason is prevented from 'attaining 
that sovereignty which it ought to attain to render a rational creature useful 
to others and content with its own station' . 21 The virtuous widow whom 
she depicts for us in contrast is a woman who subdues any passionate 
inclinations, selflessly devotes herself to educating and providing for her 
children, and then 'calmly waits for the sleep of death ' .22 In a similar vein 
Wollstonecraft also declares that 'a master and mistress of a family ought 
not to love each other with passion. I mean to say that they ought not to 
indulge those emotions which disturb the order of society. '23
However even in the Vindication Wollstonecraft seems to be ambivalent 
about this view. In a number of places she contrasts the 'romantic, 
wavering feelings' which 'inflame' the passions, with those 'strong, 
persevering passions' which 'strengthen' the passions and so enlarge the 
understanding and ennoble the heart.24 Similarly she contrasts lust with 
love, sensuality with sensibility, parental self-love with parental affection 
and so on, suggesting that while the first term in the pair undermines 
virtue the second term is essential to it. She also suggests that 'the
20. Cf. Wollstonecraft, V.R.W. Ch. 5, p. 202: Woman 'becoming the slave of her own feelings, 
she is easily subjugated by those of others'.
21. Wollstonecraft, V.R.W. Ch. 4, p.152.
22. Wollstonecraft, V.R.W. Ch. 3, pp. 138-9.
23. Wollstonecraft, V.R.W. Ch. 2, p. 114.
24. See for example Wollstonecraft, V.R.W. Ch. 4, pp. 152 & 169; Ch. 2, p. 115.
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regulation of the passions is not, always, wisdom' and that the reason why 
men seem to be more capable of independent judgement than women is 
because they have more scope to exercise 'the grand passions' .25 Even more 
surprising she claims for women the right to sexual desire: 'Women as well 
as men ought to have the common appetites and passions of their nature, 
they are only brutal when unchecked by reason: but the obligation to check 
them is the duty of mankind, not a sexual duty ' .26
By the time of The Wrongs of Woman, Maria, in a letter addressed to her 
infant daughter, cautions her daughter to learn to distinguish genuine love 
and affection from passing infatuation, but urges her not to flee from 
pleasure and to open her heart to affection, even though that will also make 
her vulnerable to pain. In an important passage she deplores contemporary 
moral standards which require women to remain married to men for 
whom they have neither affection nor esteem: '...woman, weak in reason, 
impotent in will, is required to moralize, sentimentalize herself to stone, 
and pine her life away, labouring to reform her embruted mate ' .27 Maria 
declares that to the contrary, lack of passion and coldness of heart 
underm ine virtue and she argues that desire must be reciprocal and women 
m ust have the freedom to express 'that fire of the imagination, which 
produces active  sensibility, and positive  virtue ' . 28 Later she rails against the 
tyranny of laws which pit women's reason in opposition to their 
inclinations.
25. Wollstonecraft, V.R.W. Ch. 5, p.212.
26. Wollstonecraft, V.R.W. Ch. 7, p. 238.
27. Wollstonecraft, The Wrongs of Woman, Vol. II, Ch. 10, p.154.
28. Wollstonecraft, op. cit. p. 153.
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How should these apparent tensions be read, and what implications do they
have for Wollstonecraft's conception of self-governance? I want to suggest
that in the Vindication Wollstonecraft does seem to waver between two
different ways of thinking about self-governance. On the one hand,
especially in her insistence on women's capacity to reason and in her
scathing condemnation of the 'manners' of contemporary women, she
seems to regard the control of the passions by reason as essential to self-
governance. On the other hand, she seems also to be moving towards the
view that in a well-balanced, virtuous character, reason and sensibility
should mutually strengthen and support each other, rather than either
dominating the other. This seems clearly to be the view of The Wrongs of
Woman. Why then this ambivalence on Wollstonecraft's part? There may
be some truth in the claim that the events of Wollstonecraft's own life
helped confirm her in the latter view. However I think there may be other
reasons for Wollstonecraft's wavering. A clue to these reasons is to be
found in one of her travel letters. Reflecting on her fears and hopes for her
daughter Fanny, Wollstonecraft writes:
You know that as a female I am particularly attached to her -  I 
feel more than a mother's fondness and anxiety, when I reflect 
on the despondent and oppressed state of her sex. I dread lest 
she should be forced to sacrifice her heart to her principles, or 
principles to her heart. With trembling hand I shall cultivate 
sensibility, and cherish delicacy of sentiment, lest, while I lend 
fresh blushes to the rose, I sharpen the thorns that will wound 
the breast I would fain guard- I dread to unfold her mind, lest 
it should render her unfit for the world she is to inhabit- 
Hapless woman! what a fate is thine.29
In many other places in her writings Wollstonecraft qualifies her claims
with a statement to the effect that what she describes characterises the
29. Wollstonecraft, Letters Written...in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark in J. Todd, op. cit., 
Letter VI, p. 156.
201
situation of women 'in the current imperfect state of society'. This seems to 
me to indicate that Wollstonecraft's apparent devaluation of passion stems 
from a number of sources. As I argued above, it must be seen, in the context 
of Wollstonecraft's defense of equality and of women's capacity to reason, as 
a counter to the Rousseauian depiction of 'feminine' virtue. But 
Wollstonecraft's anxiety about passion is also a response to a social situation 
which denied to women the scope for expressing desire and passion and 
hence gave rise to devastating conflicts between reason and sensibility. This 
is particularly evident in Wollstonecraft's reflections on Fanny quoted 
above, and in her depiction of Maria's marriage to George Venables, a 
situation which Maria managed to tolerate for six years only by deadening 
her sensibility. A further reason for Wollstonecraft's ambivalence was her 
view that 'in the current state of society' there was always the danger that 
women's sensibility was more likely to undermine than strengthen virtue 
by encouraging 'romantic, wavering feelings' rather than 'strong, 
persevering passions'. As Maria reflects while gazing out of her asylum 
window hoping to catch a glimpse of Darnford, 'how difficult it was for 
women to avoid growing romantic, who have no active duties or 
pursuits. '30
Wollstonecraft's attempt in the Vindication to distinguish between those 
passions which undermine and those which strengthen virtue echoes of 
course Rousseau's attempt to make a similar distinction. Like Rousseau, 
she feels that the very same faculties and capacities, under different 
circumstances, may give rise to virtue and generosity of heart or self-centred 
vice. She also shares Rousseau's views about the power of education to 
shape these faculties and capacities for good or ill. Where she differs from 
Rousseau is in her acute awareness that virtue and vice arise as much, if not
30. Wollstonecraft, The Wrongs of Woman, Vol. I, Ch. 2, p. 87.
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more, from the character of our social and affective relations with others, as
from our individual dispositions, characteristics and capacities. Although
she often wants to make exceptions for individuals of 'genius7 and at times
portrays herself as Rousseau's solitary walker, requiring solitude for
reflection, Wollstonecraft's individuals are nevertheless much more
embedded in their relations with others than are Rousseau's.31 Despite the
fact that she condemns the kind of obedient dependence characteristic of
subordination, for Wollstonecraft independence is not defined in
opposition to a mutually supportive dependence on others. In fact the
values of affection, reciprocity, and love for humanity are central to her
account of self-governance. Wollstonecraft's view is that in the absence of
genuine feelings for others self-governance is most likely to be displaced by a
kind of self-interested prudence. This was one of the aspects of Imlay which
so wounded her, and which she blamed on his involvement with
commerce.32 In the Vindication she claims:
The world cannot be seen by an unmoved spectator; we must 
mix in the throng and feel as men feel, before we can judge of 
their feelings...we must attain knowledge of others at the same 
time that we become acquainted with ourselves. Knowledge 
acquired any other way only hardens the heart and perplexes 
the understanding.33
And in The Wrongs of Woman Jemima is presented as a woman with a 
great capacity for virtue, but in her 'virtue, never nurtured by affection,
31. In a footnote in the Vindication which is somewhat reminiscent of the feminist critiques 
of liberalism discussed in Chapter 1, she suggests that Rousseau's picture of the solitary 
individual in the 'state of nature' overlooks 'the long and helpless state of infancy' and so the 
necessary sociality of human life. Wollstonecraft, V.R.W., Ch.l, p. 94.
32. See for example her letter to him written in Hamburg en route to England from 
Scandinavia. Letter LXVII, p. 251 in J. Todd op. cit. Wollstonecraft seemed to regard 
commerce as inherently corrupting. Cf. her portraits of George Venables and the young 
Damford in The Wrongs of Woman.
33. Wollstonecraft, V.R.W. Ch. 5, p. 215. Cf. also Letters Written.,.in Sweden, Norway, and 
Denmark, op. cit. Letter III: 'Mixing with mankind, we are obliged to examine our prejudices, 
and often imperceptibly lose, as we analyze them', pp. 150-151.
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assumed the stern aspect of selfish independence' until Maria treats her 
with affection and respect.34
Many of the tensions in her writings and the conflicts in her life bear 
testimony to Wollstonecraft's painful awareness that for women 'in the 
current state of society' this kind of self-governance founded in generosity 
and affection was very difficult to achieve. On the one hand, she argues, 
women's subordination to men within the family, the idea that women's 
function is solely to please men, and the denial to women of the right to 
express or act in accordance with their affections, all conspire to make love 
and friendship founded on respect just about impossible between men and 
women. This is because the effect of women's situation on women is to 
give rise either to an excess of affectionate sensibility -  as Wollstonecraft felt 
was true of herself -  or else to coquetry, while its effect on men is to render 
them lascivious or tyrannical or both. In these circumstances it is highly 
unlikely that women will have sufficient self-respect, or command 
sufficient respect from men, to make reciprocity a genuine possibility. In 
this context it is interesting to note that Wollstonecraft's sometimes prudish 
remarks in the Vindication about the need for bodily modesty arise from the 
conviction that self-respect and respect for others is necessarily connected 
with respect for the integrity of one's own body and for the bodies of others. 
By the time of The Wrongs of Woman the prudish aspects of this 
conviction have disappeared, and Wollstonecraft's comments about 
marriage laws -  'legal prostitution' -  which make women and their 
children the property of men suggest that she regarded women's right to 
self-governance with respect to their bodies as integral to the demand for 
equality.
34. Wollstonecraft, The Wrongs of Woman, op.  cit . p. 82.
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On the other hand, she continues, women's exclusion from the duties of 
citizenship tends to promote a kind of self-centredness and leads to a lack of 
that sense of justice that is necessary if we are to treat others with respect. In 
this context Wollstonecraft points to the behaviour of those leisured 
women who showed more concern for their dogs than for their servants.
She also points to the kind of parental affection which is an extension of this 
kind of self-love: 'Justice, truth, everything is sacrificed by these Rebekahs, 
and for the sake of their own children they violate the most sacred duties, 
forgetting the common relationship that binds the whole family on earth 
together' . 35 Wollstonecraft is adamant that the only solution is a 
transformation of women's situation in both private and public spheres.
IV
One of the major themes of Wollstonecraft's work is that women will not be 
able to attain self-governance without a certain degree of material 
independence, in particular without financial independence.
Wollstonecraft's concern with women's financial independence arises out of 
two firm convictions. The first is that women's emotional dependence and 
subjection to the tyranny of men will continue so long as women are 
financially dependent upon men and so long as women's independence is 
not protected by the law. This conviction is articulated most forcefully in 
The Wrongs of Woman, where it is dramatized in the stories of Maria, 
Jemima and the various women in whose houses Maria took lodgings after 
leaving George Venables, all of whom are victims of the law's inequality. 
The second is that financial independence, but more importantly, work, is 
essential to self-esteem and to virtue. As she remarks in the Vindication, 
'virtue, says reason, must be acquired by rough toils, and useful struggles
35. Wollstonecraft, V.R.W. Ch. 10, p.265.
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with worldly cares/ 36 It is these convictions which underlie
Wollstonecraft's suggestion that women could very usefully be trained for a
number of professions, including medicine, education, politics and business.
Wollstonecraft was aware that women's financial independence could not 
be achieved without large-scale changes to the organisation of society. To 
this end she advocated sweeping changes to marriage and property laws, the 
introduction of a system of public co-education, and suggested, even if 
somewhat tentatively, that it was not sufficient for women to be citizens, 
they must also be represented in government. Her view was that these were 
matters for public, not private concern, and she clearly felt that until such 
changes were introduced women would be unable to achieve self- 
governance in either their social or their affective relationships. However 
Wollstonecraft had no clear proposals as to how the changes she advocated 
might be compatible with the maternal 'duties' which she seemed to think 
were natural to women. It is for this reason that feminists recently have 
raised two serious objections to Wollstonecraft's conception of self- 
governance.
Firstly it is often claimed that Wollstonecraft's ideal of self-governance is an 
ideal attainable only by middle-class women. In the Vindication for 
example, her description of a harmonious and fulfilling domestic scene 
includes reference to a woman 'discharging the duties of her station with 
perhaps merely a servant-maid to take off her hands the servile part of the 
household business', and it is evident that without such domestic help 
Wollstonecraft herself would not have been able to devote much of her 
time to the business of writing.37 The character of Jemima in The Wrongs
36. Wollstonecraft, V.R.W. Ch. 4, p. 143, footnote 5.
37. Wollstonecraft, V.R.W. Ch. 9, pp. 254-5. Wollstonecraft employed a French nursemaid 
named Marguerite to care for Fanny.
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of Woman indicates that Wollstonecraft became increasingly aware of this 
problem. Nevertheless much of the narrative is occupied with the story of 
the middle-class Maria who promises, in exchange for Jemima's support, to 
better her situation. Is the self-governance of educated middle-class women 
therefore to be achieved at the expense of working-class women who can 
relieve them of the 'servile' aspects of their duties?38 This question is of 
course still pertinent today.
Secondly it is argued that despite the importance of Wollstonecraft's critique 
of property and marriage laws and of her argument that the rights of 
citizenship must be extended to women if they are going to be expected to 
fulfill what are after all social duties (the rearing of children), her critique of 
civil society works by trying to extend the contractual relations of civil 
society into the private sphere, rather than challenging the association 
between the masculine/feminine distinction and the tensions within the 
liberal public sphere between justice and love, contract and kinship, 
individuality and community. In other words Wollstonecraft claims for 
women the capacities of the self-governing male citizen, arguing that 
relations within the family between men and women and parents and 
children must be founded on the same basis as relations between equal 
citizens within the public sphere. Given this starting point, Wollstonecraft 
can only acknowledge the ethical and political implications of women's 
specific embodiment by arguing that women have specific social duties, 
namely their maternal duties, to which any activities in which they engage 
in the public sphere must be seen as secondary. Wollstonecraft's conception 
of self-governance thus compels her both to preserve the distinction
38. This objection is raised by both Jane Martin, op. cit. and Moira Gatens, op. cit.
between public and private spheres and consequently to accept the 
representation of women's bodies as passive bodies bound to nature.39
I want to begin to address these criticisms by first assessing Wollstonecraft's 
views on maternity. It seems to me that Wollstonecraft's remarks about 
women's maternal duties need to be read fairly carefully for the following 
reasons. Firstly, it is clear that these remarks play a very important strategic 
function in Wollstonecraft's argument in defense of equality. For as I 
indicated above, what she seeks to show is that, even granting the premises 
of the Rousseauian argument, the conclusions thought to follow from it do 
not in fact do so. It should not be assumed however that Wollstonecraft 
simply endorses these premises. Secondly, that Wollstonecraft does not 
straightforwardly endorse these premises is I think evident from a number 
of conflicting remarks she makes about maternity. It is true that she does 
claim that 'the care of children in their infancy is one of the grand duties 
annexed to the female character by nature' .40 However she also claims that 
'natural affection, as it is termed, I believe to be a very faint tie, affections 
must grow out of the habitual exercise of a mutual sympathy' .41 And in The 
Wrongs of Woman Maria remarks that 'in the present state of women, it is 
a great misfortune to be prevented from discharging the duties, and 
cultivating the affections' of a mother.42 It seems to me that these remarks 
suggest that Wollstonecraft's views on maternity pertain to a very specific 
context. The context is one in which women had few options, as far as 
contributions to society were concerned, apart from the raising of children;
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39. As I mentioned earlier, this criticism is raised by Moira Gatens, op. cit. A criticism to this 
effect is also raised by Carole Pateman in The Sexual Contract (Polity Press, 1988).
40. Wollstonecraft, V.R.W. Ch. 10, p. 265.
41. Wollstonecraft, V.R.W. Ch. 10, p. 266.
42. Wollstonecraft, The Wrongs of Woman, Vol II, Ch. 10, p. 154. My emphasis.
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in which, in the lack of genuinely reciprocal relationships between men and 
women, the only outlet for women's affections was in their relationships 
with their children; in which women were by default primarily responsible 
for the raising of children because there was no legal or social obligation for 
men to do so; and in which many leisured women effectively abrogated 
their responsibilities towards their children.
Given the complexity of this context I think Wollstonecraft's views on 
maternity need to be read on a number of different levels. At one level they 
are addressed to men, in particular to middle-class men, in the hope of 
convincing them that the education of their daughters and wives will in fact 
better enable them to perform those duties which she concedes are 'annexed 
to the female character by nature'. At another level, by distinguishing 
between affections and duties and by suggesting that maternity is a social 
duty, not a merely 'natural affection', Wollstonecraft aims to contest the 
assumption that maternity and self-governance are incompatible virtues by 
showing that the kind of affections, responsibilities and skills which arise in 
the context of the raising of children are essential to self-governance. On 
this basis she can then argue that 'maternal duties' are not incompatible 
with the duties of a citizen. At yet another level I think that this distinction 
also enables Wollstonecraft to suggest that women should be able to fulfill 
their obligations to society in ways other than, or additional to, maternity. 
Although Wollstonecraft was very well aware that this would not be 
possible without vast changes to the structure of society, it seems clear that 
she thought the difficulty was a question of social organisation, rather than 
of women's natures.
If my reading of Wollstonecraft's views on maternity is correct, what are its 
implications for the claim that Wollstonecraft's ideal of self-governance is 
an ideal attainable only by educated middle-class women? I think it is 
important to try to distinguish, as far as is possible, between the issue of
209
whether class distinction is a necessary feature of Wollstonecraft's 
conception of self-governance, and the issue of what she herself says on the 
matter. As far as Wollstonecraft herself is concerned, she seems to voice a 
number of somewhat conflicting views, probably reflecting the limited 
range of conceivable options that were available to her, indeed to all 
women. In a number of places she suggests that self-governance has less to 
do with what she calls a woman's 'station' than it has to do with a woman's 
dignity and independence. In the Vindication for example she claims that 
as far as virtue is concerned it seems most prevalent among poor 
uneducated working-class women, and in The Wrongs of Woman Maria 
writes to her daughter T fondly hope to see you...possessed of that energy of 
character which gives dignity to any station; and with that clear, firm spirit 
that will enable you to choose a situation for yourself, or submit to be classed 
in the lowest, if it be the only one in which you can be the mistress of your 
own actions' . 43 Wollstonecraft was aware however that poor women, in 
addition to suffering the 'wrongs of woman', also suffered the burdens of 
the poor more generally and she felt that poor women were unlikely to be 
the mistresses of their own actions until both class and sex inequalities were 
abolished. Yet elsewhere Wollstonecraft seems to align self-governance 
with 'cultivated sensibilities' and to take the existence of servants for 
granted, even though she is insistent that servants must be regarded and 
treated as fellow human beings. It is clear, though not surprising, that 
Wollstonecraft did not really come to terms with the question of who would 
care for the children of professional women. It is therefore quite possible 
that she assumed another woman, probably a servant, would take up some 
of the responsibility. Despite this I do not think that Wollstonecraft's 
conception of self-governance presupposes class distinction. For it seems to
43. Wollstonecraft, V.R.W. Ch. 4, p. 171; The Wrongs of Woman, Vol. II, Ch. 9, p. 149.
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me that her ideal of self-governance is not committed to the idea that only 
professional women can achieve independence, even though she is 
adamant that a certain degree of education is essential for all women.
Rather, at the heart of Wollstonecraft's concern with women's 
independence are the ideas that women must have the liberty and resources 
to assume responsibility for their own actions, and that self-governance is 
not inconsistent with maternity, affection or interdependence.
Where does this leave Wollstonecraft with respect to the public/private 
distinction and'with respect to the alleged masculinity of her conception of 
self-governance? Again I think Wollstonecraft's views need to be read 
carefully. On the one hand it seems to me that Wollstonecraft was aware 
that, 'in the present imperfect state of society', men's equality and reason 
were achieved at the expense of women's liberty and autonomy, and that 
reason and sensibility, justice and love, citizenship and kinship, and 
individuality and community, seemed irreconcilable, particularly for 
women. I have tried to show that, because she was concerned with the 
ethical implications of sexual difference, Wollstonecraft tried to articulate a 
conception of women's self-governance which does not simply identify self- 
governance with one side of these oppositions (the 'masculine' side), but 
rather tries to reconcile them, as well as to disentangle them from their 
association with the masculine/feminine distinction. I have also argued 
that Wollstonecraft was aware that her recommendations for women would 
require massive re-organisation of the public sphere, including the political 
representation of women's interests. That Wollstonecraft in 1792 could not 
envisage the full extent of this re-organisation should not lead us to 
conclude that she underestimated its difficulty or immensity.
On the other hand however what is to be made of Wollstonecraft's 
agreement with Rousseau that the family is the foundation of civil life?
And what is to be made of her concession that women's comparative
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physical weakness may make them more 'dependent', and so perhaps less 
able to achieve virtue, than men?44 To some extent this concession should 
be read as a response to Rousseau's attempt to ground women's lack with 
respect to reason and virtue in the 'natural' passivity and dependency of the 
female body. Wollstonecraft seeks once again to show that one may accept 
Rousseau's premises without accepting his conclusion -  that virtue is 
different for the different sexes. This interpretation is supported by 
Wollstonecraft's frequent arguments to the effect that the physical 
incapacities to which many women are subject are the direct result of their 
subordination, in particular of ideals of feminine beauty which actively 
discourage women from developing physical strength and skill. However 
in the light of the fact that Wollstonecraft's text wavers between the 
character ideal conception of self-governance which I have highlighted in 
this chapter, and the idea that self-governance is a matter of reason's 
sovereignty over the body, this concession also indicates that Wollstonecraft 
was still struggling in the grip of the dominant representation of women's 
bodies as passive, heteronomous bodies. This is perhaps why in the 
Vindication she could not see a clear solution to the problem of women's 
subordination except a transformation of the family. The events of 
Wollstonecraft's life after the publication of the Vindication, as well as her 
later writings, indicate that Wollstonecraft became somewhat less optimistic 
about this solution. But the fact that feminists today are still coming to 
terms with the problem she so acutely diagnosed, and with some of her 
solutions, shows that many of the conflicts Wollstonecraft experienced and 
expressed, in trying to articulate an adequate ideal of self-governance, are 
still with us.
44. Wollstonecraft, V.R.W., Author's Introduction, p. 80 & Ch. 2, p.109.
Part IV
Embodying autonomy
Introduction
In Part I of this thesis I argued that the notions of individual self- 
determination and self-constitution underlie our conception of what it is 
to be a moral agent. I also argued there that it is important for feminists 
not to jettison these notions, for, as we have seen, a defense of women's 
capacity and right to exercise autonomy is crucial to any critique of 
oppression. However the arguments of Parts II and III have also shown 
that, within the constraints imposed by our recent philosophical heritage, 
articulating what it means for women to be autonomous agents has not 
been an easy task. As we saw through the discussions of Hegel and 
Rousseau in Part IH, the difficulties have arisen out of a context in which 
autonomy has been associated with the virtues of the 'masculine' public 
sphere and in which women's bodies have become a metaphor for those 
aspects of human life which the autonomous individual must control and 
transcend. In different ways, de Beauvoir and Wollstonecraft both tried to 
come to terms with these difficulties and to some extent succeeded in 
doing so. Both stressed that, in the absence of equality and reciprocity in 
both public and private spheres, the pursuit of autonomy gives rise to 
relations of domination and subordination, and both attempted to resist 
and transform the image of women's bodies and subjectivities as governed 
by nature. That their efforts at resistance, as we have seen, were not 
entirely successful, reveals the extent to which, within the social, political 
and conceptual structures we have inherited, the supposed passivity of 
women's bodies has been naturalised and seen as the cause, rather than 
the result, of the gendering of social life. However the failure of de 
Beauvoir and Wollstonecraft adequately to articulate an ideal of 
autonomy for women also raises doubts about the validity of the 
assumption that autonomous agency is the activity of a supposedly 
sexually neutral will or subjectivity.
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The question which now faces feminists interested in the ethical 
implications of sexual difference is how to respond to these doubts. On 
the one hand, as we saw in Chapter 1, some feminists have argued that the 
most appropriate response is to reject the ideal of autonomy altogether. 
Their argument, you will recall, is that this ideal is inextricably bound up 
with masculine individualism, and with distinctions such as those 
between public/private, reason/passion, and culture/nature, which define 
autonomy as a transcendence of femininity. On the other hand, it might 
be thought that if we take seriously the idea of an embodied subjectivity 
then what is required is a sexually specific account of autonomy for 
women. Something along these lines has been suggested by Carol 
McMillan, as we saw in Part III.
I want to endorse neither of these suggestions. With respect to the first 
suggestion, that feminists abandon the ideal of autonomy, the arguments 
of Part m  have shown that, within our intellectual and cultural heritage, 
the ideal of autonomy certainly has been crucially associated with ideals of 
masculinity and with conceptions of social and political life which define 
autonomy and femininity as mutually exclusive. Further, we have seen 
through the examples of de Beauvoir and Wollstonecraft the extent to 
which this alignment has made the ideal of autonomy so fraught for 
women. However, we also saw in their work indications as to how the 
ideal of autonomy can be re-thought in such a way that some of the 
worries raised by these feminist critiques can be met. By incorporating 
within their conceptions of genuine autonomy a recognition of the 
importance both of intersubjective recognition and of human 
embodiment, de Beauvoir and Wollstonecraft indicated a way in which 
the associations between autonomy and masculinist ideals and 
distinctions such as public/private, reason/passion and so on, may begin
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to be dismantled. Given my arguments in Part I about the importance of 
the ideal of women's self-determination, it seems crucial that feminists 
pursue and develop their suggestions, rather than abandoning the ideal of 
autonomy altogether.
There are two principal objections I wish to raise against the suggestion 
that feminists should attempt to develop a sexually specific ideal of 
autonomy for women. The first is that, as the example of McMillan has 
shown, many attempts in this direction have simply ended up re­
affirming women's traditional place, because they have failed to question 
the more general theoretical adequacy of our inherited ideals of 
autonomy. But secondly, even if it were possible to articulate a sexually 
specific account of autonomy which does not simply re-affirm women's 
inferiority, there is still a further question to be raised about the 
desirability of such an account. For we may ask to what extent it will 
simply reinforce the idea that masculinity and femininity are two distinct, 
irreconcilable categories.
Because I wish to avoid such a conclusion, my aim in this part of the 
thesis is to outline an alternative to the untenable image of the 
disembodied, self-sufficient autonomous agent, an alternative which starts 
from a recognition of the significance of embodiment in the constitution 
of subjectivity, and hence which takes seriously the ethical significance of 
bodily differences, but which entails neither a rejection of the ideal of 
autonomy nor the articulation of a sexually specific account of autonomy. 
My view is that the question of sexual difference helps bring into focus 
certain problems with some of our ways of thinking about autonomy, 
moral agency and moral reflection. These problems, as we have seen, 
have certainly caused difficulties in articulating what it means for women 
to act as autonomous moral agents, but the issues they raise go beyond the
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question of sexual difference and therefore require a more general 
solution. In the two sections of this Introduction I shall both re-cap the 
arguments of earlier parts of this thesis, in order to provide a summary of 
these problems as they have emerged so far, and sketch out an account of 
embedded and embodied autonomy which may begin to address them. In 
Chapter 6 ,1 shall use the example of decision-making in abortion in order 
to illustrate the kind of conception of autonomous moral reflection that is 
demanded by taking embodiment seriously.
I
At the outset of this thesis, in Part I, I argued that although the kind of 
conception of autonomous agency that emerges from contemporary 
philosophical discussions of autonomy seems correct, there are also a 
number of reasons to be cautious about how we spell out this conception. 
You will recall that, using these discussions as a basis, I had characterised 
autonomous agency as the capacity to constitute an identity for oneself 
through one's decisions and projects and on the basis of one's values and 
commitments. My concerns about this account focused on the apparent 
conflict between the ideal of autonomy, thus articulated, and other values 
such as love and loyalty; on the notions of independence of judgement 
and critical reflection; and on the nature of the self presupposed by this 
account. I want now to re-articulate and amplify these concerns in the 
light of my discussions in subsequent chapters.
I shall begin with the question of how best to articulate the notion of 
independence of judgement and the conception of critical self-reflection 
which underpins it. In Part I, I voiced misgivings about the way in which, 
in the contemporary philosophical literature, autonomy is often described 
as a process of freeing oneself from one's socialised prejudices. In the light 
of my discussion in Part HI, the nature of these misgivings can now be
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expressed more completely. On the one hand, as Wollstonecraft and 
Rousseau both insisted, it is clear that a person cannot be self-governing if 
she is either unable, or lacks the liberty, to engage in some kind of 
reflection about, and critical assessment of, the opinions, prejudices, 
customs and habits of her family, her peers, her community or her society. 
Some kind of independence in these respects seems to be essential to 
individual self-determination. On the other hand, as Hegel insisted, it is 
also clear that no form of social life can persist and reproduce itself unless 
individuals feel themselves bound in certain ways by certain taboos, 
habits, customs, ways of life, and attachments which are not negotiable 
and which cannot simply be overturned by the decisions of individuals.
To say this is not to say, as McMillan attempted to do, that we can specify 
in advance what form these ways of life, attachments and so on will take, 
for this will depend upon a whole set of contingent factors specific to 
particular communities and societies- including demographic, geographic, 
cultural, religious, political and other factors. Nevertheless, a minimal 
requirement of any form of social life would have to be that it ensures that 
at least some individuals are involved in some way in reproducing and 
rearing children.
■r~ *
My argument in Part III was that one of the consequences for 
Enlightenment thinkers of the challenge to sovereign power and to the 
old order of status, was that the claims that each individual should be self- 
governing, and that power can only legitimately be exercised through the 
agreement of individuals, raised the question of how to ensure the 
persistence of those social habits, customs, ways of life, and attachments 
which found social life. As we saw through the discussions of Rousseau 
and Hegel, one very powerful and influential historical and conceptual 
solution to this difficulty was to try to make a distinction between the non-
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negotiable ethical bonds of the family and the contractual ethical relations 
of the body politic. This distinction had two results. Firstly, it constructed 
the sphere of the family, the sphere of customs, habits, particularistic 
affections and so on, as the 'natural', historically unvarying foundation or 
underside of social life. Secondly, it identified independence of judgement 
and self-determination with a transcendence of this sphere. We saw in 
Part EH how these results have made the ideal of autonomy seem 
inconsistent with women's ethical life. But they have also given rise to 
inadequate conceptions of moral reflection and autonomous agency.1
Firstly, because what I have called the 'underside' of social life has been 
represented as merely 'natural', as governed by prejudice, irrational 
customs, sentimental attachments and so on, the kind of critical reflection 
involved in autonomous decision-making has been represented as a 
process which should disregard, or at least abstract from, these prejudices, 
customs and attachments and assess them from a supposedly impartial 
point of view. Further, in cases where the 'impartial' and the 'embedded' 
perspective conflict, the tendency has been to assume that the impartial 
perspective represents the morally autonomous perspective.
Autonomous moral reflection thus gets divorced from the concrete 
context in which moral agents are embedded and out of which moral 
conflicts arise. This explains the misgivings voiced in Part I about the 
possible implications of the idea that the exercise of autonomy often 
involves a kind of freeing of oneself from one's socialisation.
Secondly, because autonomy has been associated with ethical relations 
founded on agreement and convention, the exercise of autonomy has 
come to be seen as incompatible with, or at least compromised by, certain
1. The following remarks do not apply to Hegel however.
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ways of life and by certain binding responsibilities, attachments and 
commitments. Hence my unease in Part I about the apparent tension 
between autonomy and other values such as love or loyalty.2 Thirdly, and 
following from these two points, the kind of critical reflection involved in 
autonomous decision-making has been represented as a process of reflection 
engaged in by isolated and discrete individuals, in abstraction from, or in 
tension with, their responsibilities towards others. Independence of 
judgment, in other words, has been seen as incompatible with 
interdependence on others.
In response to these ways of thinking about moral reflection and autonomy, 
some communitarian and feminist philosophers have argued that the ideals 
of individual self-determination and critical reflection are individualist and 
alienate us from the kinds of ethical relations which found social life- those 
arising out of shared ways of life and non-negotiable attachments and 
responsibilities. Although I am unable here to address the contemporary 
debate among communitarians, liberals and feminists on this issue, I would 
suggest that an adequate account of autonomy must steer a course between 
the two alternatives of individualism and communitarianism. For while the 
exercise of autonomy is important, and must involve a critical assessment of 
one's own and others' opinions, prejudices, customs, attachments and ways of 
life, autonomous moral reflection cannot be thought of as disengaged from, 
or incompatible with, a person's responsibilities and attachments, nor should 
it be seen as the activity of disembedded and isolated individuals. Rather,
2 In Chapter 6 I will argue that this view of autonomy is implicit in many feminist defenses of 
abortion, particularly in the way in which bodily autonomy is represented.
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reflective self-constitution is a process which occurs in response to our 
specific context and our concrete relationships with, and responsibilities 
towards, others. While it is true that certain responsibilities, relationships, 
ways of life or customs may unjustly impede a person's autonomy, it is a 
mistake to assume that autonomy can only be achieved by unencumbered 
individuals. Nevertheless it is because self-constitution is an intersubjective 
process, that unless our relationships with others are genuinely reciprocal, 
that is, unless we respect the autonomy of others and are attentive to their 
different needs and perspectives, the pursuit of autonomy will give rise to 
relations of subordination and domination.
If this is right, then how should we think of the process of critical self­
reflection? Once again it seems to me that this is a process which arises out of 
our interactions with others, and in a number of different ways. To begin 
with, as W ollstonecraft argued, self-evaluation and self-constitution require 
moral example. We work out what virtues and characteristics we value, how 
we w ant to live our lives and undertake our responsibilities, through the 
example of others and through the process of identifying with, or distancing 
ourselves from, those examples. In addition, we become aware of the way in 
which our attitudes, values and desires have been structured by our familial 
or cultural environment, and of the limitations of our own perspectives, 
through the attem pt to understand the different perspectives of others. In 
these ways we achieve a certain degree of independence of judgement. But 
this independence should be seen as a matter of achieving a more 
encompassing perspective, rather than as a matter of somehow transcending 
our socialisation (or our factidty, as de Beauvoir seemed to think), or stepping 
beyond all concrete and particular perspectives.
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We have seen that the inconsistency, within our cultural and philosophical 
heritage, between the ideal of autonomy and women's supposedly 
particularistic and embedded ethical life, has required us think carefully 
about how to articulate the notions of independence and critical reflection. 
Similarly, the representation, within that same heritage, of women's bodies 
as obstacles to autonomy requires us to think equally carefully about how to 
understand the nature of the autonomous self. In Chapter 1, following 
Frankfurt, I argued that part of what is involved in the process of self­
constitution is identifying oneself with certain aspects of oneself -  certain 
desires, values, characteristics -  while attempting to distance oneself from 
other aspects. I also suggested that failure in this respect, that is, acting upon 
certain desires, impulses and so on with which one does not identify, can 
give rise to a kind of psychic alienation or self-estrangement. What de 
Beauvoir made clear was that this kind of alienation is a characteristic of 
oppression. She also made it clear that, because our relation to the world is 
necessarily a bodily relation, oppression and the alienation which is its 
product latch on, as it were, through a person's body and body-image, so that 
the experience of self-estrangement is, at least in part, a bodily experience. 
Bartky gives a wonderful phenomenological description of such an 
experience, the experience of feeling one's body freeze in response to a wolf- 
whistle.
It is a fine spring day, and with an utter lack of self-consciousness I 
am bouncing down the street. Suddenly I hear men's voices. Catcalls 
and whistles fill the air. These noises are clearly meant for me; they 
come from a group of men hanging about a corner across the street. I 
freeze. As Sartre would say, I have been petrified by the gaze of the 
Other. My face flushes and my motions become stiff and self- 
conscious. The body which, only a moment before, I inhabited with
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such ease now floods my consciousness. I have been made an 
object...There is an element of compulsion in this encounter, in this 
being made-to-be-aware-of one's own flesh.3
Bartky argues that this kind of sexual objectification is one of the
mechanisms by means of which women's autonomy is undermined. She
also suggests that this undermining gives rise to a kind of fragmentation of
a person's sense of herself.
But how should we understand this notion of fragmentation of the self? 
Bartky describes it as the splintering off of a person's body from her 
personality. When the woman freezes she feels herself to be no longer an 
autonomous person, but just a body, an object for the other. But what is it to 
experience oneself as no longer a person? Bartky characterises this 
experience by saying that, whereas before the wolf-whistle the woman was 
not conscious of her body as a sexually specific body, the experience of being 
whistled at suddenly makes her aware of the sexual specificity of her body. 
Now Bartky does not claim that every experience in which one becomes 
aware of the sexual specificity of one's body involves self-estrangement. She 
wants to distinguish between those cases where such an awareness is 
appropriate and desired, as in reciprocal erotic encounters, and those cases 
where such an awareness is inappropriate, as in a job interview. If Bartky is 
simply saying that there is a difference between the kind of sexual self- 
awareness that arises from a reciprocal erotic encounter and the kind that 
arises from sexist chauvinism, I have no dispute with her. But what 
worries me is the extent to which her characterisation of self-estrangement 
echoes the distinction which we have already encountered in de Beauvoir 
between the body as transcendent and the body as immanent. For she seems 
to be saying that to perceive oneself as a person is to be somehow unaware
3. Sandra Lee Bartky, 'On Psychological Oppression', p. 37 in S. Bishop and M. Weinzweig 
(eds.) Philosophy and Women, (Wadsworth, 1979).
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of one's body and of one's sexual specificity. To experience oneself as no 
longer a person is to experience one's body as a mere thing in the world, and 
as a sexually specific thing, rather than as the radiation of a subjective 
personality.
Moreover, as I have already argued in my discussion of de Beauvoir, this 
kind of distinction reinforces the idea that self-constitution is a matter of a 
sexually indifferent and disembodied will or self exercising control over a 
sexually specific body. It thus implies the mistaken view that women can 
only be autonomous by somehow transcending their sexual specificity. But 
I want to stress that this kind of view is also problematic because it involves 
a mistaken view of subjectivity and of autonomous agency, presupposing 
that we can make a sensible distinction between an active, conscious and 
free subjectivity on the one hand and a passive, determined, merely natural 
body on the other. My call for caution in how we understand the nature of 
the autonomous self arose from a concern that this kind of view be avoided. 
How then can we retain the insights of de Beauvoir and Bartky -  that 
autonomy and self-estrangement are bound up with our body-images and 
with our bodily relations to the world and to others -  without reinforcing 
the idea of autonomy as control over the body? In what follows I will try to 
answer this question by outlining an account of subjectivity as in part 
constituted by a person's bodily perspective. Before doing so however I want 
to provide an explanation of why some feminists may have adopted the 
view that autonomous agency involves control over the body.
In my discussion of Rousseau I argued that Rousseau's account of the 
connection between the character of the female body and women's position 
in social life contains a revealing slippage. Rousseau argues that women are 
incapable of abstract reason and must be excluded from the body politic 
because their bodies are closer to nature than men's bodies and are therefore 
subject to feelings, desires and bodily processes which cannot be controlled
221
by reason. However we saw that when it comes to spelling out what it 
means to say that women's bodies are subversive of reason's control, 
Rousseau's real worry is about how to ensure that men exercise control over 
women's sexuality and procreative capacities. I argued that what Rousseau 
makes clear is that women's supposed incapacity for autonomous agency 
has very little to do with the attributes of women's bodies. Rather, the 
denial to women of the scope for autonomy is necessary to the maintenance 
of a patriarchal social order, that is a social order in which men control 
women's sexuality and reproductive capacities. From Wollstonecraft 
onwards, the claim that women must have self-determination in these 
respects has thus been critical to feminist defenses of women's capacity for, 
and right to, autonomy. Bartky's phenomenological description of the 
experience of being whistled at, for example, aims to show how lack of this 
kind of self-determination undermines a person's sense of herself.
However in a context in which autonomous agency has been defined in 
terms of control over the body, and in which women's bodies have become 
a metaphor for inert nature, it seems that some feminists have responded to 
women's lack of sexual and reproductive self-determination by reversing 
Rousseau's slippage. Thus the demand for women's self-determination 
with respect to their bodies, their sexuality, and their reproductive capacities, 
has become conflated with the idea that self-determination involves control 
over the body by the will.
The problem that needs to be addressed then is this. How can we make 
sense of the idea that self-determination with respect to one's body is 
essential to self-constitution, and how can we explain the kind of bodily self­
estrangement that is characteristic of oppression, without presupposing a 
distinction between the person -  a free subjectivity -  and her body? It seems 
to me that to answer this question we need to sketch out a conception of 
embodied subjectivity that can fulfill the following three requirements.
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Firstly, such a conception has to be able to show why subjectivity is 
necessarily bodily and therefore why the idea of a sexually indifferent 
subjectivity makes no sense. Secondly, it needs to be able to show why 
bodily autonomy is essential to a person's autonomy. Thirdly, such a 
conception needs to provide an account of bodily autonomy which does not 
construe it as control over the body by a disembodied subject or will. This 
third requirement is somewhat complicated for the following reasons. To 
be a person at all requires that we have developed the capacity for a certain 
degree of bodily control and direction. When we think of the process by 
which an infant becomes a person for example, it is clear that this is in part a 
process which involves the infant learning to gain control of, and direct, its 
bodily movements, impulses and desires, and developing and increasing its 
bodily capacities.4 But this process does not stop with infancy. In order to 
carry out any kind of project at all, it is clear that, at least to some extent, we 
must stave off and re-direct our immediate desires and bodily impulses in 
the interest of longer-term goals. But the problem seems to be this. When 
we think of the process of learning bodily direction in infancy we do not see 
it as a matter of the infant learning to control its body through the exercise 
of its will. Rather we think of the infant becoming a self and acquiring a 
will in the process of learning bodily self-direction. However this 
interactive conception of the self tends to drop out when we think of self­
constitution and bodily autonomy in adulthood, with the result that we 
think of self-directed agency in abstraction from the body. What I am 
suggesting therefore is that although to be an agent at all clearly requires the 
capacity for bodily control and direction, this capacity should not be thought 
of as a capacity which is somehow separate from the body, nor should it be 
thought of as a capacity for control over the body.
4 . Cf. Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, p.137, 'Consciousness is in the first 
place not a matter of "I think that" but of "I can"'. (RKP, 1962).
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Without necessarily endorsing Lacanian psychoanalysis, I want to suggest 
that as a starting point for an adequate conception of subjectivity we can 
make use of Lacan's notion of the 'imaginary body' and argue that 
subjectivity is always already a bodily subjectivity because the self is 
constituted through the constitution of the body-image.5 In his analysis of 
the mirror-stage, Lacan proposes that a crucial moment in the formation of 
the self is the formation of a unified body-image. The body-image is the 
infant's psychical representation of its body boundaries and bodily processes. 
This representation is not yet a fully fledged self because, according to Lacan, 
the self only emerges with the emergence of the unconscious, and as a result 
of the resolution of the oedipal crisis through the castration complex. 
However this representation is a prefiguring of the self in which the infant 
begins to constitute a self by integrating its fragmented experiences of its 
bodily processes into a unified image. The details of the place of the notion 
of the 'imaginary body' in Lacan's psychoanalysis need not concern us here. 
But I want to take up the idea that the self is constituted in part through the 
formation of a unified body-image and to suggest that this process is not 
confined to early infancy, nor to pre-conscious experience. Rather we 
continue to constitute ourselves as selves through the continual process of 
developing a bodily perspective. Autonomy and bodily autonomy involve 
achieving what I want to call an integrated bodily perspective, as opposed to 
the estranged bodily perspective that is the result of oppression.
5. Jacques Lacan, The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I as revealed in 
psychoanalytic experience' in Ecrits: A Selection, translated by Alan Sheridan, (Tavistock, 
London 1977). I am indebted to an article by Moira Gatens for drawing my attention to the 
way in which the Lacanian notion of the 'imaginary body' sheds light on some of the 
problems with the way in which subjectivity has been conceived within feminism. See Moira 
Gatens, 'A Critique of the Sex/Gender Distinction' in Beyond Marxism? Interventions after 
Marx, Allen, Judith & Patton, Paul (eds), (Intervention Publications, Leichardt, 1983), pp. 
143-162. My discussion of the notion of a bodily 'perspective' also draws on some of Gatens' 
suggestions in this article and on Luce Irigaray's notion of the 'morphological body'. See 
especially Luce Irigaray This Sex which is not One, translated by Catherine Porter, (Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, 1985).
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Before explicating the idea of an integrated as opposed to an estranged bodily 
perspective however, I want first to explain what is meant by the idea of a 
bodily perspective simpliciter. It needs to be stressed that such a perspective 
is quite distinct from the biological body. It might best be characterised as the 
point of intersection of biological processes, cultural representations of the 
body and of bodily processes, and of an individual's personal unconscious 
and conscious history. Thus our bodily perspective is constituted in 
response to certain biological processes over which we do not exercise 
conscious control -  menstruation or menopause for example -  and in 
response to involuntary changes to our body boundaries and capacities -  for 
example those experienced by the infant as it becomes increasingly mobile, 
the sexual developments which occur during puberty, or the changes to a 
woman's body boundaries in pregnancy. But our experiences and 
representations of these processes are always already mediated by the ways 
in which those processes are signified in our culture, by the particular 
psychic significance those processes have, at any given time, for each 
individual, and by the way an individual comes to terms with those 
processes and with their cultural and personal meanings. What I am 
suggesting then is that the constitution of a bodily perspective is an active, 
meaning-conferring process; that it is a necessarily social process which 
occurs through our bodily interactions with others, and through the ways in 
which we perceive our bodies to be represented by others; and that a 
person's bodily perspective is a fluid perspective which changes in response 
to changes in a person's bodily situation and in response to her changing 
relations with others. I also want to suggest that the kind of bodily self- 
direction that seems crucial to personhood and autonomous agency is 
always mediated through this shaping for ourselves of a bodily perspective.
It seems to me that the idea that subjectivity is constituted in part through 
the shaping for oneself of a bodily perspective, confounds the distinction
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between an active, conscious and free subjectivity and a passive, 
determined, merely natural body. A further implication of this view is that 
if our body-images, and therefore in part our conceptions of ourselves, arise 
in response to, and are representations of, bodily processes and changes, 
then we should expect that, while there will be certain commonalities in the 
bodily perspectives of human beings, it will also be true that sexually 
different bodies will give rise to different psychic representations of the body 
and of the self. Given this, it should be expected that in some respects, and 
with respect to certain bodily experiences, the bodily perspectives of women 
will overlap to a certain degree, and in different ways from the ways in 
which the bodily perspectives of men overlap. That being said, I have 
argued that our bodily perspectives are not simply a function of bodily 
processes and changes. Rather they are constituted in the context of certain 
shared cultural meanings and in the context of an individual's particular 
history, as well as her bodily and social relations with others. This means 
that, despite some overlap between perspectives, we should also expect there 
to be vast differences among the bodily perspectives and experiences of 
women, depending on their particular cultural context or, within a culture, 
depending on factors including their racial, ethnic and class situation, their 
sexual orientation and whether or not they are mothers. We should also 
expect changes within a woman's bodily perspective, sometimes resulting 
from changes in her bodily situation, sometimes from changes in her 
relations with others. The notion of a sexually specific bodily perspective 
thus does not appeal to a biologically determined or essentialistic conception 
of femininity. Rather it aims to account for both the commonalities and the 
differences between the bodily perspectives of men and women, and among 
those of women.
On the basis of this characterisation of the notion of a bodily perspective, we 
can now begin to see how to articulate the difference between an integrated
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or autonomous, and an estranged, bodily perspective, without recourse to 
the notion of a controlling and sexually indifferent consciousness. If our 
bodily perspectives, and hence in part our subjectivities, are constituted in 
response to certain involuntary bodily changes and processes, then it makes 
no sense to think of bodily autonomy as a matter of exercising conscious 
control over the body. Rather bodily autonomy involves achieving an 
integrated bodily perspective, that is, a representation of the meaning of our 
bodies and of those involuntary bodily processes we experience, which we 
ourselves determine and with which we identify. It also involves being able 
to act in accordance with that representation. An estranged bodily 
perspective by contrast is a representation which either does not seem to be 
self-determined, or with which we do not identify.
A number of points need to be made to clarify this view. Firstly, it is 
important not to interpret the difference between an integrated and an 
estranged bodily perspective as the difference between an actively produced 
and a passively received body image. Our body images are always active 
interpretations or representations of our body boundaries and bodily 
processes, even if those representations are always culturally mediated. The 
difference is rather a question of the extent to which we have the scope to 
engage in critical self-reflection upon those personal and cultural 
representations. The notion of Identification' must thus be read as 
identification which is the result of critical reflection. As I made clear in the 
first section of this introduction, such reflection cannot be understood as a 
process which abstracts from a person's specific situation. Rather it arises 
out of this situation and in the context of her interactions with, and 
responsibilities towards, others. For example a woman may re-shape her 
own bodily perspective through her relationship with a pregnant friend. 
This brings me to my second point which is that our bodily perspectives are 
causally efficacious and actually shape the character of our experiences of
227
our body boundaries and bodily processes. For, as de Beauvoir makes 
vividly clear, it is obvious that in a cultural context in which menstruation 
is represented culturally as unclean, a woman may in some sense identify in 
an unreflective way with her own representation of her body as shameful 
and disgusting and so come to experience menstruation in this way. It is for 
this reason that it is so important to challenge the various cultural 
representations of women's bodily experiences as obstacles to autonomy, for 
they bring about the paradoxical result that women shape for themselves a 
bodily perspective which represents their own bodies as passive. Thirdly, as 
I hope I have already made clear, I do not think the aim of any such 
challenge is to enable the articulation either of a universal and singular 
'feminine' bodily perspective or of a sexually specific account of autonomy. 
Rather it is to enable women to shape for themselves an integrated and 
autonomous bodily perspective. Nevertheless, because our bodily 
perspectives are formed in response to certain bodily processes and changes, 
in articulating what it means for women to exercise autonomy and bodily 
autonomy in certain circumstances which are sexually specific -  for example 
in pregnancy and abortion -  we need to recognise the specificity both of 
these processes and of the reflective bodily perspectives to which they give 
rise.
In the next chapter I want to outline what such a recognition might entail by 
using the case of pregnancy and abortion as an example. My argument has a 
number of different, though connected strands. One concern is to argue that 
the ways in which some feminist philosophers have defended women's 
right to abortion misconstrue the notion of bodily autonomy, because they 
fail to question the representation of pregnancy as a process which simply 
takes over women's bodies and with respect to which women are passive.
As a result they misdescribe what is involved in exercising autonomous 
decision-making in pregnancy and abortion. My main concerns however
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are to try to characterise the kind of reflective bodily perspective that is 
formed during the process of pregnancy, to show how this perspective must 
underpin women's claims to bodily autonomy with respect to pregnancy 
and abortion, and to argue that, in order to come to grips with the moral 
issues raised by abortion, we must accord this perspective a great deal of 
moral significance. My argument also aims to show that if we take seriously 
the moral significance of embodiment, then we must also come to terms 
with the embedded nature of moral agents and of moral decision-making.
Chapter Six
ABORTION AND EMBODIMENT1 
I. Introduction
Feminist perspectives on abortion focus on a fact the moral implications of 
which are either overlooked or considered unimportant by most other 
disputants in the debate. This is the fact that a foetus is not a free-floating 
entity about whom questions of potentiality and personhood arise as 
though in a vacuum. Rather a foetus is a being whose existence and welfare 
are biologically and morally inseparable from the woman in whose body it 
develops. From a feminist perspective the central moral subjects of the 
abortion question are thus not only, or not primarily, foetuses but women.
Within an influential strand of the feminist philosophical literature it has 
been usual to understand the moral dilemmas arising from this unique 
relationship between a foetus and a woman in terms of a conflict of rights 
and to defend a woman's right to abortion via the notion of bodily 
autonomy. In its crudest form, the alleged conflict is between a) the 'right to 
life' of the foetus, a right based on the presumption that it is a being 
deserving of some moral consideration, and b) the right of the woman to 
bodily autonomy, that is, her right to decide what happens in and to her
1. A slightly different version of this chapter will appear as an article, also entitled 
'Abortion and Embodiment', in the December 1991 issue of the Australasian journal of 
Philosophy. I am grateful to the journal's editor Robert Young, and to the journal's anonymous 
referees, for their comments on the article. These comments have helped to clarify both my 
argument in this chapter and the account of a reflective bodily perspective which underlies 
the argument. Earlier versions of this chapter were read as papers in the Philosophy 
Department at Monash University and the Philosophy Society at Princeton University, and 
at a seminar on 'Legal and Conceptual Aspects of Abortion' at the University of New South 
Wales. I would like to thank participants in those discussions for their comments. I would 
also like to thank the following people for their helpful discussions and/or comments on 
earlier versions of this chapter: John Bigelow, John Burgess, Genevieve Lloyd, Michaelis 
Michael, Robert Pargetter, Peter Singer, Michael Smith, C.L. Ten.
body. In attempting to resolve this conflict in women's favour feminist 
defenders of abortion have taken two main lines of argument.
The first, articulated best by Mary Anne Warren, argues that in abortion 
decisions the woman's right to bodily autonomy must always prevail over 
any rights which may be claimed on behalf of the foetus.2 This is because 
the only beings with full moral standing are persons. Not only are foetuses 
not persons, they are not even personlike enough to warrant our regarding 
them as if they were persons. Indeed, Warren claims that an 8-month 
foetus is no more personlike than the average fish. On this view then, the 
'right to life' of the foetus, to the extent that it has such a right, cannot 
possibly outweigh the right of a person to one of the fundamental rights of 
persons -  the right to bodily autonomy. In fact, Warren claims that having 
an abortion is morally equivalent to cutting one's hair.
The second line of argument is best represented by Judith Jarvis Thomson 
and, following her, Christine Overall.3 Their claim involves a sophisticated 
reinterpretation in terms of an absence of rights, of the cruder claim that 
even if a foetus does have a right to life, the woman's right to bodily 
autonomy overrides that right. By trying to show that even if the foetus is a 
being with moral standing it has no automatic right to occupancy of a 
woman's womb, their argument seeks to undermine the basic premise of
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2. My argument in this part of the chapter refers to Mary Anne Warren's paper 'On the Moral 
and Legal Status of Abortion' in R. Wasserstrom (ed.) Today's Moral Problems (Macmillan, 
1975). In a very recent paper, which I refer to in more detail later in this chapter, Warren's 
characterisation of the foetus is markedly different although her basic position on the 
woman's right to bodily autonomy remains unaltered. See 'The Moral Significance of Birth', 
Hypatia, Special Issue: 'Ethics and Reproduction', ed. by Laura Purdy, vol. 4, no.3, Fall 1989. 
This paper is a modified version of an earlier paper with the same title which appeared in 
Bioethics News, Publication of the Centre for Human Bioethics, Monash University, vol.7, 
no. 2, January 1988.
3. Judith Jarvis Thomson 'A Defense of Abortion' Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1 
(1971); Christine Overall, Ethics and Human Reproduction, Chs. 3&4 (Boston: Allen & 
Unwin, 1987).
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the conservative position on abortion -  namely the premise that if 
foetuses are persons, that is, beings with full moral rights, then abortion is 
necessarily wrong.
My aim in this chapter is to defend a feminist perspective on abortion by 
showing that questions of women's autonomy lie at the heart of the 
abortion issue. I want to argue however that the conflict-of-rights 
framework and rights-based models of bodily autonomy are liable seriously 
to misrepresent both the nature of abortion decisions and the reasons why 
the availability of abortion is essential to women's autonomy. My 
dissatisfaction with this kind of approach centres on four related concerns. 
Firstly, a conflict-of-rights approach fails adequately to address the issue of 
responsibility in pregnancy and abortion. Hence it mischaracterises both the 
nature of the moral relationship between woman and foetus and the kind 
of autonomy that is exercised in pregnancy and abortion. Secondly, it tends 
to oversimplify our conception of the status of the foetus. Thirdly, it leads 
to a misconstrual of the notion of bodily autonomy because it is inattentive 
to the kind of reflective bodily perspective that arises from a 
phenomenological account of pregnant embodiment. Finally, defending 
abortion solely on the grounds of women's right to bodily autonomy 
logically requires that the right to abortion cannot entail a right to secure the 
death of the foetus but only a right to foetal evacuation.
What I want to argue is that a strong feminist case for abortion needs to 
construe a woman's right to obtain an abortion as the right of an 
autonomous moral agent to be able to make a decision about whether she 
wishes to take responsibility for the future well-being of a being dependent 
upon her. In choosing an abortion in other words, a woman is not merely 
choosing not to allow the foetus occupancy of her uterus. Nor is she merely 
choosing not to undertake responsibility for a particular future child.
Rather, as Steven Ross has pointed out, she is choosing that there be no
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being at all in relation to whom she is in a situation of such responsibility.4 
To require that a woman has no right to secure the death of the foetus, at 
least in the early stages of pregnancy, thus violates her autonomy.
Now against this claim it could be argued that here the woman is not only 
making decisions about her own life but about that of another. What 
entitles her to make such a decision? The next three sections of the chapter 
attempt to answer this question. In the second section I make some 
suggestions as to how we should understand the notions of responsibility 
and autonomy in pregnancy, while the third section assesses the moral 
status of the foetus both from the point of view of its intrinsic moral 
properties and from the point of view of its relationship with the woman in 
whose body it develops. Building on the previous two sections, the final 
section draws on a phenomenological account of pregnancy in order to 
explain the connection between autonomy, bodily autonomy and pregnant 
embodiment. My criticisms of the rights-based accounts of bodily autonomy 
emerge from this discussion.
II. Responsibility and Autonomy
Appeals to responsibility in the context of the abortion debate usually trade 
on the asymmetry between the situation of men and women with regard to 
pregnancy. The asymmetry is that while it is always possible for men to 
evade or even remain blissfully unaware of the consequences of their 
actions where those actions result in pregnancy, the same is not true for 
women. Further it is women alone who are physically able to sustain the 
foetus. Thus women come to be held "responsible" for what was after all a 
joint action. Given this context it is hardly surprising that feminist defences
4. Steven Ross, 'Abortion and the Death of the Foetus', Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 
11, no. 3, (Summer 1982).
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of abortion often attempt to shift discussions of the abortion issue away 
from the question of responsibility. Thorny, as it may be however, one of 
my central claims in this chapter is that the issue of responsibility is crucial 
for an understanding of women's moral autonomy with respect to 
pregnancy and abortion. In this section of the chapter I attempt to outline 
an adequate feminist approach to the question of responsibility in 
pregnancy and abortion.
A number of different aspects of responsibility are often conflated in the 
abortion debate. To disentangle these I want firstly to distinguish what I call 
causal responsibility from moral responsibility. By causal responsibility I 
mean simply responsibility for the direct causal consequences of one's 
actions in cases where those consequences can be said to be reasonably 
foreseeable and where a person's actions were freely chosen. In this sense a 
woman can be said to be responsible for the existence of the foetus in much 
the same way as she can be said to be responsible for getting drunk, in that it 
is her actions, in this case along with those of another, which have brought 
about this outcome.5 Although conservatives do not usually make an 
explicit distinction between causal and moral responsibility, the 
conservative claim seems to be that in the case of pregnancy, because the 
outcome here is to have brought into existence a being with full moral 
standing, then a woman's causal responsibility necessarily entails a moral 
responsibility towards maintaining the existence of the foetus.6
5. I discuss the question of men's responsibility below. Given this account of causal 
responsibility, a woman is of course not causally responsible in the case of rape. But neither 
can she be considered causally responsible if she cannot and cannot reasonably be expected to 
foresee the consequences of her actions (eg if she is a minor or mentally handicapped) or if her 
actions were performed under duress (the distinction between rape and consent is not as hard 
and fast as many would think), or if she cannot be said to be acting autonomously (eg. in a case 
of drug addiction or alcoholism or some other dependency).
6. Somewhat surprisingly, some feminists have argued for a similar view. See Hilde and 
James Lindemann Nelson, 'Cutting Motherhood in Two: Some Suspicions Concerning 
Surrogacy', Hypatia, op. cit.
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Feminists and liberals have responded to this claim in a number of ways. 
The approach of Warren and Tooley is to attempt to shift the focus of the 
abortion debate away from questions of moral responsibility and towards a 
consideration of the actual present status of the foetus with respect to 
personhood. Their argument is that because foetuses are not persons and 
therefore do not have rights, abortion is morally permissible.7 The second 
approach is to show that one does not necessarily have automatic moral 
responsibility to maintain the existence of a being dependent upon oneself -  
even if that being does have full moral standing and hence a right to life. 
This is Thomson's approach in the examples of the violinist and Henry 
Fonda.8 As Warren and Feinberg have shown however this strategy fails 
because the examples chosen are disanalogous to the case of the foetus in 
one relevant respect, namely with respect to causal responsibility.9 The 
strategy thus begs the question. Yet another tactic is to show that the 
attribution of causal responsibility is a lot less straightforward than it might 
appear and thus to argue that causal responsibility for the existence of a 
being does not necessarily mean that one is required to assume moral 
responsibility for maintaining its existence. For to what extent is a person 
still morally responsible for the consequences of an action if they have 
taken reasonable precautions against those consequences occurring? 
Thomson's example of the house-owner covering her windows in wire
7. Warren, 'On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion', op. cit.; Michael Tooley, 'Abortion 
and Infanticide', Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol 2, No. 1 (1972).
8. The violinist example seeks to show that a person has no moral obligation to sustain the 
life of a famous violinist who has been attached to her without her consent, and whose 
survival is dependent on being connected to her circulatory system for nine months. The Henry 
Fonda example involves the case of a person who is dying but would be revived by the touch of 
Henry Fonda's hand on her brow. The example seeks to show that a person does not 
necessarily have a right to whatever is required to ensure her survival. See Thomson, 'A 
Defence of Abortion', op.cit. I discuss the problem with such examples in the final section of 
this chapter.
9. Warren, 'On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion', op.cit.; Joel Feinberg, 'Abortion', Ch. 
6 in Tom Regan (ed.) Matters of Life and Death. (Random House, 1980).
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mesh to prevent the entry of 'people-seeds' seeks to undermine in this way 
any necessary connection between causal and moral responsibility.10
While these responses have been partially successful in exposing some of 
the assumptions at work behind the seeming self-evidence of the 
conservative argument, they nevertheless fail adequately to come to terms 
with the question of moral responsibility in pregnancy because they concede 
too much at the outset to the conservative notion of moral responsibility. 
This is particularly true of the last approach which forces Thomson, after a 
series of increasingly bizarre examples, to attempt to dissolve the question 
of responsibility by an appeal to decency.* 11 What needs to be pointed out is 
that the conservative account of moral responsibility is premised on a set of 
assumptions which are fundamentally oppressive to women. For it is 
significant that in this whole debate about responsibility there seem to be 
only two possible ways for women to get pregnant. Either they are raped, in 
which case they have no causal responsibility for the existence of the foetus 
-  although according to some conservatives they nevertheless have a moral 
responsibility towards it. Or else they are not raped, in which case they are 
held to be fully responsible, in both a causal and moral sense. In neither 
case however is men's moral responsibility ever seriously discussed, despite 
their obvious causal involvement in the pregnancy. The consequence of 
this blindness is that moral responsibility in pregnancy gets construed
10. In this example 'people-seeds' are seeds which blow in through house windows like dust, 
take root in carpets, and then grow into people who demand food and shelter!
11. I have in mind here Thomson's discussion of the woman who at 7-months requests an 
abortion in order to avoid having to postpone an overseas trip. Thomson realises that her 
argument does not allow her to claim that such a request would be immoral, so she resorts to 
the claim that it would be indecent. This issue aside Thomson's example is somewhat 
offensive in its presentation of women's moral attitude towards abortion. Those women 
usually seeking abortions at this stage of pregnancy are those whose health is in some way 
gravely threatened by continuation of the pregnancy, or those who, due to drug addiction, 
mental handicap or some other such reason, cannot be said ever to have made a moral decision 
with regard to their pregnancies.
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extremely narrowly, as just responsibility towards the foetus, and in a way 
that seems to commit women to maternity.
The challenge then seems to be to envision a notion of moral responsibility 
in pregnancy that acknowledges the moral complexities of the situation, 
and of the decision facing a woman who is weighing up the choices of 
abortion or maternity, but that does not imply that the only possible 
morally responsible course of action is to choose maternity. My starting 
point here is to accept, without argument at this stage, both that the foetus 
does have some moral significance and that this is in part why causal 
responsibility does entail some kind of moral responsibility. Having 
conceded that much to the conservatives I want to disentangle two aspects 
of moral responsibility which are confused in conservative arguments.
The first aspect, which I call decision responsibility, emerges as a strong 
theme in Carol Gilligan's interviews with women making the abortion 
decision.12 Gilligan's women reveal that in their thinking about abortion, 
acceptance of causal responsibility means assuming a moral responsibility to 
make a decision or a series of decisions about your future relationship with 
the being whose existence you have directly brought about. The decision 
process is focused on questions such as whether you are in a position 
adequately to care for it, both now when it is in the foetal stage and, more 
importantly, when it is an independent being; how and whether it can be 
integrated into your life and the lives of others, for example other children, 
whose lives will also be significantly affected by your decision; whether you 
feel yourself able, or prepared to, provide the physical and emotional care 
and nurturance needed in order for both foetus and child to flourish. What
12. Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P., 1982). It should 
be noted here that the kinds of moral reflection in which these women engage is in part made 
possible by the fact that these women do have reproductive choice.
237
emerges from these discussions of responsibility is that the assumption of 
moral responsibility in pregnancy cannot be construed just in terms of 
responsibility towards the foetus but has a wider focus -  on the self, on 
relations with significant others, on a person's other commitments and 
projects. When responsibility is construed in such a way it is clear that 
exercising moral responsibility in no way entails a commitment to 
maternity and that the choice of abortion is in many cases the morally 
responsible decision. It should also be noted that the exercise of decision 
responsibility involves the same processes of critical self-constitution in the 
context of our relations with others which, as we have already seen, 
characterises autonomous agency.
The second aspect of moral responsibility in pregnancy, which I call parental 
responsibility, is the one which a person assumes when a commitment has 
been made to maternity.13 What this kind of assumption of responsibility 
involves is a responsibility not just to maintaining the existence of the 
foetus, nor even just a commitment to providing the care and nurturance 
needed for it to flourish, but a commitment to bringing into existence a 
future child. Often, though not necessarily, it also involves a commitment 
to long-term care and nurturance of that future child. My claim is that the 
decision to abort is a decision, for whatever reason, that one is not prepared 
to bring such a child into existence.
13. As I have indicated decision responsibility is a process, not a single decision. Thus a 
woman may change her mind a number of times before finally assuming parental 
responsibility. She may also change her mind after having assumed it. For reasons which I 
explain below I think there is a significant moral difference between such a change of mind in 
the first trimester or early in the second trimester and a change of mind during the latter half 
of pregnancy -  except of course where such a change is made for medical reasons or because of 
foetal deformity discoverable only by amniocentesis during the second trimester. It does not 
follow from this however that women should be legally prevented from obtaining abortions 
for other reasons later in pregnancy. I discuss the distinction between moral and legal 
responsibility below.
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It should be pointed out here that with respect to all aspects of responsibility 
the situation of men and women -  in pregnancy at least -  is asymmetrical. 
The asymmetry is that while men and women are equally responsible for 
pregnancy in the causal sense, causal responsibility and decision 
responsibility are in effect completely separable for men, but inseparable for 
women. This is because a woman's bodily connection with the foetus 
makes causal responsibility and hence decision responsibility inescapable 
for her.14 On the other hand men's bodily alienation from the 
consequences of their actions and from the physical, psychic and emotional 
experience of pregnancy means that they may be in a position where they 
are either unaware of their causal responsibility for the existence of the 
foetus or choose not to acknowledge their causal responsibility or assume 
decision responsibility.
A sensitivity to this difference illuminates two important points. Firstly, if 
causal and decision responsibility are inseparable for women, then 
pregnancy cannot be thought of simply as a merely 'natural' event which 
just happens to women and in relation to which they are passive.
Although pregnancy certainly involves biological processes which are 
beyond the woman's control, these processes are always mediated by the 
cultural meanings of pregnancy, by the woman's personal and social 
context, and by the way she constitutes herself in response to these factors 
through the decisions she makes. In other words, pregnancy is never 
simply a biological process, it is always an active process of shaping for 
oneself a bodily and a moral perspective.15 For this reason, the moral issues 
associated with pregnancy and abortion cannot be viewed in abstraction 
from the first-person perspective of the woman concerned.
14. I discuss the nature of this bodily connection in detail in Section IV below.
15. I develop this point in more detail in Section IV below.
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Secondly, because of the particularity of the woman's situation in 
pregnancy, in cases of conflict over abortion ultimately it should be up to 
the woman to decide whether or not she will choose abortion.16 To say this 
however does not imply that, in situations where men are aware of and do 
acknowledge causal responsibility, they have no say in an abortion decision. 
In such circumstances, because the decision made will obviously affect their 
autonomy, they should also be party to, and involved in, both decision 
responsibility and, where appropriate, parental responsibility. Indeed after 
birth they may assume most, or even all, parental responsibility. 
Nevertheless prior to birth the impact upon their autonomy of any decision 
is very different from its impact on the autonomy of the woman. This is 
why in cases of conflict the woman's decision should prevail.
Two objections are likely to be raised at this point. The first is that a woman 
may also choose to relinquish moral responsibility, for example to others 
through adoption. Further it is often argued that abortion is just a 
relinquishing of moral responsibility for the foetus. From the preceding 
discussion it should be clear that this objection conflates the two senses of 
moral responsibility distinguished above. Deciding against assuming 
parental responsibility does not mean that one has relinquished moral 
responsibility, not even for the foetus. For no matter what she decides -  
maternity, abortion, adoption -  a woman is still responsible to herself, to 
others, to the child if there is one, for the decision she has made. In fact, as I 
have just argued, it is through such decisions that a person constitutes
16. I have in mind here recent cases in the UK and Australia where men have attempted to 
obtain court orders, on the grounds of paternal right, to prevent women from obtaining 
abortion. My analysis of the asymmetry in the positions of men and women with respect to 
responsibility in pregnancy should make it clear why feminists have been so outraged by the 
men's presumption in these cases that they should be able to overrule the decisions of the 
women concerned.
herself in relation to others. Further, as I have already pointed out, the 
decision to abort is often the most morally responsible course of action.
The second objection is that I have placed a great deal of moral weight on a 
decision process which in some cases just never occurs. For some women's 
lives are so chaotic and so little under their control that they cannot be said 
to be making any autonomous decisions about their own welfare, let alone 
about the welfare of any foetus that may be developing inside their bodies. 
My response to this objection, as I have already indicated, is to say that in 
such a case I would not even attribute causal responsibility to women in 
this situation. Thus the question of their moral responsibility does not 
arise. However given the difficulty of actually deciding, in any given case, 
whether or not a woman does have any causal responsibility for a 
pregnancy, what the objection forces us to recognise is that a distinction 
needs to be made between our moral assessment of a situation and the 
question of legal sanctions. Although I have argued that the decision to 
continue with a pregnancy entails some kind of parental responsibility, this 
is quite different from claiming that women should be legally liable for the 
foetus' welfare. Arguments to this effect must be vigorously resisted for 
they wrongly presume that foetuses are the moral and legal equivalents of 
women. In fact, as Mary Anne Warren has argued, 'There is room for only 
one person with full and equal [legal] rights inside a single human skin'.17
While this analysis of responsibility still leaves unanswered questions 
about the intrinsic moral status of the foetus it does tend to suggest that, at 
least in part, its moral status is dependent on the relational properties it has 
with others and that the abortion issue cannot adequately be broached if we
240
17. My insert. Warren, The Moral Significance of Birth', op. cit., p. 63.
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focus on intrinsic properties alone.18 This relational aspect of the foetus' 
moral standing is best captured through the notion of moral guardianship.
I want to suggest that although a foetus cannot be a bearer of full moral 
rights because, as I shall argue in the next section, it lacks the requisite 
intrinsic properties (namely personhood), nevertheless in a context in 
which some one or more members of the moral community have decided 
to take parental responsibility for its future well-being, it has moral 
significance by virtue of its relations with her or them. We might say that 
in such a case it has de facto significance through her or them, until such a 
point when it can be considered a full moral being in its own right. This 
significance does not guarantee the foetus a 'right to life' which overrides 
all other possible competing claims, but rather provides some grounds for 
the foetus’ claims to nurturance and care that is, guardianship, from the 
woman who bears it and protection from harm from others.
In this context it should be noted that once again the situation of men and 
women with regard to moral guardianship is inescapably asymmetrical in 
pregnancy. A man, no matter how well-intentioned, cannot act as the 
primary guardian of an in utero foetus. The reason for this asymmetry is 
not hard to discern, namely the physical inseparability of the foetus from 
the woman, but its moral implications are often overlooked. The main 
implications are firstly that, as I argued earlier, in cases of conflict it should 
be the woman who has the right to decide the fate of the foetus. Secondly, 
this asymmetry makes it clear that, as Warren has argued, the event of birth 
is morally significant.19 Its significance lies in the fact that at birth the 
infant becomes a member of the human moral community in its own right 
because its relationship with its mother and other human beings changes
18. Warren makes a similar claim in 'The Moral Significance of Birth', op. cit.
19. Warren, ’The Moral Significance of Birth’, op. cit.
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significantly. Not only is its body now separate from that of its mother, but 
it no longer needs to stand in a relation of moral and physical dependence 
on her in particular. Any responsible human adult will now be able to 
provide it with the care, nurturance and moral protection required for it to 
flourish.
Having assessed the relational moral status of the foetus I want now to 
justify my earlier claim that causal responsibility for the existence of the 
foetus entails decision responsibility because the foetus is a morally 
significant being. A useful starting point for this discussion is Warren's 
account of foetal status.
III. Foetal Status and Potentiality
If, following Warren, we distinguish between "human beings" and 
"persons" and argue that only persons can be members of the moral 
community, then it seems clear that the foetus is not a bearer of moral 
rights in the same sense that a person is and so does not have the same 
"right to life" as a person.20 Nevertheless, as Warren herself argues with 
respect to infants, it does not follow from the fact that, because anyone who 
is a person is entitled to strong moral protections, that it is wrong to extend
20. Warren, 'On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion', op.cit. Warren supports this 
distinction by outlining five criteria for personhood, specifying that a person need not satisfy 
all these criteria but that a being which satisfied none of them could not be considered a 
person. The five criteria are:
1. Consciousness (of objects and events external and/or internal to the being), and in 
particular the capacity to feel pain;
2. Reasoning (the developed capacity to solve new and relatively complex problems);
3. Self-motivated activity (activity which is relatively independent of either 
genetic or direct external control);
4. The capacity to communicate, by whatever means, messages of an indefinite 
variety of types, that is, not just with an indefinite number of possible contents, but on 
indefinitely many possible topics;
5. The presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness, either individual or racial, or 
both.
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moral protections to beings that are not persons.21 The more personlike the 
being, the more it should be treated as a person. The question arises 
therefore of how far advanced since conception a human being needs to be 
before it begins to have a right to life by virtue of being like a person, that is, 
at what stage should we start treating a foetus as if it were a person? On this 
point Warren in her earlier paper claims that the foetus of 7 or 8 months is 
no more personlike, or even less personlike, than the average fish and thus 
should not be treated as a person. For although, like the fish, the late term 
foetus is sentient, sentience is not sufficient for personhood. Contra 
Thomson, she thus concludes that "whether or not it would be indecent 
(whatever that means) for a woman in her seventh month to obtain an 
abortion just to avoid having to postpone a trip to Europe, it would not, in 
itself, be immoral, and therefore it ought to be permitted".22
Warren's comparison between foetuses and fish occurs in the context of a 
discussion of the nature of personhood. The intention of the comparison is 
to show that, while the foetus is indeed a member of the human species, as 
far as personhood and hence claims to rights are concerned the foetus is 
morally on a par with a fish. With respect to driving home the distinction 
between human beings and persons I do not dispute the effectiveness of 
Warren's comparison. However I want to suggest that the metaphor is 
problematic for two reasons. Firstly it invites us to ignore the fact that, 
contingent though it may be, personhood is constituted by a complex of
21. Warren, ' The Moral Significance of Birth', op.cit. I follow Warren here in using the term 
'person' because I think that in the context of abortion the distinction between 'human beings' 
and 'persons' is an important distinction to maintain. However I am not happy with the 
legalistic and individualist connotations of the term which tend to downplay the 
intersubjective processes of development by means of which infants become self-conscious 
subjects.
22. Warren, 'On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion, op. cit. p. 133
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properties which supervene on a specific physical constitution.23 Yet 
despite its contingency, or perhaps because of it, I want to argue that this fact 
is morally significant. Secondly, although the foetus/fish metaphor should 
not be read as providing a model of the relationship between a woman and 
a foetus, it has the serious, if unintended, effect of downplaying the moral 
significance and particularity of this relationship. In particular it has the 
effect of de-emphasising both the woman's role as moral guardian and her 
parental responsibility for the present and future well-being of the foetus. 
My claim is that the force of the feminist defence of abortion must lie in its 
highlighting of the moral particularity of the relationship between a 
woman and a foetus.
On the question of foetal status and potentiality my claim is that foetuses 
are morally significant beings by virtue of the fact that they are potential 
persons. This makes them morally different in kind from fish. However I 
think it is plausible to suggest that the moral value of the foetus' potential 
personhood is not static, but changes during the course of a normal 
pregnancy. This is because potential for personhood is not the only thing 
that bestows moral status on the being with that potentiality. Rather, the 
moral value of a being's potential personhood is related to the physical or 
biological basis of the potentiality, in particular it is grounded in the degree 
of complexity and development of this physical basis. Thus the more 
physically complex and developed the being is, the more value we attribute 
to its potential for personhood. There are two ways in which this claim 
could be developed. One way would accept an on/off view of potentiality
23. I see this point as connected with my claim, in the Introduction to this part of the thesis, 
that our selfhood emerges through our increasing bodily capacities and through the processes 
by means of which we learn bodily self-direction. In stressing the connection between the 
development of subjectivity and physical development however I am not denying the 
significance of the social relationships in the context of which these developments must 
occur.
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and argue that potential for personhood remains constant although its 
moral significance changes. On this view conceptus and late term foetus 
both have the same potentiality but the moral value of those beings is 
different because the physical basis of the potentiality is different. In the one 
case we have a clump of undifferentiated cells, in the other a highly 
complex organism. Thus in the one case we have a being very far from 
being able to actualise its potentialities because it lacks the very physical 
basis to do so, in the other we have a being fairly close to being able to 
actualise its potentialities to the extent that the physical basis of those 
potentialities is highly developed.24 Another way would be to question the 
on/off view of potentiality and to argue that potential for personhood itself 
changes as the foetus develops physically.25
For my purposes in this chapter nothing hinges on the differences between 
these positions. But what is appealing about the general suggestion is that it 
enables us to agree with Warren's criteria of personhood while 
nevertheless resisting the counter intuitive implications of these criteria, 
viz that a being has no intrinsic moral significance unless it is a person and 
that there is no important moral difference between a conceptus and a late 
term foetus. For now it can be argued that the intrinsic moral status of the 
foetus changes in direct relation to its changing physical basis. Thus, at least 
in terms of its intrinsic properties, an early stage foetus does not have great 
value. With respect to a highly developed foetus, although it is not a being
24. This argument is a simplified version of an argument of John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter. 
See 'Morality, Potential Persons and Abortion', American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 25, 
no. 2, April 1988
25. An argument for this view is presented by Michaelis Michael in 'The Moral Significance 
of Potential for Personhood' (unpublished paper, Monash University, 1986). His view there is 
that the potential a being has to give to a rise to a person is the function from situations the 
being is (normally) in to the probabilities of its giving rise to a person from those situations. 
We have greater potential when we have one function dominating another.
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with full moral rights, its gradually increasing moral significance warrants 
our treating it, in most circumstances at least, as if it were such a being.
Combining this view with the guardianship view outlined earlier we get 
the idea that the moral position of the foetus changes over the course of 
pregnancy. At the early stages its moral standing is defined in relational 
terms, that is by virtue of the fact that it is a being with moral significance 
for the woman in whose body it develops and who acts as its moral 
guardian. As the foetus develops physically however its intrinsic moral 
significance increases. Its moral standing is less and less dependent on its 
relational properties with the woman in whose body it develops and more 
and more tied to its own intrinsic value. This does not mean, however, 
that the foetus is ever the moral equivalent of the woman. Hence in cases 
where the foetus' continued existence severely threatens the woman's 
physical or mental survival, her interests should always prevail up until 
the moment of birth. It does however suggest that late term abortion is 
morally different from early abortion and that they cannot be justified on 
the same grounds.
On the question of guardianship, I suggested above that the rationale 
behind Warren's defence of abortion (namely that the foetus is not a 
person), particularly in the context of the foetus /fish comparison, has the 
effect of downplaying the moral significance of the woman's parental 
responsibility for the present and future well-being of the foetus. This effect 
is reinforced by Warren's claim, which she justifies on the grounds of a 
woman's right to bodily autonomy, that a decision to abort is morally 
permissible up until the moment of birth. For now it looks as though the 
foetus is a potential threat to the woman's bodily autonomy up until the 
moment of birth, rather than a being in relation to whom the woman has a 
unique bodily and moral connection. In the next section I want to argue 
that this view is based on a flawed conception of bodily autonomy. Here I
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simply want to point out that in pregnancy the assumption of parental 
responsibility necessarily involves a certain commitment of one's body. In 
other words, the decision to continue a pregnancy (and presumably by 7 
months some prior decision has been made) is a decision to assume 
responsibility (even if only for 9 months) for the well-being of the foetus 
and this entails providing bodily nurturance for it, perhaps even at some 
bodily risk to yourself. Now obviously there are limits to this risk. I am not 
suggesting that women have responsibility to the foetus whatever the risk. 
As I have already indicated, I am also not suggesting that parties other than 
the woman, for example the medical establishment, or the state-legal 
apparatus, have a right to determine the limits of that risk. Like many 
other feminists, including Warren, I am alarmed by the recent movements 
advocating both so-called 'foetal rights' and the introduction of charges of 
'foetal abuse' against women who do not do what is required to nurture the 
foetus in the uterus. Further the whole question of what is 'required' for 
adequate nurturance is open to much interpretation against women's 
autonomy as persons. Nevertheless, I think that my accounts of 
potentiality, guardianship and responsibility explain why there is a genuine 
moral requirement upon a woman to protect and nurture a foetus once she 
has assumed parental responsibility for its future well-being, without that 
requirement involving any infringement of her autonomy. In this context 
it should be noted that Warren's downplaying of the question of 
responsibility also fails to stress men's obligations with respect to a 
pregnancy.
IV. Pregnant Embodiment and Bodily Autonomy
I have argued so far that, at least in the early stages of its development, the 
moral standing of a foetus is dependent upon its relationship with the 
woman who bears it and who acts as its moral guardian. In terms of its own 
intrinsic properties its moral standing is not particularly significant. This is
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a necessary condition for the permissibility of abortion, but it is not 
sufficient. For it fails to explain why the availability of abortion is necessary 
for the moral autonomy of women and hence why a restriction on its 
accessibility violates their autonomy. In this section I attempt to explain 
and justify this claim. From my discussion it will also become clear why, in 
order to secure women's autonomy, abortion must be understood as foetal 
death rather than foetal evacuation.
What has emerged so far is that in order to understand the kind of 
autonomy that is exercised by women in pregnancy and abortion we must 
be attentive to the moral particularity of pregnancy. As we have seen there 
are a number of different factors which make pregnancy morally unique.
To begin with, pregnancy is not simply a biological event with respect to 
which women are passive. Rather it is an active process and a social process 
which places women in a situation of moral responsibility -  which I earlier 
called decision responsibility. This responsibility is due in part to the 
foetus’ potential moral significance, but it is also due to the fact that the 
decision to commit or not to commit oneself to the existence of such a 
future person has far-reaching implications for the woman's own life as 
well as, possibly, for the lives of others -  for example, the "father" of the 
possible future child, other children, relatives, friends and so on. But 
pregnancy is also morally unique because the physical connection between 
the woman and the foetus, and the physical processes which occur during 
pregnancy, give rise to a unique bodily perspective.
In what follows I want to draw on a phenomenological account of pregnant 
embodiment in order to give an account of the kind of reflective bodily 
perspective that emerges out of the experience of pregnancy. I also want to 
suggest that the experience of moral responsibility in pregnancy which I 
have detailed above is mediated by this reflective bodily perspective, which 
both structures and points to the moral particularity of the relationship
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between woman and foetus -  especially to the fact that this relationship and 
the responsibilities it entails cannot be conceived of as extrinsic to the 
woman's subjectivity. It should be clear from my discussion of the notion 
of a bodily perspective in the Introduction to Part IV that this 
phenomenological description is not a description of the subjective feelings 
of individual women, but is rather a normative and reflective 
apprehension of the way in which conscious experience is structured by our 
(bodily) situations, perspectives and modes of perception. The 
phenomenological experience I describe is therefore not meant to be an 
empirical description of the way in which all women experience or feel 
about their pregnancies, since, as I argued earlier, women's individual 
bodily perspectives, feelings and experiences depend upon a wide range of 
factors, including the cultural, social and historical context in which they 
live their lives.26
My suggestion is that although in some senses (for example, biologically) it 
makes sense to speak of the foetus as a separate being from the woman, in 
other ways (for example in terms of talking of a conflict of rights), it makes 
no sense at all -  especially in the early stages of pregnancy.27 
Phenomenologically, the experience of pregnancy, particularly in the early 
stages, is unique in the sense that it defies a sharp opposition between self 
and other, between the inside and the outside of the body. From the 
perspective of the woman, there is no clear-cut boundary between herself
26. My account here builds on psychoanalytic insights into the mother-child relation; on some 
of the descriptions of pregnancy and maternity in the work of Julia Kristeva; on Iris Young's 
phenomenology of pregnant embodiment; and on my own a posteriori reconstructions. See Julia 
Kristeva, 'Motherhood According to Giovanni Bellini' in Desire in Language (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1980) and 'Stabat Mater' in Moi (ed.) The Kristeva Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1986); Iris Marion Young, 'Pregnant Embodiment: Subjectivity and Alienation', The Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy, 9 (1984).
27. The rights-based model has also been criticised on different but related grounds by other 
feminists. See Janet Farrell Smith, 'Rights-conflict, Pregnancy and Abortion' in Carol Gould 
(ed.) Beyond Domination (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984).
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and the foetus, between her body boundaries and the body boundaries of the 
foetus. The foetus, to the extent that it is experienced as part of the 
woman's body, is also experienced as part of her self, but as a part that is also 
other than herself. On the one hand it is another being, but it is another 
being growing inside her body, a being whose separateness is not fully 
realised as such by her. This is the case even with an unwanted pregnancy. 
The uniqueness and intimacy of this kind of relationship, one where the 
distinction between self and other is blurred, suggests that the welfare of the 
foetus, at least early on, is not easily separable from that of the woman. The 
foetus is not simply an entity extrinsic to her which happens to be 
developing inside her body and which she desires either to remove or to 
allow to develop. It is a being, both inseparable from and yet separate to her, 
both part of and yet soon to be independent from her, whose existence calls 
into question her own present and future identity.
The changing phenomenology of pregnancy also concurs with the account I 
have given of foetal status. For it seems to me that one of the main reasons 
for the experience I have described is that in early pregnancy, although the 
woman's body is undergoing massive changes, the foetus itself is not 
physically developed very much at all. The foetus' separateness is thus 
neither physically well established nor is it felt as such by the woman.
What happens as pregnancy continues is that, as the foetus develops 
physically, a triple process occurs. Firstly, from the perspective of the 
woman, the foetus becomes more and more physically differentiated from 
her as her own body boundaries alter. Secondly this gradual physical 
differentiation (which becomes very pronounced as soon as the foetus starts 
moving around -  perhaps explaining why 'quickening' used to be 
considered morally significant) is paralleled by and gives rise to a gradual 
psychic differentiation, in the experience of the woman, between herself 
and the foetus. In other words, as the foetus' body develops so it seems to
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become less and less a part of the woman's body and less and less a part of 
herself although, as psychoanalysis reminds us, the psychic experiences of 
unity and differentiation continue to resonate for both mother and child 
right through infancy and early childhood. Thirdly, physical and psychic 
differentiation are usually accompanied by an increasing emotional 
attachment of the woman to the foetus, an attachment which is based both 
in her physical connection with the foetus and in an anticipation of her 
future relationship with a separate being who is also intimately related to 
her.
From the reflective perspective of the woman the foetus thus has a double 
and ambivalent status. On the one hand, it is experienced as interior to her 
own subjectivity, and this sense of interiority is grounded in the bodily 
connection between the woman and the foetus. On the other hand, this 
experience of interiority and connection is interrupted by an awareness that, 
if the pregnancy continues, this being which is now a part of her will 
become a separate being for whose welfare she is morally responsible. But 
this awareness itself arises in part from the woman's bodily experiences -  for 
example from the changes to her body shape and from feelings of the 
strangeness of her body to her -  which remind her of the other being which 
is growing within her. I think it is this double character of the foetus' bodily 
and moral relationship to the woman that explains both why questions of 
responsibility are central to the experience of pregnancy and why the right of 
determination of the fate of the foetus is essential for a woman's 
autonomy.28
28 At this point I would like to respond to an objection which is often made against the view I 
have proposed here. It could be argued that the woman's experience of the foetus as part of 
herself and as interior to her subjectivity is simply mistaken. So why should any moral 
weight be given to this experience? How is it different for example, from the experience of a 
slave-owner who regards his slaves as a part of himself and thinks that because of this he 
has a right to determine their fate? My response to this suggestion is that these cases are 
completely disanalogous, and for two reasons. Firstly, I have argued that a necessary 
condition for the permissibility of abortion is that the foetus, especially in the early stages of
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I think this reflective perspective also explains why it is a mistake to 
construe bodily autonomy in pregnancy and abortion simply as a matter of 
preserving the integrity of one's body boundaries. It is this kind of 
understanding of bodily autonomy which seems to inform the views of 
Thomson and Warren, at least in her early paper, who construe the right to 
bodily integrity along the lines of a property-right. The idea seems to be that 
a woman has a right to preserve the integrity of her body boundaries, and to 
control what happens in and to her body, in the same way as she has a right 
to dispose of her property as she sees fit, and that the denial to women of 
access to abortion might be said to be akin to a system of coverture. I think 
this idea is quite explicit in such feminist slogans as "Keep your filthy laws 
off my body" and in some of Thomson's metaphors -  for example, the 
metaphor of the body as a house. Now it seems to me that underlying this 
view of the body is the mistaken idea that I am the owner of my body and 
my body parts and that, as their owner, I can dispose of them, use them, or 
contract them out for use as I see fit. This view of the body often underlies
pregnancy, has little moral value in and of itself, although it may have a great deal of value 
for the woman in whose body it develops. This is not a merely arbitrary claim, like the claim 
of the slave-owner who may think that his slaves have little moral value in and of 
themselves. Rather it is justified by the fact that the foetus simply does not yet have the 
capacities which ground the moral worth of persons, and by the fact that the foetus' possible 
potential for personhood has little significance until those capacities are close to being 
actualised.
But secondly, this objection ignores what I have been insisting on throughout this 
chapter, namely that the relationship of the woman to the foetus is morally unique. It is not 
a relationship of domination and subordination and inhuman ownership, as in the case of the 
slave-owner. Rather it is a relationship in which one human being grows and develops inside 
the body of another, and in which the moral significance of the foetus is in part bound up with 
its significance for the woman. The moral particularity of this situation, in other words, is 
grounded in the nature of the bodily connection between woman and foetus. The woman's sense 
of the foetus as in some senses a part of herself is thus not arbitrary. It arises, as I have tried 
to show, from her own reflective bodily perspective and from the kind of moral reflection to 
which pregnancy gives rise.
Certainly it is possible to think up all kinds of examples in which the relationship 
between the woman and the foetus might have been different -  as in Thomson's examples. But 
my point is that these examples cannot give us an adequate understanding of the moral 
complexities of the issues raised by pregnancy and abortion precisely because they overlook 
the context out of which these complexities arise, namely the bodily and moral connection 
between the woman and the foetus.
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defences of surrogacy but I think it is also evident in Thomson's 
assumptions about pregnancy. In her argument pregnancy emerges as a 
kind of contract between the woman and the foetus such that she contracts 
with it for it to use her body for the required period until it will be able to 
survive without her. Thus in Thomson's violinist example the idea seems 
to be that the unwanted foetus is attempting to use a woman's body without 
her having contracted with it to do so and it is this which makes abortion 
permissible. A similar kind of presumption seems to be operating in 
Warren's view that the foetus represents a potential threat to the woman's 
bodily autonomy up to the moment of birth.
For the remainder of the chapter I want to argue that this conception of 
bodily autonomy as well as the rights-based model which provides the 
framework for it, are seriously flawed. My first set of objections to this way 
of defending abortion is that it misrepresents both the nature of pregnancy 
and the woman-foetus relationship. As a result it is unable to come to 
terms with the question of moral responsibility in pregnancy. The second 
and connected objection is that it justifies the demand for abortion in terms 
of a right to an evacuated uterus, rather than in terms of a right to 
autonomy with respect to one’s own life. This misrepresents the nature of 
the abortion decision. These two objections are explained in the next two 
subsections.
IV.i. Bodily Autonomy, Subjectivity and Responsibility
It seems that underlying the property-contract model of bodily autonomy is 
a very inert view of pregnancy in which pregnancy is represented as a 
purely biological process which in some ways just takes over a woman's 
body and with respect to which women are passive. It is as though, having 
agreed to the terms of the contract, the woman then simply allows her body 
to be used by the foetus. But this view of pregnancy blinds us to the fact that
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the relationship between the woman and the foetus is a special relationship 
of a very particular nature. The foetus is not a stranger contracting with the 
woman for use of her body but another, not yet separate, being growing 
within her body, a being implicated in her own sense of self and whose very 
existence places her in a situation of moral responsibility.
However if we take seriously both the issue of responsibility in pregnancy 
and the kind of reflective bodily perspective that I have argued emerges 
from the process of pregnancy, then pregnancy seems to defy the making of 
a sharp distinction between a passive, unconscious, biological process and 
an active, conscious, rational process. To a large extent the biological 
processes occurring in a woman's body are beyond her control.
Nevertheless, as I have already argued, these processes are always mediated 
by the cultural meanings of pregnancy, by the woman's personal and social 
context, and by the way she constitutes herself in response to these factors 
through the decisions she makes. Thus coming to terms with pregnancy 
and its implications, taking responsibility of whatever kind for the future of 
the foetus, are the activities of an autonomous moral agent. Bodily 
autonomy in pregnancy and abortion thus cannot be construed simply as 
the right to bodily integrity. Rather it is a question of being able to shape for 
oneself an integrated bodily perspective, a perspective by means of which a 
woman can respond to the bodily processes which she experiences in a way 
with which she identifies, and which is consistent with the decision she 
makes concerning her future moral relationship with the foetus.
To think that the question of autonomy in abortion is just a question about 
preserving the integrity of one's body boundaries, and to see the foetus 
merely as an occupant of the woman's uterus, is thus to divorce women's 
bodies from their subjectivities. Ironically it comes close to regarding 
women's bodies simply as foetal containers -  the very charge which many 
feminists have levelled against the 'foetal rights' movement. If however
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we see our subjectivities as constituted through the constitution of our 
bodily perspectives, then my body is no more my property than I myself am 
my own property. Rather my body is my mode of being-in-the-world. 
Consequently changes to my body or to my perceptions of my body-image 
must affect my relation to the world. The experience of pregnant 
embodiment, that is, the gradual differentiation and development from 
within her own body of another being which is now a part of herself, thus 
affects a woman's mode of being-in-the-world both physically and morally 
and as a consequence, in terms of her sense of self. She is now no longer 
just herself but herself and another, but this other is not yet separate from 
herself. It is because of this psychic and bodily connectedness between the 
woman and the foetus that in pregnancy questions about the fate of the 
foetus cannot be separated out from the issue of a woman's right to self- 
determination.
IV.ii. Evacuation and Abortion
If, as I have argued, the early stage foetus is both morally insignificant ( in 
terms of its own intrinsic properties) and its identity and very existence are 
as yet indistinguishable from that of the woman, it becomes nonsensical to 
speak of a conflict of rights between them because we cannot talk about the 
needs and rights of the foetus in abstraction from those of the woman.29 
The idea of such a conflict only makes any sense later in pregnancy where 
the foetus is physically ell developed and differentiated from the woman 
and where this physical basis now grounds a definite and significant moral 
value. Combining my earlier discussion of the moral insignificance of the 
early stage foetus with my claim that the early stage foetus is 
phenomenologically and psychically experienced by the woman as both part
29. This does not of course mean that we cannot talk of what is physically harmful or 
beneficial to the development of the foetus.
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and not part of herself thus grounds the moral permissibility of securing its 
death. At present the foetus is in itself a morally insignificant part of herself 
but it is a part of herself which, if the pregnancy continues, will become a 
separate, independent and significant being for whose future existence she 
will be required to take parental responsibility and to whom she will 
become increasingly emotionally attached. What the abortion decision 
involves is a decision that this part of herself should not become a being in 
relation to whom such questions of parental responsibility and emotional 
attachment arise. In other words abortion is not a matter of wanting to kill 
this particular being, which is, after all, as yet indistinguishable from 
oneself. It is rather a matter of not wanting there to be a future child, so 
intimately related to oneself, for which one either has to take responsibility 
or give up to another.
Because property-contract models of bodily autonomy are inattentive to the 
phenomenological experience of pregnancy and ignore questions of moral 
responsibility they misrepresent the nature of this decision. For if the 
demand for abortion is just the demand to control one’s own body and use 
its parts as one sees fit, then abortion cannot involve the right to choose 
whether or not to bring a child into existence but only the right to evacuate 
a foetus from one's body. While Thomson and Warren explicitly 
acknowledge this as an implication of their account of bodily autonomy, 
they do not defend the position to which they are committed. In her 
discussion of abortion in Ethics and Human Reproduction however, 
Christine Overall does attempt to defend this position even though she is 
explicitly critical of a property-contract view of women's bodies. My 
argument is that such a position is inconsistent with a concern for women's
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autonomy.30 In what follows I want to develop this argument via a critical 
analysis of Overall's discussion.
Overall argues that abortion consists of two conceptually and morally 
distinct events which, though inseparable in current gynaecological practice 
may yet, with the advancing state of technology, become practicably 
separable. These are: (1) the evacuation of the foetus from the uterus, and 
(2) the destruction of the foetus. Overall's argument is that while (1) is 
morally permissible, (2) is not. In other words, if the foetus could be kept 
alive in some kind of incubator or were some form of foetal transplant and 
adoption possible -  that is, the evacuation of the foetus from one's 
woman's uterus and its implantation in the uterus of another -  then such 
procedures, rather than abortion resulting in the death of the foetus, would 
be morally required.
Overall’s argument, which is very similar to a double-effect argument, 
involves a reconstrual of the alleged rights conflict in abortion. Where the 
original formulation is a conflict between (a) the foetuses' right to life, and 
(b) women's right to bodily autonomy, she reconstrues this, in terms of an 
absence of rights, as a conflict between (c) the pregnant woman (or anyone 
else, eg. a physician) has no right to kill the embryo/foetus, and (d) the 
embryo/foetus has no right to occupancy of its mother's (or anyone else's) 
uterus. Overall's claim is that the right to bodily autonomy reconstrued as 
(d) does not entail (2). (d) involves a simple taking-over of Thomson's 
formulation without further argumentation. Overall's main argument in 
defense of (c) is an appeal to the foetus' potential personhood, but "appeal" 
is all it is because Overall does not really discuss the criteria for personhood
30. Anne Donchin has expressed similar worries about the implications of Overall's position. 
See her review essay The Growing Feminist Debate Over the New Reproductive 
Technologies', Hypatia, op. cit.
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nor does she explain how we should understand the claim that foetuses are 
potential persons. What we need to show is why translating (b) into (d) 
misconstrues the feminist defense of abortion. Overall offers three 
supposedly analogous cases which are supposed to back up this appeal and 
to show why the right to bodily autonomy, reconstrued as (d), does not 
entail a woman's right to demand (2), that is, the destruction of the foetus. 
The problem with these cases however is that Overall fails to make any 
moral discriminations between different stages of foetal development. The 
cases are as follows:
(A) If an aborted foetus lives we have no right to kill it, although we are 
not morally obliged to keep it alive. Here Overall seems to be appealing to 
the acts and omissions doctrine which in this context I would reject on 
paternalistic grounds. If the foetus is likely to die and will presumably 
suffer more if simply allowed to die (which is pretty certain if we are talking 
about an abortion prior to 20 weeks), it seems morally preferable that we kill 
it.
(B) We have no right to kill premature babies in a case, for example, 
where the mother might have wanted an abortion but was prevented from 
obtaining one. But if there is no moral difference between a 26 week 
premature baby and a 26 week in utero foetus, it should be just as morally 
wrong to kill the foetus as the baby. Overall's argument here appeals to the 
claim that all foetuses, at whatever stage of development, are morally 
indistinguishable. I have already argued against this claim and have agreed 
that the killing of a late term foetus is morally different from killing an 
early foetus, although I have also indicated that I would not rule it out a 
p rio ri, for example, in cases where it is unlikely it would ever acquire the 
complex physical basis required for personhood. I would agree though with 
Overall that were it possible to abort a late term foetus alive, in most cases 
where the foetus was likely to survive and become a healthy infant the
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mother would not have the right to kill it. Having said that I would 
nevertheless take issue with Overall's claim that there is no moral 
difference between a 26 week premature baby and a 26 week in utero foetus. 
Her claim assumes that birth has no moral significance. This is an 
assumption which I have already contested.
(C) At the other end of the process, Overall claims that neither foetus nor 
embryo are the property of the parents. Thus, she argues, just as parents 
involved in in vitro fertilization programmes should not have the right to 
demand the destruction of embryos, neither do women have the right to 
secure the death of the foetus. While I would agree with Overall that 
neither conceptus nor foetus are the property of its parents, I disagree that it 
is only on such grounds that we might regard it as their right to determine 
its fate. I don't want here to tackle the issue of the 'disposal' of in vitro 
fertilization embryos and/or foetal tissue. Suffice it to say here that 
Overall's argument once again trades on the unargued claim that foetuses 
at all stages of development have intrinsic moral worth as 'potential' 
persons.
Overall is aware that her position gives rise to many difficult questions -  
ought we to save all aborted foetuses? Should we try to adopt them out 
were that possible? What if foetal adoption caused more suffering for 
women or for foetuses? She attempts to avoid some of these and to resolve 
the conflict between conflicting rights (c) and (d) by arguing that they apply 
to different periods of pregnancy, that is, that while right (d) may be 
regarded as overriding in early pregnancy (with the result of abortion then 
being the foreseeable but unintended death of the foetus), right (c) may be 
regarded as overriding in late pregnancy.
While I agree with Overall that, in most cases, it is morally indefensible to 
demand the death of a late term foetus, the problem with her argument is
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that she offers no reasons as to why this should be the case, nor does she 
offer an explanation as to why, if, as she thinks, there is no significant 
difference in moral standing between a conceptus and a late term foetus, the 
foreseeable consequence of the foetus' death should be any more allowable 
early in pregnancy than later on. In fact she assumes a basic similarity to all 
three cases and takes this to show that neither the woman nor anybody else 
has a right to require the death of either conceptus or an embryo/foetus. As 
I have shown however, there are a number of reasons why there is a 
morally significant difference between these cases and it is this difference 
which makes foetal death in early abortions morally permissible. I conclude 
then that Overall's defense of abortion as foetal evacuation fails.
More importantly however, Overall's failure to make any significant moral 
discriminations between these cases renders her "solution" to the conflict 
between (c) and (d) arbitrary and far too contingent upon what is 
technologically feasible. For were it to become possible to evacuate an early 
stage foetus from the uterus of one woman and implant it into the uterus of 
another or to rear it in an incubator, Overall would be committed to the 
moral desirability of this procedure. Not only that, she would be committed 
to arguing that such a procedure, rather than abortion, is morally required. 
For the reasons outlined in this chapter, it seems to me disturbing that this 
outcome should seem to follow from a feminist defense of abortion. Apart 
from oversimplifying the complex issue of foetal status, this position 
ignores the fact that much more is at stake in the demand for abortion than 
the misconceived demand to dispose of or use one's own body parts as one 
sees fit. What is at issue is women's moral autonomy, an autonomy which, 
because of the specificity of women's embodiment, must include autonomy 
with respect to the fate of any foetus developing within her body. Because 
of the connection between the foetus, which is both part and not part of 
herself, and the woman's moral and bodily subjecthood, to allow the fate of
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the foetus to be settled by what is or is not technologically feasible once 
again removes from women what the availability of abortion helps make 
possible -  the right to autonomous moral agency with respect to one's own 
life.
V. Conclusion: Metaphors, Experience and Moral Thinking
I want to conclude this chapter with some brief reflections on the 
methodological implications of the analysis I have given. A survey of the 
philosophical literature on abortion, including some of the feminist 
philosophical literature, shows that philosophical thinking on this topic has 
been dominated by bizarre metaphors and fantastic examples (Warren's 
fish, Tooley's kittens, Thomson's violinists, people-seeds, houses and so on) 
and has given rise to abstruse metaphysical speculations about the nature of 
personal identity (Parfit). These examples and speculations have 
undoubtedly served to question certain common unreflective prejudices 
and to highlight the philosophical ramifications and complexities of some 
of the questions raised by abortion. Unfortunately they have also 
contributed to the representation of pregnancy as a mere event which 
simply takes over women's lives and with respect to which women are 
passive. In addition, they have focused philosophical and moral reflection 
away from the contexts in which deliberations about abortion are usually 
made and away from the concerns and experiences which motivate those 
involved in the processes of deliberation. The result of this is that 
philosophical analyses of abortion often seem beside the point, if not 
completely irrelevant, to the lives of the countless women who daily not 
only have to make moral decisions about abortion but more importantly 
who often face serious risks to their lives in contexts where abortion is not a 
safe and readily accessible procedure. While I do not pretend to have 
addressed the social, religious, political and legal obstacles which give rise to 
this abhorrent situation I do hope to have explained why the morality of
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abortion is not simply or even primarily about questions concerning 
personhood and foetal status but more fundamentally is about women's 
self-determination. I also hope to have shown, though this example, why 
an account of autonomy must incorporate a recognition both of the 
embededness and of the specific bodily perspectives of moral agents.
Conclusion
I have tried to show that, within an important strand of our philosophical 
and cultural heritage, autonomy has come to be defined in opposition to 
femininity and, as a result, has been presented as an achievement which is 
difficult for women to attain. My argument has been that this exclusion has 
been effected both by conceptual structures which locate women's ethical life 
primarily in the realm of affective relations with particular others, and by 
symbolic and cultural representations of women's bodies and bodily 
processes as passive and as resistant to control by the will. I have also tried 
to show that these representations of 'Woman' do not operate at a merely 
discursive or symbolic level. Not only are they incorporated into the 
structures of our social, political and ethical life, but they are also causally 
efficacious in shaping women's bodily perspectives and experiences, as well 
as their relations with others. I am aware that a more detailed account than 
the one I have so far given, of exactly how such symbolic representations 
can be causally efficacious, could be provided. Nevertheless I hope to have 
shown that such representations latch on in part through the self­
constitution of a person's bodily perspective. This is why resistance to 
certain representations of women's bodies is so important in underpinning 
women's claims to the autonomy necessary for them to be regarded as moral 
agents.
I have also tried to show what is involved in an adequate response to the 
tensions between our ideals of femininity and of autonomy. On this issue 
my argument has been that feminists must neither reject the ideal of 
autonomy, nor simply attempt uncritically to appropriate existing ideals for 
women. I have also argued that while a feminist perspective reveals the 
inadequacies with some of our philosophical and cultural ideals of 
autonomy, the aim of a feminist critique should not be to articulate a 
sexually specific ethic for women. Rather what is required is a re-shaping of
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the ideal of autonomy in general, so that autonomy becomes not merely an 
individual but also an intersubjective achievement, and one which also 
affords due weight to the recognition of the ethical significance of a person's 
bodily perspective. For it is only through such a recognition that we can 
understand what it is for women to exercise autonomy in circumstances 
which are specific to women, such as pregnancy and abortion. In my 
discussion of the kind of autonomy that is exercised in abortion decisions I 
hope to have shown what might be the ethical implications of such a 
recognition. Once again I am aware that there is scope for a more detailed 
elaboration of the suggestions I have made, as well as for an investigation of 
what their implications might be for a host of other issues -  ranging from 
surrogate motherhood and in vitro fertilization technology through to 
prostitution and pornography. However what I hope my discussion has 
shown is that in any such investigation we must recognise that moral 
agents are not abstract persons who happen to be embodied in this or that 
kind of body. The complexion of a moral problem depends crucially on the 
context out of which it arises and on the particular bodily perspectives of the 
agents involved.
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